Source Library · SRC-V99-026 · Official operational history
NORAD/CONAD History 1956-1957
NORAD / Continental Air Defense Command · 1957
NORAD/CONAD History 1956-1957 · 154 pages · PDF 12.6 MB
US federal government record (NORAD/CONAD command history). Public domain; hosted here so it can be read and searched. Original source ↗
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/5, 899 CONTINEN HISTORICAL Stn01ARY July 1956 - June 1957 Classified By: Multiple Sources Review On: 15 September 1987
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/V( --I NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 12 Sep 05 MEMORANDUM FOR NORAD-NORTHCOM/HO FROM: HQ NORAD/J3 SUBJECT: Declassification Review of Histories 1. The following historical document has been reviewed per Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, "Classified National Security Information" as amended by E.O. 13292, and NARA Classified National Security Information Directive No.1, and is now declassified. 2. The document reviewed is NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary Jul 56 to Jun 57. Pages reviewed include: 2, 5-7,17-32,41-46,49,50,53,54,57-66,69,70-84,89, 93-100, 105-117. Declassify - systems and procedures no longer valid. 3. Our POC for this review is Contractor, Mr. Jeffrey Clemens, NJ330, 4-1512. ., g~~t.~~ Vice Director of Operations 1 Attachment Reviewed Document THIS MEMORANDUM IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENTS ARE WITHDRAWN FOR THF. COMMON DEFF.!VrF. POUR LA DEFENSE COMMUNE
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NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND MEMORANDUM FOR HQ NORAD/J3V MAR l' 2DD5 FROM: Commander, NORAD and USNORlHCOM SUBJECT: Delegation ofSecret Original Classification Authority 1. In accordance with Executive Order 12958, as amended, "Classified National Security Information,n Section 1.3 (c)(3), you are hereby delegated authority to classify information in your area ofresponsibility up to Secret. 2. Classification may be applied only to information that is owned by, produced by or for, or is under the control ofthe United States Government. Information may not be considered for classification unless it concerns the following: (a) Military plans, weapon systems, or operations (b) Foreign government information (c) Intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology (d) Foreign relations or foreign activities ofthe United States, including confidential sources (e) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism (f) United States Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities (g) Vulnerabilities or capabilities ofsystems, installations, infrastructure, projects, plans, or protection services relating to national security, including defense against transnational terrorism (h) Weapons ofmass destruction 3. Individuals designated as original classification authorities must receive security education and training prior to exercising authority as an original classifier. Directorate security managers are responsible for conducting training and maintaining a copy ofthis letter on file. The NORAD-USNORlHCOM point of contact is CMSgt Cheryl Robinson, 554-6946. I:~. ~ TIMOTIIY J. KEATING Admiral. USN
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ftB-eA~~.Df,, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND AND UNITED STATES NORTHE COMMAND s MEMORANDUM FOR HQ NORAD/B 16 August 2005 FROM: HQ NORAD-USNORTHCOMIHO . SUBJECT: Declassification Review of Histories 1. Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, "Classified National Security Information," as amended by E.O. 13292 requires a review of classified documentation more than 25 years old. This document review must be completed by 31 Dec 06 or the documents will be automatically declassified. 2. The NORAD-USNORTHCOM History Office (HO) maintains NORAD, Continental Air Defense (CONAD), and Air/Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) histories, studies, and other documentation that fall into this category. In order to comply with the Executive Order, HO will forward these documents on a systematic basis to functional experts within the NORAD staff to complete this review. 2. During the review process, if any of the material within the documentation still requires protection, please mark those portions (e.g. words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, pages) with red brackets([ D. Justification must be rendered for any material that is determined to be exempt from the 25 year declassification process. Per E.O. 12958113292 and National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Classified National Security Information Directive No.1, a final determination for exemption from automatic declassification must be forwarded from the NORAD-USNORTHCOM Command Group to the NARA's Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) for processing and forwarding to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel. Bottom line is that NORAD-USNORTHCOM cannot make final determination for exemption from the 25-year automatic declassification limitation. 3. Please have your staff review the following history/study extracted pages: Document: NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary Jul 56 to Jun 57 Pages: 2,5-7, 17-32,41-46,49,50,53,54,57-66,69, 70-84, 89, 93-100, 105-117 4. Once the declassification review has been accomplished, please complete the attached memorandum signed by the directorate's Original Classification Authority (OCA) and return to the NORAD- .. , USNORTHCOM History Office by 16 September 2005. p~ ~ 5. HQ NORAD/HO POC is the undersigned at 4-5999/3385. b~ l\ofU.clj"~ V V!~ ~~ Jk,Jw ~,rts-ptl) JEROME E. SCHROEDER Deputy Command Historian 1 Atch Extract pages from NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary Jul 56 to Jun 57 THIS MEMORANDUM IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATCHS ARE WITHDRAWN ~T
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---------------------------- ~NClASSlflED MEMORANDUM FOR NORAD-USNORTHCOMIHO Date: FROM: _______________ SUBJECT: Declassification Review of Histories/Studies 1. The following historical document(s) haslhave been reviewed per Executive Order (E.O.) 12958, "Classified National Security Infonnation" as amended by E.O. 13292, and NARA Classified National Security Infonnation Directive No.1 , and is/are now declassified. [list document identification here to include title, date, and pages/sections reviewed/declassified] 2. Our POC for this review is GradelN arne/Phone) [Signature/Signature Block of Directorate's Original Classification Authority] 1 Atch Reviewed document SAMPLE REVIEWINDORSEMENT ~~ClASSJffEO
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UCl sstHED .. NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND '- .. .. -.- . UPON REMOV.~.L Or- ATIACHMENT(S) - ... -.--- THIS COHR::r pCm CENCE MAY BE ...- - . j " .a _ ' .' DOWNGR."d)[J TO_ LlNCLit;5;. MEMORANDUM FOR HQ NORAD/HO 126 MAR 1998 FROM:N/J3V SUBJECT: Declassification Review of CONAD/NORAD Historical Summaries 1. The NORAD/J3 staff has reviewed the attached CONAD Historical Summary Jul 56-Jun 57(S) and CONAD/NORAD Historical Summary Jul-Dec 57 (S-REL CAN US) and is pleased to provide a large portion of these documents for release. 2. The CONAD Historical Summary, Jul 56-Jun 57 (S) is now declassified except for the bracketed information on the pages listed below which remain classified SECRET. Classification of these marked portions is retained lAW section 1.5 of E.O. 12958, as they relate to military plans or operations [classification category (a) of EO 12958]. Pages: 7,21-22, and 75-81 3. The CONAD/NORAD Historical Summary, Jul-Dec 57 (S-REL CANUS) is now declassified except for the bracketed information on the pages listed below which remain classified as SECRET-REL CAN US. Classification of these marked portions is retained lAW section 1.5 of E.O. 12958, as they relate to military plans/operations, or constitute foreign government information [classification categories (a) and (b) of EO 12958]. Pages: 83,84-85,88,102,115-117,121, and 128 2. If you have any questions concerning this document please contact Major Martin, DSN 554-7000. ~ats- AMES B. SMITH Colonel, USAF Vice Director of Operations 2 Atch 1. CONAD Historical Summary (S), Jul 56-Jun 57 2. CONAD/NORAD Historical Summary (S/REL CAN US), Jul-Dec 57 .:-- -.~ fll ~~~-:R~~~~~~~~'~l~J'$) - -- - --..I11III WNGA;~DED TO '-'",IC-UhS , "-.. - - - -. FOR THE COMMON DEFENCE POUR LA DEFENSE COMMUNE 1
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" '. NORTH AMERICAN A E COMMAND AND UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND 10 Feb 98 MEMORANDUM FOR HQ NORAD/J3 FROM: HQ NORAD/USSPACECOM/HO SUBJECT: Declassification Review of Histories 1. Executive Order 12958 requires a review of classified documentation more than 25 years old. The NORAD/USSPACECOM History Office (HO) maintains NORAD and Continental Air Defense Command histories, studies, and other documentation that falls into this category. In order to comply with the Executive Order, HO will forwa(d these documents on a systematic basis to functional experts within the NORAD staff to complete this review. 2. During the review process, if any of the material within the documentation still requires protection, please mark those portions (e.g. words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, pages) with red brackets ([ D. Along with this, please provide the justification for retaining the security classification for these portions. 3. Once the declassification review is completed, please prepare a memorandum for the director's/vice director's signature which states: a. The CONAP/ADC/ADCOM (as appropriate) history(ies) for the period(s) _____ have been reviewed and are now declassified; or b. The CONAD/ADC/ADCOM (as appropriate) history(ies) for the period(s) _____ have been reviewed and are now declassified except for the following sections: ________. The justification for retaining the classification is: ________ 4. Request the NJ3 staff review the following documents per Executive Order 12958 and the instructions in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. Please complete the review by 25 March 1998. a. CONAD.Historical Summary (S), Jul56-Jun 57. b. CONAD/NORAD Historical Summary (S/Rel CANUS), Jul-Dec 57 5. HQ NORAD/HO POC is the under . THOMAS FULLER Command Historian 2 Atch 1. CONAD Historical Summary (S), Jul56-Jun 57. 2.. CONAD/NORAD Historical Summary (S/Rel CANUS), Jul-Dec 57 THIS MEMORANDUM IS UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATCHS 1 & 2 ARE WITHDRAWN
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. ' . '. . . ': ~ ~ , . . ., \'. \ \ \ , J .I I ! This Document Containslnformotion Affecting the National Defense oJ the Unit~ States Within the Meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 i! . -U.S.c., Sectioris793 and 794. Its Transmission . i or the Revelation of Its Contents in any Manner to an Unauthotized Person is Prohibited by Law. 1 \ RETAIN OR DESTROY IN ACCORDANCE WITH AFR 205-1 \ " I . :.' DO NOT RETURN . '.: \ 1 11 ./ , i , . ' \ \
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PREFACE '!his is an historical SUlIIDB.ry of the year !'rom 1 July 1956 to 30 June 1957. Future issues of this sUlDD8ry will cover a six month period. Material for this sUJJlll8.l"Y was taken from a wide collection of documents. Readers desiring more detailed information than is given in the text are invited to use any of the documents cited in the reference notes to this history. '!his historical summary is one of a number of publications issued by the Directorate of Command History. Included are brief historical papers on subjects of relatively small scope and comprehensive historical studies of subjects of broad scope. Tbgether these publications make up the over-all command history. In addition, the historical office maintains an archives of important documents on air defense dating back to World War II. By means of this archives, this office can answer queries for information on a wide variety of subjects. Members of the staff' are invited to make use of this information service. '!his history was prepared jointly by Mr. Lloyd H. Cornett, Jr., Miss Elsie L. Joerling, Staff Sergeant Derril E. Howell, and the undersigned. Colorado Springs, Colorado L. H. BUSS 15 September 1957 Director of Command History v
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• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ~ I . CON·TENTS ~ ONE NEW TEIUof) OF REFERENCE FOR CONAn•••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 Unified Command Plan - USAF andCONAD Studies••••••••••• 1 Study of Separation of CONAD and ADC •••••••••••••••••••• 3 Joint Chiefs of Staff Recommendations on CONAD Terms of Reference•••••••••••.••••••••••••••• 6 New Terms of Reference •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 TWO TAKING OVER NORTHEAST AND ALASKA Am DEFENSE•••••••••••• 15 Northeast Area...................-...•... ~ ...•••'.......... . 15 - ( Alaska••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 11 II •••••••• THREE THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP•••••••••••••• 19 Genera-I ~._ Situation.'..'.......'..'e:. - ••••• ; .-: ~: •.•••••••••••••••••• 19 ~Cana.da.................................:.......0 19 Mexico............ . ~ •••• " - " 21 e"................." . : •••••••••••• '••••• FOUR CONAD REGIONS AND DIVISIONS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 23 Auth~r1ty••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •• 23 Organization•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 23 FIVE CONAn (JOINT) DIRECTION CENTERS••••••••••••••••••••••••• 26 CONAD Centralized Control Concept••••••••••••••••••••••• 26 CONAD Plan for Employment of AA Weapons in SAGE Era••• ~. 28 Co-location of Missile Master and AN/GPA-37 at Ten Sites 29 Co-location: of Remaining'AAOC'swith ADDC's ••••••••••••• 35 Co-location in Alaska•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••.•• 35 SIX STA'ruS OF COMBAT WEAPONS, July 1956-June 1951••••••••••• 38 ADC Interceptors (Includes 64th Air Division)••••••••••• 38 D
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~ ~ LA ~ Alaskan Air Command Interceptors •••••••••••••••••••••••• 42 Antiaircraft Weapons Status, Continental U. S••••••••••• 45 Antiaircraft Weapons Status, Alaska and N. E. Area•••••• 49 SEVEN S~TUS OF THE RADAR SYSTEM•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51 U. S. Land Based Radar •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51 Northeast Area•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 54 Alaska•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 54 Contigllous Radar•••••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••••• 57 Distant Early Warning Line •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 63 Seaward Extensions •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 65 Mid-Canad..a Line ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 69 EIGIfr OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES ••••·••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 71 Alert Requirements •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 71 Rules of Engagement••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 75 Canadian Rules of Engagement•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 77 Antiaircraft Rules for Canadian Operation••••••••••••••• 78 Military and Civil Warning•••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~. 79 Exercises ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 81 NINE AIR DEFENSE PRO~•••••••••••·......................... . 85 Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan, 1956-1966•••.•• 85 Fiscal Year 1959·Plan••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 86 Defense Against Missiles •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 89 ,APPENDIX I MISSIONS OF FRIENDLY FORCES••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 93 II AI)(: FIGHTER-~c:E:llro.R roRCE••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 95 III USARADCOM UNITS, 15 APRIL 1957.•.••••.••••.••.••.••••••• IV OPERATIONAL LAND BASED CONTINENTAL U. S. RADARS••••••••• 101 v - KEY PERSONNEL HEADQUARTERS CONAD, 1 JUNE 1957••••••••••• 104 REF'ERENCE NO'IES•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 107 .- ~,. j I
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U CL ~ FlED ILLUSTRATIONS ~ CONAD Headquarters Staff - 1 November 1954 •• ~' •••••••••••••••••• 4 CONAn Organization September 1954 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 8 ,- CONAD Organization - September 1956 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 9 / CONAD Headquarters Organization - June 1957•••••••••••••••••••• 11 --- ADC Headquarters Organization - June 1957 •••••••••••••••••••••• 12 - ARADCOM Headquarters Organization - June 1957•••••••••••••••••• 13 - NAVFORCONAD Headquart~rs Organization - June 1957•••••••••••••• 14 ~ Canadian Northeast Area..•..•..............•......•....•..•.•.. 16 Proposed Programmdng - Missile Master Program•••••••••••••••••• 34 Location of Primary AAOC's - June 1957••••••••••••••••••••••••• 36 , ADC Interceptor Deployment - JUne 1957 ••••••••••••••••••••••••• 39 Allocation of Assigned Battalions - June 1957•••••••••••••••••• 47 Operational Continental U. S. Radars - June 1957••••••••••••••• 52 Geographical Location of 64th Air Division (D) Units - July 1957 55 Alaskan Air Command ACW Stations - June 1957••••••••••••••••••• 56 Air Defense Warning System Outside CONUS - July 1957••••••••••• 67 Air Defense Command Alert Network # 1•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 80 ( '. !J) UNCL 55 FLED 1x I
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UCLA NEW TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CONAD UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN - USAF and CONAD STUDIES CONAD was established by the Joint Chiefs of Start as a joint cOlllDaIld on 1 September 1954. '!he original terms of reference gave CONAD the mission of (1) def'ending the continental United States against air attack and (2) supporting CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CO)f;AC, CIl'«:AL, and CINCNE in their missions to the maximum extent consistent with its primary mission. Under these terms, CONAD con sisted of the USAF Air Defense C()I!ID9nd, the U. S. Arrss:I Air Defense C()!IIMnd (USARADCOM), and the Nava1 Forces CONAD (NAVPURCONAD). USAF was named executive agency f'or CONAD and the tel"DlS stipulated that CINCOHAD would be an Air Force general. '!he USAF ADC Headquarters was additionally designated as Headquarters COHAD and the COIIIDBllder of ADC was named Commander-in-Chief of CONAD. 7 : '!his was the arrangement for two years -- until September 1956 when CONAD's mission was broadened and the organization overhauled. Many months before thiS, a number of actions began that necessitated and/or led to these changes. . First aD:>Dg these was the Joint Chiefs of Staf'f revision of' the Unified C()DIDR.Xld Plan. 'lheir aim in this was to produce a more ef ficient military structure world-wide and to reduce cost. Early in 1956, when each service vas making recommendations for this revision, USAF Headquarters proposed abol1tion of the Alaskan and Northeast Commands and assignment of' air defense of' the areas of these commands to CINCONAD.l Under. the USAF plan, CONAn vas to be designated a unified cODlDEUld -- an arrangement that CONAn opposed. CONAD officers went to Washington to object to the unified com mand idea for CONAn and to present the views of General Earle. E. * The U. S. Arrss:I Antiaircraft COIIIIIand vas redesignated the U. S. Ar'rq Air ·Defense CODIDal'ld. on 21 March 1951. '!he latter term is used throughout this ·history, however, for clarity. 1 I·.:. ·r UNCLAS TFIED I ~
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U ' LA 2 -_._- ._-•• . ,,- -' Parlrid8e, CONAl>'s C01IIDNlder-in-Chief (and ADC's COIIIIIEUlder). In a JIeIIO dated 13 February 1956, delivered by these officers, General Partrid8e advised USAF Headquarters that:2 '!be air defense of North America is a single problem. '!berefore, any United States change in organization at this time JIIlSt be pointed tovard an eventual combined organization for an integrated air defense with a central ized operational control of the Air Defense Force of all countries and services in and adjacent to North America. i-:~:;~.; ::(., As a first step to accomplish [thiiJ objective, I I consider that the physical separation of Headquarters CONAl> and Headquarters ADC is in order, witb all. com ponent Headquarters remaining at EDt Air Force Base. CONAD III.1St be given the mission of air defense of the Un!ted States, including the plans and requirements therefor, and the operational control of all weapons useful in the air . defense mission. All component C()JIIDA.ndS, including ADC, must be given the mission of providing trained forces to CINCONAl> for his operational control. As to the plan for maldng CONAD a unified. cOJlllBDd, the CONAl> officers pointed out that the organization and operational procedures ~ II , for a unified cOJllDalld would not be suited to air defense. Specifical ly, they objected to the fact that the cC«!I!!Aooer of a unified COlllDBnd exercised operational control through his component cornrmnders. '!be USAF planners accepted these views and reinstated a Joint collllBDd arrangement for CONAl> in their proposal. Shortly.thereafter, USAF presented its proposal to the Joint Stra tegic Planning Comm:1ttee. '!be Navy and *riDe Corps agreed to it entir~ly and the Arm::! agreed to disestablishment of the Northeast Ca. mend. '!he Arm:I objected., however, to doing away with the Alaskan CO!!I!I8Dd. '!he AraI:y maintained that the organization and cOlllllBDd structure should remain the same. In March 1956, USAF asked General Partridge to review the pro posal before it was sent to the JCS. USAF had accepted the Arm:I's . views and proposed nov that the Alaskan COIII!8nd be kept. It still proposed that the air defense responsibility in this area be given to CONAn in addition to that of the Northeast. Also, it still recom ~ded that the Northeast COIIIDruld be abolished.
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·i u'el 3 ~ General, Partridge agreed, reiterating his views that "CONAD re- ~ sponsibilities, initiall~y, should be limited to planning, requirements, operational control and deployment of air defense forces and to insure compatibility of air defense systems now under construction in all areas. "4 In addition, he reminded USAF that "All our actions should be guided by the ultimate aim of integrating the operational control of the air defense of Canada and the U. s. "5 The JCS finished the revision by mid-1956 and the Secretary of De fense approved it. The new Unified Command Plan gave CINCONAD the re sponsibility of defending Alaska and the NOrtheast Area against air at tack as well as the United Sta·ces, and of assisting in the air defense of Canada and Mexico. It also provided for the disestablishment of the U. s. Northeast Command on 1 September 1956. study of Separation of CONAD and ADC In the meantime, a joint study was und~rway in Colorado Springs on reorganization of.CONAD. In December 1955, CINCONAD bad directed that a joint study group be formed of component and CONAD officers to gtudy the feasibility and means of separating the CONAD and ADC staffs. '!he reason for wanting to separate the starfs and appoint a separate com mander for ADC was that the ADC HeadqUB-~ers had not been able to func tion effectively as a joint headquarters. '!he combined, two-hat ar rangement was not effective. It had been extremely difficult for the I I ,- . ~ \ ) i ' .. Air Force officers serving in dual capacities to adequately handle both positions. It had not been possible to clearly separate the functions of CONAD and its component commands and to recognize commend channels. Separation was necessary to increase CINCONAD's capability to exer cise his major functions of pJanning and establishing air defe~e re- . quirements and of operationally controlling the air defense forces. General Partridge saw that the agency responsible for .Jair defense, the agency having operational control of the forces, had to be a clearly defined., separate organization. And the channels or means for exercis ing operational control had to be sepa.!'ate,i.e., they had to be through CONAD's channels an~ not ADe's or ARADCOM's. '!he joint study group completed its work in March 1956. Its study prcposed a separate staff consisting of a commander; chief of staff; secretariat; an., inf"ormation services; and deputies for plans and operations, communications and electronics, and intelligence.1 A staff' of 351 was proposed in the original study -- consisting of 118 officer" .160 enlisted men, and 13 civilians. Of the 118 officers, 23 were ArIIr3J u
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( -. ~ .. ) 5 i.l Navy, and 1 Marine; 83 were Air Force.In addition to the Air Foree commander, all deputy chiefs of' staff were Air Force officers·. AI:). A:rTrry general waS proposed for the chief of staff position., UNCLASS FI D Both the Army and Navy component commanders objected to the pro posed size and composition of the CONAD staff. Lieutenant General Stanley R. Mickelsen, (JoIIDILaIlding General of ARADCOM, said that while he agreed with the need fgr a separate staff, he disagreed with the pro posal on three counts: . (1) the size and rank structure of the staff; (2) stem ming from the first, the apparent intent to involve the CONAD staff in details which are properly component cOIl1lmild re- . sponsibilities; and (3) the assignment of almo$tall of the key staff positions of responsibility to USAF 'officers. ~ ' ~ : He added that he believed a small CONAD Headquarters was proper and adequate for the task. But, he said, if the large staff was approved, there should be adequate Army representation. " •••it is considered es sential that at least a few of the directors be Army officers, particu larly in view of the major contribution that AARACOM is making in the CONUS air defense effort."9 In general, these were also the views of·; the Navy component. Captain Dennis J. Sullivan, Acting COMNAVFORC'ONAD, stated that he did not agree with the proposed staff' "in regard to total Size, rank structure, assignment of key positions, or representation from the services concerned."10 · Ilis estiJDate was that about 30 to 40 officers were all that would be r~quired to perform~the CONAD function. In April' 1956, CONAD sent its proposal for new terms of reference which included separation of the headquarters and for the functions of the separate headq~ters to the' JOS for approval (through the Chief of Staff, USAF). In July, the latter advised CONAD that on 19 June 1956, the Secretary of Defense. had reached a favorable deci~ion on the concept of operational control and cOIIDILaIld relationships and for separation of the headquarters as recomme~ by the JOS (see discussion next page). USAF also advised that the join~staff had been directed to revise the CONAD terms of reference. CONAD sent £ts . proposal fqr manning of the headquarters to the JOS on 6 August. · 'Ihe strength proposed -- a total of 357, includin~ 124 officers, 159 enlisted men, and 74 civilians --was essentially ,the same as had been recommended by the joint study group in ~ch 1956.12 The UNCLASSIFIED .... ) i·j"" ~. . :-;.. , \ ) '-"
Page 28
L. 6 proposed UMD was approved on 22 August.13 'lhe Army Chief of Staff did not concur with the staffing of CONAD Headquarters. He oPjected specifically to the placing of Air Force officers in key positions. USAF referred the mat~er to General Part ridge for reply. His reply stated in part that: l In determining the composition of the Headquarters staff under the Terms of Reference, due consideration was given to each of the military services and their basic functions. Since air defense planning and operation for the North American continent requires during this time era an intimate knowledge of offensive and defensive aerial warfare, I selected initially Air Force personnel for cer tain key staff positions. It is my intention to utilize the personnel made available by the three services to the limit of their capabilities with due consideration to rank, experience and forces assigned. He pointed out fuL~her that the manning and organization were subject to change as the situation warranted.* ( JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS ON CONAD 'IERm OF REFERENCE Two of the main actions underway in the first six months of 1956 that led to changes in the CONAD mission and organization have been shown: · the JCS revision of the Unified Command Plan and the CONAD pro posals for change in organization. A third important action began in May. On the third of that month, the Armed Forces Policy Council was briefed on the Army and the Air Force positions on the control of air defense weapons. FollOwing the formal presentations, the JCS were re quested to make recommendations on command. relationships and operation al control for air defense and to clarify the authority of CINCONAD. This was completed by 5 June. The JCS felt that many of the difficult ies CONAD was experiencing were caused by the organizational arrange ment and to the wording of the existing terms of reference. Among the recommendations in the JCS memorandum was separation of the headquart * Francis F. Urbane, a U. S. Army Brigadie~ General, reported to CONAD Headquarters on 16 May 1957 to take the position of Deputy Chief of Staff Communications and Electronics. o U SIFIED
Page 29
7 ers of ADC and CONAD. The recomm~dations were approved by the Secre" tary of Defense an 19 June 1956 as noted above. These recommendations were reflected in the new terms prepared after Mr. Wilson's approval of the JCS memorandum. NEW TERM3 OF REFERENCE The new terms of referance were sent to CONAD on 4 September 1956. v They provided for the change in mission directed by the Revised Unifi~ Command Plan and for the change in organization recommended by the JaS. CINCONAD's mission was broadened in two areas: (l) responsibility for air defense of Alaska and the Northeast and (2) responsibility for assisting in air defense of Canada and Mexico according to approved p]z~= and agreements .15 CINCONAD was also charged with supporting CINCAL, CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCARIB, and CINCSAC in their missions. CINCONAD was given operational control over the USAF Air Defense Command, the U. S. Army Air Defense Command, and the Naval Forces CONAD and all forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available to these commands. CINCONAD's authority in this respect was defined in broader terms than before (more in line with the definition given for the com mander of a joint task force by the Joint Action Armed Force Manual). His authority, the terms stated, included those functions of com mand involving composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives and direction necessary to accomplish the mission. It specifically included determination of procedures for con ducting the air battle, for exercising operational control of all as signed forces, and for directing engagement and disengagement of weapons. Finally, it included authority to centralize operational con trol of forces, including the assignment of individual antiaircraft batteries to designated targets. The new terms again provided that the forces and operations of the seaward extensions of the early warning systems were to be under CINCLANT and CINCPAC. UNCLASSIfIED
Page 30
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Page 31
1 ers of ADC and CONAn. The recommendations were approved by the Secre- tary of Derense en 19 June 1956 as noted above. These recommendations were reflected in the new terms prepared after Mr. Wilson's approval of the JCS memorandum. NEW TERM3 OF REFERENCE The new terms of referance were sent to CONAn on 4 September 1956. v They provided for the change in mission directed by the Revised Unified Command Plan and for the change in organization recommended by the JCS. CINCONAD was given operational control over the USAF Air Defense Command, the U. S. Army Air Defense Command, and the Naval Forces CONAn and all forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available to these commands. CINCONAD I s authority in thip respect was defined in broader terms than before (more in line with the definition given for the com mander of a joint task force by the Joint Action Armed Force l-bnual). His authority, the terms stated, included those functions of com mand involvi~ composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives and direction necessary to accomplish the mission. ,It specifica~ly included determination of procedures for con ducting the air battle, for exercising operational control of all as signed forces, and for directing engagement and disengagement of weapons. Finally, it included authority to centralize operational con trol of forces, including the assignment of individual antiaircraft batteries to designated targets. The new terms again provided that the forces and operations of the seaward extensions of the early warning systems were to be under CINCLANT and CINCPAC. ~ ClASSlf f .16fiJJPE" i.. ':.-~
Page 32
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I l , UNClASS FIED .,j 10 \ .;J ' . • -: 'Dle responaibillties ot the cCDpClOent cc 008 were clarit1ed aDd standardized to a great extent. It vas specit1cal.ly stated that tbe ca.ponent cQW!fllMers bad no specitic service cOlllbat IlissioDS. '!heir respoosib1llty UDder C~ vas to equip, &dJI1.nister, train, and provide cc.ibat ~ torces. CIRCORAD's Joint c.--.enders vere re sponsible tor caDbe.t operations. COKAD vas mde a Joint C(ftMnd vith the Air Force as executiYe agency. But the statement that CINCORAD would be an Air Force geDeral who would be designated as cCIIPIBnder ot ADC vas deleted. Instead, it was provided that CINCOIIAD would not be a cOlllpODe1)t cc nder. CI5CORAD vas given the authority to set up a separate Joint head quarters with a separate start. In addition, he vas authorized to set up such separate subordinate Joint organizationa as he deemed necessa ry. On 17 September 1956, the nev ~ structure tor the separate CORAD Headquarters vas established. 'lbe CORAD CCWIIftnder-in-Cb1et, Oenera1 Partridge, vas relieved ot cC"t!W!ADd ot ADC OIl this date aDd Lieutenant General Joseph B. Atkinson (who bad been Ca--nder-in-Chiet Alaskan CCt!III8nd) vas appointed. CQPI1IAnder ot ADC ~ 17 But it vas DOt ,l' j ~ti1 1 October that the COBAD staff aetually separated pbyaicaily, './ insotar as space perm1tted, and began f\mctiOD1ng separately. By the end ot June 1957, the CONAl> start totalled 366 (116 otticers, 178 en listed men, and 72 civilians) against an authorization ot 399. " Bq ADC 30 -rune 1957 ADC 30 JuDe 1957 Bq ARADCOM 15 July 1957 ARADCOM 15 July 1957 Bq NAVFORCOKAD 30 June 1957 Auth Asgd Auth Asgd Auth Asgd Auth Asgd Auth Asgd Oft 481 541 12,928 12,624 117 110 4,121 3,952 - 24 22 En}. 431 499 85,159 87,952 151 156 38,328 41., 803 17 15 CiT 432 481 12,944 12,999 55 52 105 102 2 2 Total 1,)44 1,621 111,031 112,875 --- -' . / 323 31B 42,554 45,857 43 39 ' o UNCLASSIFIED
Page 35
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HEADQUARTERS AIR DEFENSE COMMAND UNCLISSIFIED
Page 37
c :) UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMAND ORGANIZATIONAL CHART c=: .- ::r=:: (/) Ul -n t--1 rn o .. ,. ~ '. COMMANDING GENERAL I SECRETARY GENERAL STAFF ,-- ASST CHIEF OF STAFF GI ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G2 ~ ~ . . . I' .. I IWESTERN ELECTRIC REPRESENTATIVE] . . , 1 DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT REPRESENTATlVt I " .. .... -, . .~I , " . '~ I- PUBLIC RELATIONS - HQ COMMANDANT 13(.~ 1957 lj·i .... . .' """ ADJUTANT GENERAL ... SIGNAL , . .CHIEF OF STAFF ,. . . ASSLCHIEF OF STAFF G3 " , - CHAPLAIN .. ARMY AVIATION ,, ' LIAISON OFFICERS LIAISON SECTION ASST CHIEF OF STAFF G4 " ASST CHIEF OF STAFF PLANS &REQUIREMENTS ORDNANCE r- I"- ENGINEER 1 '. . : i ~ ~ ~ ~ ; w ~ ~.. '--- ' f " / --1-· .·-. '(, ·~I .:.
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~ -, -, Co...) l-EADQUARTERS I NAVAL FORCES, CONAD STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART ~ (,~. .~ ' . ' L "'" ' r; c:: ::.::::= '=> r- :l:;::. <.n (..I') ~ -r., r--t rn C) . COMNAVFORCONAO 1001 I CHIEF OF STAFF C)( AlOE AND FLAG LT. ICO ACOFS FOR ADMIN INO ACOFS FOR INTEL 1H21 ACOFS FOR PlANS 8 OP~ ACOFS FOR COMMS IWS I OPERATIONS OFf. 1:101 CIJlRENT PlAIIS OFF (~n fIITII( PlANS lREQUIROOf1S~~ ASST COIIIIS OFF 11111 ASST OPS OFF (JOIl LJ -.ssT CfS OFf 911FACEoaJ c::: :::c:= ~-) r- :L:=o t-, ( \ '. ") '.~:~' !..:: . l'
Page 39
IE .. TAKING OVER NORTHEAST AND ALASKA AIR DEFENSE . NOR THEAS T AREA b U. S. NorthwtCc.....nd, a JCS unified cOlllllBDd, vas dises tablished on 1 SepteDaberl956 in accordance with the .leS Revised Uni fied COIIIIIIBDd Plan. On this same date, CINCONAD took over responBi bilityfor ai~ ~~~ense of the Northeast. , To implement this responsibili1:.y, CINCONAD designated the Com , mnder, Northeaa't Air COJ!I!!R.nd (COMNEAC) his sybordinate Joint coDlllaIlder . responsible .for air defense in the Northeast. He placed all U. S. air defeilSe forces in the Northeast under the operational control of COMNEAc~ CINCONAD -8.dvised the latter that the air defense responsi bilities assigned to HEAC were the same as formerly held by the North east Coumand and that there would be no change in the arrangements " vith Canada' and Denmark for air defense operationsi!* 1he ReAF All" Defence CCIIIIBlld was responsible for operational con trol of u.s. ~&1r. ~defense forces in the Canadian portion of the NEAC area. Ali a~ement ' 'to this effect was lEde in April 1953 by CINClfE and the A~l" ,Offl'ciE;r 'Gc).m;a,nding the RCAF ADC. 'lb1s agreement and subsequent , renelm.l.s provid~ that the ACX; RCAF ADC would exercise operational con trol through CIHCiU. COMNEAC now took the latter's place. CINCONAD 'and, the , ~CX; RCAF AIx= agreed that the arrangements in force at the time ' , *" '!he' lfortbe~t Area as used here meant both the Canadian and the ""'Greenland Areas. ' ** An agreement was completed by Denmark and the U. s. on 27 April 1951 (it went into force on8 June 1951). 'Ibis agreement was made at thee.request of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. '!he agreement ',provided for the IIlUtual. use of bases and other facilities in Greenland .. and guaranteed 'that sovereignty of the KingdOIi of Denmark would not be prejudiced. 'lbeagreement, being in implementation of the North At "lantic Treaty; was to remain in effect for the duration of the North Atlantic Treaty~ ' ' u c S FI 0
Page 40
UCLA IED ( would remain in etf'ect until a new agn!eJleDt cOUld be signed.2 A new agreement, dated 1 January 1957, vas signed by General Partridge and Air Vice Marshal 1.. E. wrq, C()IIIMnder ot the RCA!' ADC. It provided that the Are ReAl AIle would exercise operational control over all U. S. air detense torces in what waa terlled the Jortheast Area (see inBet) through CINCOBAD's subordinate cIWMmer in the area.3 'D1e air detense torces listed in the afPee.nt were squadrons, baaes, aircratt, ACW units, GOC units, antiaircrat't units, aDd ca..m1 cationa units • Operational control vas det1ned as the paver ot directing, co ordinating, and controlling the operatiODal. activities ot deployed units. RedeplO)'Jlent ot units vas specifically excluded. CIltCOBAD 's ar rangements vith COtIfEAC were interUi only, tor flO,"," POLl '. it vas planned by USAF that NEAC would also be abOl1S~as soon as possible. 1bis date vas set tor 1 April 1957. On this date, USAF discontinued NEAC.ADC took over the USAF air detense torces in the area lDcluding the one diviSion, the 64th Air D1vision (Detense) and possession ot Pepperrell AFB and all U. S. ACW atations. ADC also suc ceeded REAC in the re sponsibilities it held tor supporting and run ning the lEW line sta tions in eastern Canada and Greenland. 5 'lhe Arrtq ant1air crat't group in the area, the 7th at 'lhule, vas relieved tram assigmaent ,to the First Ar7q and " U I f'l 'ltv "FlED o
Page 41
UI Cl .IE 17· , assigned on 1 September 1956 to the U. S. ArtIly Air Defense COIIID9.lld.6 First ~ retained responsibility for logistic and adDdnistrative support. CONAD established the 64th Continental Air Defense Division on 1 April 1957 as its subordinate Joint air defense coonand in the North east to take REAC's place.7 Its area of responsib11ity was atill re ferred to as the Northeast Area and was the same as established tor the 64th Air Division (Defense y} It included the Northeast Area as defined by the COKAD-ReAF ADC Agreement j the portion ot the DEW line which REAC had had responsibilityj and Greenland in accordance with the terms ot the 1951 Danish-U. S. Agreement. 'nle coDll!mder of the 64th Air Division, Colonel Carroll W. M::Colpin, vas naaed cC'WIIIIA.nder of the 64th CONAD Division. As C~NAD's Joint ccmpeMer, Colonel McColpin vas responsible for conducting the air defense of the Northeast Area (outside the limits of the Canadian air defense areas) and exercising operational control of all air defense weapons systems assigned or otherwise JlBde available for air defense.9 He vas also responsible for complying with instructions of the A(X; ReAF ADC on operational control of U. S. air d~fense forces in the Canadian part of the Northeast Area and exerciSing operational control of air defense forces in this area. Finally, he was to exercise operational control of the Eastern portion of the DEW line, exclusive of the seaward extensions. ALASKA On 1 September 1956, CINCONAD also assumed operatiOD&l. control over all air defense forces assigned or othenrl.se JlBde available tor air defense of Alaska.10 At the same tille, he designated C~er in-Chief Alaska (CINCAL) as the cODDander responsible to him for all air defense activities in the area and delegated to CINCAL the authori ty to exercise operational control of air defense forces in A1aska~ His control vas to continue to be exercised through the Commender Alaskan Air Command (the Air Force component cOlJlllB.nder). cmcAL was also responsible for operational control of the Western part of the DEW line, exclusive of the seaward extension. * ':the Alaskan CODIIBDd was a JCS unified cOlllllBnd. 'Jhe Department . I of the Air Force vas executive agency. Components of ALCOM were ~kan Air Command, U. S. Army Alaska, and Alaskan Sea Frontier. U CLAS F ED
Page 42
I 18 'lbese arrangements were incorporated in a memorandum of agree ment between CINCAL, Lieutenant General Joseph H. Atkinson, and CINCONAD, dated 28 August 1956. '!he mission of CINCAL was established as (1) to maintain the security of the Alaskan CQlllllAnd being guided by special agreements made between the U. S. and Canada in the planning for and conduct of pertinent operations, (2) to support CINCONAD, CINCPAC, and CINCSAC in their missions, and f3) to report to the .leS through CINCONAD on all air defense lIBtters. 1 '!be agreement specified that CINCAL would partiCipate with CINCOlfAD in the development of plans and requirements tor air detense of Alaslm; such plans to be refiected in .leS approved CONAn documents. It was noted that while there was no otticial relationship between like component cODlDAndS ot CONAn and AlCOM (such as U. S. ArtIly Air De fense Canmend and the U. S. ArtIly Alaska), close coordination between these components was necessary. '!he antiaircraft torces in Alaska remained assigned to U. S. AnIJy Alaska (USARAL). '!he Department ot the Army instructions to Lieutenant General Stanley R. Mickelsen, USARADCOM COlIID8.Ilding General, and Johjor General James F. Collins, USARAL CODIIIflIlding General, was that their. Ci . COJI'IIIAnds I'maintain the close and continuoUs coordination with relation to AAA matters in Alaska referred to in [thiJ Memorandum ot Agreement. n12 CG USARADCOM was to keep CG USARAL informed. on the latest thoughts and developments on AAA DIB.tters and plans. CG USARAL was to develop AAA forces requirements and plans for his area, use ARADCOM policies and directives to the extent practicable, provide AAA plans and requirements for ARADCOM review and coordination, and discuss with ARADCOM any unre solved AAA problems for determination of a recommended ~ position. '!be coordination between the two was to insure that, insotar as possi ble, training and operations met A.RAlXX)M standards. ARADCOM would Dike operational readiness and training inspections as mutually agreed upon between the two. U CL IFI ·D :~ ,; . ' o
Page 43
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Combining responsibility for air defense of Alaska and the North
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Continent.
But there s.till remained four separate commanders with
air defense responsibility in their particular theaters.
These were:
CDICONAD for the United States, Alaska, and the Northeast Area; the
AOC ADC (RCAF) for Canada; CINCLANT for the Atlantic Command; and
CINCPAC for the Pacific Command.
Each of these commanders was re
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CANADA
A close air defense partnership had long been maintained by
Canada and the United States. Both countries recognized the single
ness of the problem of air defense of the two nations.
This concept
was expressed by the 1956 issue of the Canadian-United States Mili
tary Cooperation Committee Plan (JOO/8):
1**
Air defense plans should be based upon the concept
that the air defense of Canada and ·the United States is
* See Apoen~ One for a statement of the missions of these
commanders.
** The MeC 300 series was published yearly to cover the period
,I July to 30 June. It was issued about 1 October.
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oPage 44
lEO~ 20 . a single problem and that plans for the use of the air defense resources of Canada and the United States . MUS t be developed on a combined basis so as to provide the most effective defense possible for agreed vital targets. In general, this concept had long been held by Canada and the U. S. and had guided post-war planning am development. As far back as 1949, the Military Coopel1ltion Committee (MCC) had drawn up a joint emergency defense plan to outline the major actions necessar,r and the agreed principles of common defense operations. The foCC followed this with a directive to the U. S. air defense organization, the Continental Air Commani, and the RCAF Air Defence Group (the Canadian organization that preceded the ReAr Air Defence Commar.d) to prepare detailed emergency air defense plans. The first of these was prepared in 1950. New plans were made each year thereafter. By 1957, the emergency air defense plan covered the agreed to concept for air defense operations, critical areas to be defended, combined operational arrangements, and the necessary policies and procedures for carrying out the concept of operations. The latter included cross border interception and engagement procedures, rules ( of engagement, ani the agreement for operational control of U. S. forces in Canada. Another major part of the joint planning was the Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan, 1956-1966, dated 15 December 1956. This plan was prepared on the basis of the above quoted requirement of the MeC and CONAD's responsibility to recommend requirements for the con tinental ai2' defense system to the JCS. The preface of this plan noted that: In the absence of any authorized combined planning agency, but in accordance with the intent of the /PeC Directivel, CINCONAD has produced this document to set the objectives for the air defense of Canada and the United States within a mutual air defense system. In formulating these objectives, the AOC ADC (Canada) has been consulted frequently, and the RCAF Planning Liaison Staff at Headquarters CONAD has participated fully. In addition to this joint plannine and coordination of pro cedures, the two countries had shared in the building and manning of the Pinetree radars in Canada. Finally, the number of officers , . I ·· . ,: I .' .. '~ ~, ·" ~.U ur, eLA IE
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' exchanged had irx:reased greatly over the years. mAY officers filled a number of key positions in the Canadian s7stem b7 1957 and RCAF officers were in key positions in the U. S. portion of the system extending from the DEW line to the Combat Operations Center in Colorado Springs ~ The next logical step in this development was integration of the operational elements of the tvo forces into a single command strncture. '1'hi.s too was something that had been discussed at various times since the end ot World War II. In 1955, with the two systems linking, the IIIB.tter came up again. It was recognized ·· that the most effective defense, the one that could react J'M)8t quickly and Jll)S t fiexibly would be one tbat coDil1ned the oper ational control of the air defense forces of both cotmtri.es under one command. Between this tirre and the sUJ'lDnl!tr of 1957, the numerous problems aJrl details of integration were worked out in general. by the two countries. On 1 August 1957, an announcement vas _de jointly by the Canadian Minister of National. Defense and the U. S. Secretary of Defense that the two goverrments had agreed to an integrated command:) The two governments have agreed to the setting up of a system of integrated operational control of the air de tense forces in the continental United States, Alaska ani Canada under an integrated commani responsible to the Chiefs of Staff of both countries. An integrated head quarters will be set up in Colorado Springs and joint plans and procedures will be worked out in peacetime, ready for immediate use in case of emergency. Other as pects of command and administration will remain the nation al resoonsibllity. This syStem of integrated operational c;.ontrol and the setting up of a joint headquarters will become effective at an early date. This bilateral arrange ment extends the mutual security objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the air defenses of the Canada-U. S. Region. MEXICO It was also CTIlCONAD' s resoonsibility to assist in the air defense of Mexico in accordance with aoproved plans and agree ments. But unlike the situation with Canada, there were no . .. --
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(no text recognized)
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22 1 approved plans or agreements by which CINCONAD could fulfill his. responsihility. A defense plan, the Mexico-United States EmergencY' Defeme Plan (MEXUS 100/1), had been approved by the Joint Mexican-U. S. Defense Commissiol'l (JMUSDC) on 19 November 1952 and by the JCS on 19 February 1953.u This plan outlined in very general terms the measures required for the common defense. But it did not have specific agreements or rights on air defense of the border areas. At the next session of the ·JMtEDC held in July 1954, the Chair man of the U. S. Section pointed out the inadequacies of this plan and proposed its revision. A draft revision was presented. At the followin~ session of the JMUSDC in September 1955, the group considered the revision -- MElDS 100/2. By the end of the meeting, agreement had been reached on about 85 per cent of MEXUS 100/2. But CONAD learned in late 1956 that the attempts of the U. S. Section to revise the defense plan to provide for adequate conti nental defense arrangements had not been successful. tBAF had advised earlier (July 1956) that:5 The ractors which have deterred agreements by Mexico result primarily from constitutional limitations and an acute awareness of the probable reaction of Mexican pres sure groups against any proposed military agreement or pact with the U. S. However, it is possible that Mexico will accede to U.,S. requirements provided some tangible benefit will accrue to Mexico from such action. Upon resolution of certain aspects of this matter new being considered by the JCS it is anticipated that e~forts will be renewed toward reaching mutually satisfactory agree ments with Mexico. In the meantime, CONAD included in its 1956-1966 requirements plan the radars that it felt would be required in Mexico by 1961 to provide adequate defense. CONAD put in a requirement for both prime 'radars and gap fillers to provide contiguous coverage south of the border at all altitudes.6 Also for adequate air defense (but not in cluded in the above plan), CONAD planners wanted border overfly agree ments to the limit of radar surveillance and fighter capability, rules of engagement in line with those of the U.S., exchange of aircraft movement information for identification purposes, and ex change of combat intelligence. ..
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Page 49
UCLA CONAD REGIONL~ AND DIVISIONS AUTHORITY Tbe original terms of reference of September 1954 provided that each USAF Headquarters from ADC down to air division level would be additionally designated as a joint headquarters. Accordingly, jOint defense forces and joint air divisions were established at (or super imposed on) every USAF defense force and division. One of the important facets of the 1956 reorganization was sepa ration of the CONAn and Are structures. General Partridge felt that the most effective system would be a separate system. He believed that operational control should be exercised through CONAn's channels '-.. and not through component counand channels.l Tbe new terms of reference provided authority for CINCONAD to establish a separate headquarters and such subordinate JOint organi zations as he deemed necessary to accomplish his mission, including those necessary to- perm!t centralized control and employment of all air defense weapons available. Effective 15 January 1951, CONAn disestablished the joint defense forces and divisions and established CONAD regions and CONAn di vi~ions (a total of three regions and 16 divisiOns~ The CONAn regions (e.g. CONAn Forces, EasternCONAD Region) and CONAn divisions (e.g. 9th CONAD Division),were responsible for the same geographical area as the organizations they replaced; their headquarters were at the same location and they carried the same numerical designation. ORGANIZATION The region vas defined in a regulation issued in December 1956 by * A seventeenth diviSion, the 64th CONAD Division, vas estab ,lished on 1 April 1951. UCLA IFIED
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24 CONAn (21-1) as a geographical subdivision of the CONAD air defense area.3 The ~ivision was defined as a geographical subdivision of a region and those forces within the division area. The region opera tions center was to serve as the cOlllDBDder's cOJIIDaDd post and the center for coordinating the combat effort of all forces available for air defense of the region; the division control center was to be used for supervising and coordinating the combat effort of all aircraft, antiaircraft, guided missiles, and radar available to the division for air defense. Region and division cOJlJlBllders were defined as senior officers designated by CINCONAD to exercise operational control over CONAn forces within the region or division as delegated by CIN CONAn. Tbe CONAD division commander, the regulation provided, exercised operational control of weapons and/or assigned targets to all weapons through the ADC direction centers and ARADCOM antiaircraft control centers. ADC direction centers vere responsible to CONAn division commanders for surveillance, identification and warning activities within assigned areas. '!be regulation noted that in order to provide for f'ully integrated con,trol of all weapons within a specifiedgeographfcal. area, individual weapons control systems were to be co-located at CONAD direction centers whenever operationally and economically feasible. None of these were yet established, however. It was stated that CINCONAn would designate such CONAn direction centers and prescribe operating proced ures for them by separate directives. A CONAn direction center was defined as a specified subordinate joint information, communications and operatiOnS center which would be used for coordinating and supervising air surveillance and identifica tion activities within an assigned area and for exercising tactical direction of all combat weapons assigned by the division commander. '!be size and structure of the staffs of the regions and divisions were not established at the time of their formation. CONAD laid down the guide lines that the size would be limited to the minimum number of personnel required and the physical facility limited to that required to permit the CONAD <;.onmmder to exercise operational control and con duct operational planning.4,., Immediately, however, as an interim measure until CONAD could get its own separate commanders, CONAn asked ADC to designate the command ers of its defense forces and air divisions as commanders of the CONAD UNCLAS ..
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" CL S FIE 25 regions and divisions at the same location.5 This was, of course, a two-hat arrangement for the commanders. They were responsible to " their component superior for all uni-service command matters and to CONAD for all CONAD command matters. But they were to have separate staffs and were not to assign to either staff any responsibility that was in the functional area of the other. The region and division commanders could appoint only a provision al staff, however. As of mid-1957, no unit mnnrg document had been approved for any subordinate CONAD headquarters. This had one ad vantage in that it provided a means of establishing, on the basis of operational experience, realistic manning requirements. A proposed staff structure for regions and divisions was sent to the JCS for ap proval on 7 June 1957. The size of the proposed staff varied. But in round. figures, about 130 people were proposed for the region head quarters and 115 for division headquarters.7 UNCLASSIFIED . " ' .. :~ ' , :- .,'
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uc IFI CONAD (JO.l NT) DIRE C T ION CENTERS CONAD CENTRALIZED CONTROL CONCEPT* During an Army-Air Force briefing for the Armed Fbrces Policy Council on 3 ~y 1956 on concepts of air defense weapons control, Gen eral Partridge said he believed that the air defense battle was a single battle and therefore it was necessary to fight an integrated battle from the point of engagement until the enemy was destroyed. l He stated that he b~lieved that the air defense system for CONAn bad to be a system based on the integration of firepover of all air de fense veapons; a system vhich employed a single operational control channel dovn to the lovest level vhere sufficient intelligence was ava~1able to permit a coordinated integrated effort; a system vhich eliminated unnecessary duplication at substantial savings; and a syst~ vhich ~9uld provide the American people vith the most air de fense for their tax dollar. General Partridge's means for achieving these ends vere expressed in a letter to USARADCOM and ADC on 6 December 195b:2 Optimum employment of air defense veapons and their ground environment system requires centralized control of all air defense elements under a single air defense com mander responsible for the air defense of a designated area. '!his system must also provide means for the immedi * Because this history is a summary of a relatively brief time period only and because the subject of weapons control and co-location of facilities is very broad and covers a greater time period, only the essential actions of the period are covered here. A comprehensive historical study of -the subject of CO-location of facilities and the Army-Air Force-CONAD concepts of veapons control is being prepared by .' ; ~ the CONAD Directorate of Command History. In addition, a file of pertinent documents on the subject is available for loan to staff members. .._...... . UNCLASS FlED
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....~ UNCLA IFIED ... ate decentralization of control to any or all subordinate levels upon decision by the air defense commander. Cen tralized control can best be effected when the control functions of different weapons systems are centrally lo cated and fully integrated. Side benefits from co-loca tion and integration include economy of personnel and equipment. ,'. In this letter, he directed that the Armyls weapons control system, the AN/FSG-l Antiaircraft Defense System (Missile Master), and ADCls pre-SAGE semi-automatic intercept system, the AN/GPA-37 Radar Course Directing Group, be co-located and the operations functions integrated in the same operations room at facilities to be designated as Joint Direction Centers. The immediate events leading up to this directive began on 21 June 1956. On this ' date, the ~ecretary of Defense sent a memorandum to the Secretary of the Air Force in which he concurred with the views .of the Chairman or the JCS.* This was in regard to CONCONAD'~ authority to de termine air defense weapons contro.L and assignment, incl.ud.lng assignment of targets to AA batt_eries. Mr. Wilson asked that CINCONAD submt a program for: 3 testing tne feasibllity and operational. desirability for ~he centralized contro.L of antialrcraft batteries through an economical implementation of the SAGE system and Missile Master system, or some modification thereof, for the more effective utilization of the antiaircraft units of the Army in Continental Air Defense. Upon receipt of this memorandWll, CINCONAD directed that a group consisting of CONAD, USARADCOM, and ADC officers work out a test pro~ and find the best method for employing the ~'s NIXE missile with SAGE. In ensuing conferences between this group and representatives of a number of interested agencies, two documents were prepared: one on the working of Missile Master with SAGE, the other on a CONAD testing program. * These views are contained in 'roP SECRET JCS Paper 1899/264. ~; i--'. I __-_..:.. UNCLASSIFIED
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. i.. -I 28 CONAD PLAN FOR EMP . MENT OF AA WEAPONS IN SAGE ERA The first document described the employment of AA weapons under the concept of centralized control by the SAGE Direction Center. As signment of targets to individual AA batteries would be by the SAGE direction center through the AN/FSG-l according to this document which covered the operations under various conditions of degraded centralized control capability. These latter were listed as ~es I, II, III, and IV.5 Mode I would be the priDBry method. of operation with all facilities working normally. The SAGE direction center would make target assignment for all air defense weapons. The FSG-l would be used in Mode I as a switching and. coumunications central. lobnitor ing, supervising, and coordinating antiaircrat't weapons would be done at a SAGE direction center by the antiaircraft officer and the anti aircraft weapons directors and assistants. Under Mode II, M weapons located in a disabled subsector would be controlled by an adjacent subsector. The M directors of the ad i jacent subsector would assume responsibility for target assignment to M weapons in the disabled subsector. Assignment of targets to bat teries would be through the AN/FSG-l, serving as a switching relay be ~ tween the adjacent SAGE direction center and the batteries. Under Mode III, the Joint Manual Direction Center would assume responsibility for weapon control. This condition would ~sult from loss of the automatic data link between SAGE direction centers and Manual direction centers or complete ineffectiveness of the SAGE di rection center to control. Under the last Mode (IV), there would be autonomous operation by the AA batteries. '!he battery commanders would make the target weapon assignment. '!he CONAD test program was for a test of the centralized concept described in the above employment document and a determination of the most effective method. of employing M weapons under centralized control. When the CONAn concept was presegted to USAF, Air Secretary Donald Quarles directed that it be expanded. He directed that the CONAD concept cover not only the operational and technical compatibilities of the two systems, but also recommendations for AN/FSG-l modifications, specifically in the areAS of duplication. The CONAD group later met in Washington with a group from the Office of the Assistant Secretar,r of Defense for Research and Development. The latter was considering the technical aspects of the problem. The OSD group concurred in the CONAD centralized control concept and stated that technically the Missile u. UI L
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.~ _, u c SI E, 29 Master aDd SAGBaystemB could be Ede caapatible. 1bere re.ined the . need to dete~ .odificatioDS of the Missile Master aDd the two groupa &greed .to reatudy the problem. CO-LOCATION OF MISSILE MASTER ANDAN/GPA-37 I s AT TEN SITES !&cit in Colorado Spr1nga, a disagreement arose within the CONAD group. '!be ARADCOM llell'bers t'elt that they could not conscientiously agree to a IIIOd1fication ot' the Missile Master and theret'ore withdrew :rra. the group itselt'. The ARADCOM ot't'icers hoDeatly felt that the or1g1Dal. ArIq concept t'or design and use was adequate. 1be project continued but without direct Arrzq assistance. In a review ot' .the whole project, COHAD came to the realization that because the Missile M:ulter would be coming in ahead ot' SAGE, the t..Dediate problem vas .to :find a method ot' integrating the AN/FSG-l in to the .anual air det'enae system. They t'ound that the operation ot . the Are interceptor control system, the AN/GPA-37, could be integrat ed with the Missile Master at the SaDIe location. A concept for co location and integrating the two was then developed. Iftlia CODCept was approved by General Partridge and sent to the JCS OIl 19 September 1956 with an accompanying letter that stated in pe.rt:7 A c<:q)lete review of Missile Master (FSG-l) as a COltAD weapon control system under a centralized control concept has been made. It was concluded that the Missile Master (FSG-l) with minor modit'ication can 'be utilized in the air det'ense system for more effective employment ot' AA weapons. 1be Missile Master capability can be used prior to SAGE to provide a better AA weapons capability1 aDd dm-ing the SAGE era to support and back up the SAGE systea. Tbe Missile Master integration with the manual environ JleDt poses the 1JDmediate problem to be resolved. 'lhe opti IIl.D method of integrating the Missile loBster with SAGE will be deter.miued by the decisions made and precedents estab lished t'or use of the FSG-l in the manual system. In considering the methods of resolving the radar re quirements of the FSG-l, CONAl> determined that separate U CL IFIE I.. I I I .... . ( . ,' .
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30 U .L FlED surveillance, height find:tns, gap filler and IFF radars were not necessary for the FSG-l. '!be FSG-l surveillance requirement can be met by lo cating all FSG-l sites at ADC Manual Direction Centers and readjusting ADC gap filler deploy ments. 'lh1B concept of Joint utilization will require the establishment or a fev additional ADC manual direction centers and relocation of possi bly six others. 'n1is increases operational. capa bility and clarifies commend responsibilities, both in the pre-SAGE era and when the SAGE system is operational. It was noted in this letter that the ~ had committed 96.5 mil lion dollars for ten Missile Mlsters. It was stated that because or this co.a1tment and because these ten FSG-l's could be operatioml prior to SAGE, that they would be used in the Continental Air Derense Cl')1III8nd. A study of requirements for additional FSG-l's was beiD8 made by CONAD which asked that procurement be held up on any addition al Missile Masters until this study was completed. 'lb.e proposed locations for the ten AN/FSG-l's had been considered and in its study CONAD recoDlDellded establishment of Joint Bmual direc tion centers for the following areas: Washington-Baltimore, Bew York, Detroit, Niagara-Buffalo, Seattle, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Pittsburgh. In addition to the above, the st~ contained a concept far inte gration in the SAGE era and a plan for testing 1.JIIplementation or SAOB and Missile lokster integration. The proposal for operation in the SAGE era vas basically the same as described earlier. Both the Array and the Air Force accepted the COllAD :plan and on 30 October 1956, the Deputy Secretary of Defense concurred.6 He directed the A:rar:I to coordinate with CINCONAD in selecting sites for co-location of facilities in the areas listed above. He also directed the ~ to start action for construction and installation of facilities, to with hold procurement of additional Missile Masters beyond the first ten pending CINCONAD determination of requirements, and as determined and requested by CINCONAD to buy radars for joint use at sites where there vas to be no ADC or CAA radar. He directed the Air Force to ask CINOONAD to determine the re quirement for new or relocated surveillance radars for joint use and to I . i u u · SSIFIEOI
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L I ~eterm1ne the requirement for additional Missile Masters or modified Missile Masters. '!be Deputy Secretary also noted that a technical plan for inte gration of Missile Master into the continental air defense aystea (both JDBDual and SAGE) was being prepared. by the OSD Research aDd De velopment Office. 'Ibis plan would be based on the concepts and plans proposed by CINCOKAD. But installation of Missile Master vas not to be held up in the meantime. A Secretary of Defense memo to the Secretaries of the Air Force and the A.rrIry on 28 January 1957 advised that this technical. plan had been completed.9 '!be Air Force was . directed to request CINCOIAD to (1) submit for approval of the Secretary an overall test plan tor determining the feasibility and operational desirability tor central ized control of AA weapons through economical 1IIplementation ot SAGE and Missile Master or some modification thereot, (2) .enitor the studies, programs, and contract actions and tests outlined in the OSD technical plan, and (3) complete a study on radar coverage on joint requirements for co-located and integrated Missile Maater and direc tion centers. 'nlis memo, which was forwarded to CONAD by the Air Force in a letter dated 11 March 1957, also directed the Anl,yand Air Force to take specific study and contract actions on technical .at ters on SAGE-Missile Jester integration and to support CIKCORAD in providing a test program. With the help of a number ot ~ and Air Force agencies, COKAD went to work on the above tasks. A radar coverage study vas being made by ARADCOM and ·ADC for Missile Itlster and direction centers.10 The tremendous task ot preparing a test plan tor SAGE-Missile Master was nearing completion at the end ot the period ot this history. On 15 JulY 1957, CONAn sent a dratt plan to Are 8Dd ARADCOM tor tinal coordination.ll CONAD hoped to have the plan in the hands ot the Secretary of Defense by 15 September 1957. In the meantime, on 6 December 1956, CONAn issued the letter mentioned earlier that directed co-location of Missile Masters and radar direction centers at Joint direction centera. Following this, the requirements for the ten aites vere reviewed jointly by COllAD, ARADCOM and ADC. . On 4 February 1957, COXAD outlined its requirements to the JCS.12 At three sites whereADC radar was suitably located~ the Missile Master building was to be built next to the Are·direction center• : ~'. .. . .. IE 1
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:.v ~ .... '. UNCLASS I !'!he operations rooa in the Missile Master bUilding vas to be enlarged and the ADC operatiDg poeitiou placed in this roo.. The Air Force technical equiPMDt vas to rea.in in the ADC build1.nse. 'lheae sites vere: Deteue Area Site - Bev York P-9# B1p'anda# B. J. Detroit P-20, 8elt'riclp AFB# Mich. .iapra-~o P-21# Lockport AfB# K. Y. lIev co-located aDd integrated Misaile Maater-direetion centers were to be coaatl"uctecl at six sites. 'Ihe Miaaile Mutel" build1Dg vu to be lIOd1t1ecl to perIL1.t 1natallation ot ADC equ1~nt aDd operating poaitiODB in a Joint operati0G8 roo.. 'Blese aites vere: Detenae Area Site Boston Fort Heath, Mass. Chicago Arlington Hta, Ill. Philadelphia ADC Siw .P-9A . Los Angeles San Pedro Hill Pittsburgh South Park Mil. Res. Seattle Fort Lawton '!he final one of the ten sites was to be placed at Fort George B. Meade, Maryland, under the same plan as for the above six. But this was to be lett for a later date and treated iDdependently as it was re quired for technical testing of the Missile *,ster in1tially. On 15 lIhrch 1951, CONAD vas advised that the ArrIq would procure land and build a Missile Mas}er o~rations building next to the AJX; buildings at P-9# P-20, and P-2l. 3 At the other sites# the ~ would build a new facility. Tb avoid any delay on the latter, the specific land requirements and site locations and the space and technical re quirements for these were requested as soon as possible. A complete plan for the ten joint d1rect~on centers was provided jointly by ARADCOM and ADC on 30 April. l 'nle latter was approved by CONAn and sent to the JCS on 2 *,y.15 On the 23rd ot May, CONAD was informed by the executive agent for the JCS that the Army had concurred on the ADC ARAOOOM p~ and that the Air Force and Arra:I were proceeding to imple ment it.~ '!he Arrrq and Air :Force established a joint technical and steering committee tor this purpose. UNCLASSIFIED
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" CIIiQDl:r "" " LA lED .:..~~'\ t , " ~, ( . .. . ~ . .... ~ • . ;... ' 33 '.I. ~" .' CONAD estimates placed the date for operation of the combined Missile Master-direction center facilities at least two years off.17 '!be Joint installations atP-9, P-20, and P-2l were figured to start first "-- in May 1959. '!be remainder would COrle into operation in late 1959 and early 1960. Fort Meade would be the last of the ten, set at about June 1960. CO-LOCATION OF REMAINING AAOC's WITH ADDC 's Meanwhile, COllAD turned: to the problela of co-locating and inte grating the remaining AAOC's With their associated direction centers. In all, there were 22 priDBry AAOC's in the continental United States (see map ~ollow1ng). Ten of these,aa baa been discussed, bad been ap proved for co-location. 'nlis left twelve to be decided upon'! On 12 April, COKAD directed each of its regional co ndera to survey their areas andrecOJaend co-location and integration wherever operationally and economically feasible. 18 Of these 12, seven were in the Eastern Region. 'nle Eastern cO!lll9.nd.er recOl!lDeDded co-location ot only three .. -- Loring AlB, Sault Ste Marie, and Savannah.19 Four were in the Western Region" which reccw-ended co-location ot one -- Fairehild.20 Central bad ODe, but did not recOBBeDd its co-location.21 Operations or econoay factors were the primary reasons given tor not co-locating. '!hese recOllDeJldations were being considered at Ilid-1957. CO-LOCATION IN ALASKA COHAD's co-location concept was also applied to Alaska, where the Air Force bad prograDDed the intercept system BADGE (Base Air Detense Ground Environment) and the Army bad prograDDed the weapon control ," syatea AB/H3G-4. The CONAD requirement tor Alaska was stated to the JCS as tollows:22 A requirement exists for two Army Defense Control System sets in FY 1960 (AN/MSG-4). One system should be installed to control the fire of antiaircraft units in * On 2 August,CONAD asked ADC and ARADCOM to report on feasi bility of co-locating the MOC and ADDC at 'lbule, Greenland -- which would make a total of 13 sites to be decided upon. There had been 26 AAOC's; three vere inactivated this period. urCLA STFIED
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U CL .. .~. :..:~~:~ . PROPOSED PROGRAMMING 3E6RET Millllile M!lster Missile Master SAGE Long Range Location I- Search Radar OpsDate Co.):) Fac Radar Ope Sector Ope B.O.D. Radar Ope 1 Feb 59 WlI.8h-Balt Def 1 Dec 57 1 Mar 58 Sbie AB/1P8-20 troa (Ft Meade, M:l) Co.p. 1 J\m 60 P-5 to Ft Nea.de 1 Jun 60 (»II Only) after Phla DefeMe COIIb l"ac: becomes operatlODal. Reschedule AB/FPS-7 (Ft Heath, Mus) 15 Sep 58 Boeton Defense 15 May 57 1 Sep 59 1 Jan 59 1 Mar 59 troa P-10 Pittsburgh Def 1 Jan 59 1 Mar 59 Reschedule AB/FPS-3 (So Pit Mil Res) 1 Jul 58 1 Apr 59 1 Sep 59 from ~134 Reschedule AI/CPA-57 troll ~134 Chicago Defense 1 JII.ll 59 1 Mar 59 Reschedule AB/FPS-3 (Arlington Ute) 1 8ep 58 1 Sep 59 15 *7 59 from '111-178 Re schedule AR/OPA-57 rro. 'DC-178 Seattle De~ense 1 Feb 60 .1 Jan 59 lMar 59 Reechedule A1f/FPS-3 (Ft Layton, Wash) 1 Sep 59 15 ~ 59 t'roIa P-l.Reeehedule AB/aPA-'Z7 t'roIa P-1 Philadelphia Def Reschedule A1f/FPS-3 (P-9A) 1 May 59 1 Jul 59 1 Jan 60 1 .Jul 58 15 Mar 57 ~OII '111-179 Reschedule A1f/aPA-57 ~OII '111-179 Loa Angeles Def 1 Oct 60 Sbip A1f/1P8-20 troa (San Pedro Hill) 1 Mar 60 1 M!L760 1 Jul 59 1 Sep 59 p-62 Ope date Pitts burgh Defense 1. Following AaaW Sites Yill have 2. EquiplRDt for above sitell calling fr<:w iDdicated a sUpp11.6'8 in operational dates. lIources. a. 'l'M-178 ~OII 12./58 to 1/60 11.. 'DI-178 - AJf/FPS-20 rro. p-63, (1) A1f/FPS-6 b. 'DI-179 ~om 3/59 to 1/60 t'roIa P-63, (1) Alf/FPS-6 ~om P-62, IJf/GPA-37 c. SM-1]4 ~OIII 4/59 to 1/60 ~aII P-63 b. 'DI-179 - AJf/FPS-3, GPA-'Z7 frail P-31, (2) 3. Alf/FST-2 Dispoeition AN/FPS-6'tJ from P-31, Alf/aPA-37 fro. P-31 11.. P-10 to M-96 c. SM-1]4 - Alf/FPS-20 troll P-39, (2) Alf/'FP8-6' s b. P-54 to M-128 f'roII P-10, Alf/aPA-37 from p-62 4. Following AC&W sites will 5. P-1 Yill IIO'Ye to Ft Lawtcn revert to gap fIller statu. a. P-10 d. p-54 b. P-31 e. P-62 c. P-39 f. P-63 S SEDita: j --/ . IF ED
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MISSllE-MASTER PROGRAM 35 Bei8bt Finders Alf/C2A-37 Alf/FfYr-2 Relllarka lilt Alf/pps-6 2nd Alf/pps-6 Ship tro. P-54 with Alf/FPS-20 Ship f'roa P-54 with Alf/PPS-20 Sh;t trca P- with All/FPS-20 Ship tro. P-63 Reschedule 2nd PPS-6 troll p-62 Reschedule 2nd PPS-6 troa P-31 Ship troa P-IO atter Ope date Boeton Reschedule trcap-62 Reschedule tro. SM-IJ4 Reschedule troa SM-IJ4 Reschedule trom SM-IJ4 Reschedule trca P-31 Stop Installation ot 2nd Alf/FPS-6 atP-62 Stop SAG! Annex at P-62 Reschedule troa '111-178 Reschedule troa '111-178 Reschedule f'roa '111-178 Froa Stor _age or step up in production Stop Installation ot 2nd Alf/rPS-6 at P-31 Stop SAGE Annex at P-31 Reschedule 2nd Alf/FPS-6 troll P-l Ship troll IT.-l ops date )I( Ship traa P-l ope date )I( Reschedule fro. P-l Stop SAGE Annex at P-l Reschedule trca m-179 Reschedule trOll '111-179 Reschedule trca m-179 Fraa stor age or step up in production Reschedule 2nd Alf/FPS-6 trom P..39 Ship troa P-39 ope date MM Ship troll P-39 ope date )I( Reschedule trca P-39 Stop SAG! Annex at P-39 6. Alf/FSA-IO's aDd Alf/FPS-18's p-63 Claysburg, Fa. C8DDot be progruaed until SM-IJ4 Pickatown, s. D. such tiDe as saP tiller 'Df-178 Levi.town, )t)nt. coverage and requirements m-179 lCaliapel1, Mont. tor Missile M!lster Prograa are known. 7. Site Locationa. * Source: ARADCOM, ADO to COlIAD, "Plana tor COJIAD (3oint) Direction Catera at '!'en (10) Loeatiou," P-1 MeChord AFB, 'oIaah. 30 April 1957, Inel., Tab •• i;,.· P-10 110. Truro, M!lss. '. P-31 W11l1a.e Ba7, Wisc. P-39 San Clemente I., Cal. P-5~ Pa1erao, B. 3. p-62 Brookfield, Ohio • SEGBEr CL I
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uzxjco LOCATION OF PRIMARY ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT OPERATIONS CENTERS 30 June 1957 O Rapid City Sites approved for colocation Rte.t Pro'.ct
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UNCLAS I D . J7 ,, defense of the Ladd/Eielson bases (Fairbanks), and the other system to control antiaircraft units in defense of Elmendorf-Fort Richardson (Anchorage) and the IRBM sites at Willow Run and Hidden Lake. Each of the AN/M3G-4's will be interconnected with the BADGE system.· Colocation of the AN/M3G-4 and the associated ADDC is established-policy. Alaskan Air Command and U. S. Army Alaska reviewed possible site locations in the Fairbanks and Anchorage areas. '!hey tentatively selected MurphY Dome in the former and:ltbunt Susitna in the latter for joint direction centers.23 Murphy Dome would require only expansion of current facilities, but the Mount Susitna site would require new · facilities. They hoped to get these sites in the FY 1959 MCP. CONA» approved selection of Murphy Dome on 31 May 1957, but with held approval of )bunt SUsitna.24 '!he latter was difficult to reach and would require that a road be built fram sea level to over 4,000 feet altitude. CONAD felt that the cost and eonstruetion difficulties would be too great. On 18 June, CONAn recommended to the JCS that co location at Murphy Dome be approVed.25 cmcAL was advised that JCS approval of a site in the~chOrage area would be requested when a suitable site was chosen. UNCL
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LA F ED~ j.~TATUS 0 - COMBAT'-' ~ :WEAP()NS JULY 1956 -JUNE 1957 ADCINTERCEPTORS At mid-1956, ADC had a total of 68 all-weather interceptor squad rons assigned. However, four ot these squadrons (31st, 482nd, 484th and 5l8th) had no aircratt. At mid-1957, the ADC interceptor force within the continental limits ot the U. S. had grown to 69 -- three of which (39Bth, 484th and 5l8th) remained without aircraf't or crews. Now also there were three squadrons located in the Ifortheastarea to make a total of 72 under ADC ownership. '!hese squadrons, acquired on 1 April 1957, were located at Goose (59th), Harmon (6lst) and 'lbule (74th). ADC Interceptor Force* 'lYPE AIRCRAFr F-86D F-86L F-86D/L F-89D F-89H F-89J F-89D!H F-89H/J F-94c F-102A F-94c-F-102A F-89D-F-102A Sqdns No Aircraft 'mTAL J~el956 42 o o 8 1 o4 o 8 1 o o 4 b8 SQUADRONS ~el957 13 10' 11** 5 4 1 o 5 5 13 1 ' 1 3 · 72 * For source, see Reference Note One at back of book. ** Includes the three squadrons located in the Northeast Area. See Appendix Two for complete listing of squadrons. u · / UCLASSIFIED
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39
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.: . U CL . 40 As the above table indicates, the ADC ~orce was in a state ot flux because o~ extensive conversion and moditication. These programs had taken their toll on CONAl> combat potential through 1956 in both crews and aircr~t. At m1d-1957, the ratio ot crews- and aircraf't over mid-1956 had shown. only slight improvement. On 30 June 1956, 1,485 mission aircraft were assigned ADC, with 844 operationally ready. To man this fleet 1,939 crews were assigned ADC ot which 999 were 0per ationally ready. '!hese totals .had. by mid-1957 reached the tollowing proportions: 1,501 aircraft assigned with 830 ready; 2,ll2 crew as signed and 1,184 ready.2 '!be improvement, though slight, was important because it toretold added combat potential with improved and/or new ~ighting machines~ '!he F-86D h&d been the primary weapon throughout 1956. It was sup ported by the F-94c and the F-89D. At m:1d-1957, these three models were either being mod1~ied or replaced with a new aircraf't -- the F-102A -- and three improved models -- the F-89H, the F-89J and the F-BbL. The F-89H was a new version o~ the F-89D which could tire the GAR-I (Falcon) air-to-air missile. A second advanced model ot the F-89D waS the F-89J which could ~ire the MB-l. 'Ibis lattermociel. made it possible tor CONAn to incorporate atomic weapons into the air de ~enses. ~.s Project FOLLOW-ON"" provided the third improved model - the F-86L -- which was an F-86D with modernized electronic gear and wings with slatted leading ~s. The major increase shown in the air cra~t inventory came with the introduction o~ a truly new aircra~ - the F-102A. This latter plane was a delta-wing, single-place inter ceptor which held the promise o~ ,giving CONAD a much greater detensive capability.3 However, the increased combat potential did not come as soon as expected. The lag resulted from a number o~ ~actors, the most ser~ being the conversion and moditication programs. Fi~en squadrons (approxima.tely 23 per cent) o~ ADO' s ~ighter ~orce had lost their com bat capability because o~ a USAF directed conversion ~m operational F-86D's to non-operational F-102A's. * Project FOLLOW-ON was to make the F-86D compatible with the new AN/GPA-'R. ** See Appendix 'l\ro. UNCLAS I IE
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FiE " ~ 41 '!be entire F-102A program was jeopardized by tbe lengtb ot time it was taking to reach combat readiness because ot an unreliable missile launch mechanism and fire control system ()oI)-lO) and poor results with the Falcon (GAR-lD) missile. On 28 June 1957, only 91 of the 301 assigned F-102A aircra:f't were operationally ready. Cor rective measures were being studied by AlC and .ARDC. But doubt re mained in the minds of tbe CONAn sta.tt that the flaws could be ironed out before introduction of the F-l04B -- a program which would engulf' six more squadrons -- in July 1957.4 . . . Further lowering tbe combat potential was the conversion tOF-89J aircraft. As pOinted. out above, the F-89Jwaa ·introduced. into the weapons inventory to provide the COlllllBlld with an atomic capability. But of the six squadrons converting, only two had the faeilities to use the primary armament -- tbe MB-l. Alao significant was the modi fication required on tbe F-8bD to ccmvert to the F-86L. Eleven squadrons were meeting Project FULLOW-oN schedules by 30 June 1957. In all, a total of 31 squadrons were involved in the modification and conversion programs at mid-1957 -- which spread CONAn combat capa bility fairly tbin.5 Another serious problem caused. by operation of the newer aircraft was that of providing adequate firing systems. A closely related problem was that of providing the weapons system with missiles that could be effectively controlled. In testing the firing systems (E-9 and lCJ-10) of the F-89H and F-102A with tbeir priDBry armaments (the GAR-l and GAR-lD), it was found. that they were not reliable. It was not entirely the fault of tbe weapons systems, bowever, for the missiles themselves failed to guide properly. Apparent fixes to the problem had been discovered by June 1957, although extensive testing was needed before they could be accepted whole-heartedly. ~t no solution was expected to reduce the vulnerabliity of the firing systems to ECM for some time. No fighter equipped. with the E series :fire control system (~S) could adequately overcome j8DlD1ng under IFR conditions. The newer MD-lu of the F-lu2A offered some ad vantages, bu~ it was still vulnerable. A capability was expected wi~h the introduction of ~he MG-13/40 series FCS programmed for FY 1960. But no imnediate improvement, if a:tJ.Y, was planned for the equip ment currently employed.b~ ... . ~ .:"" UNCLASSifiED ~I
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41 ( , . UNCLASS FlED, __ .... - The entire F-102A program was jeopardized by the length or time it was taking to reach combat readiness because or an unreliable missile launch mechanism and :fire control system (K;-10) and poor ,results with the Falcon (GAR-lD) missile. On 28 June 1957, only 91 'or the 301 assigned F-l()2A aircraft were operationally ready. Cor rective measures were being studied by AJoC and .ARDC. But doubt re DBined in the minds o:f the CONAn starf' that the :flaws could be ironed out be:fore introduction o:f the F-104B -- a program which would engulf six moresquacirons -- in July 1957.4 FUrther lowering the combat potential was the conversion to F-89J aircraft. As pointed out above, the F-89J was introduced into the weapons inventory to provide the command with an atomic capability. But O:f the six squadrons converting, only two had the :facilities to use the primary armament -- the MB-1. Also sign1:ficant was the modi :fication required on the F-80D to convert to the F-86L. Eleven squadrons were meeting Project FOLLOW-ON schedules by 30 June 1957. In ali, a total o:f 31 squadrons were involved in the modi:fication and conversion pro~ at mid-1957 -- which spread CONAD combat capa bility :fairly thin.5 Another seriOus problem caused by operation o:f the newer aircraft was that o:f providing adequate :firing systems. A closely related problem was that o:f providing the weapons system with missiles that could be e:f:fective1y controlled. In testing the :firing systems (E-9 and K;-10) o:f the F-89H and F-102A with their priDBry armaments (the GAR-1 and GAR-lD), it was :found that they were not reliable. It was not entirely the :fault o:f the weapons systems, however, :for the missiles themselves :failed to guide properly. Apparent fixes to the problem had been discovered by June 1957, although extensive testing was needed be:fore they could be accepted who1e-heartedly. But no solution was expected to reduce the vulnerab1iity o:f the f'iring systems to ECM f'or some time. No f'ighter equipped with the E series f'ire contro1- system (~S) could adequately overcome jamming under IFR conditions. '!he newer MJ-1u of' the F-1u2A oUered some ad vantages, but it was still vulnerable. A capability was expected wi~h the 1n~roduction of' ~he MG-13/40 series PeS programmed f'or FY 1960. But no imnediate improvement,if' any, was planned :for the equip ment currently emp10yed.b UNCLASSIFIED,
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42 UNCLASST I 0 ALASKAN AIR COMMAND'INTERCEPTORS The following table shows the number and location of the Alaskan Air CODIIIB.ild interceptor un1ts as of 31 March 1957.1 SQUADRON LOCATION TrPE AIRCRAFr 64th 65th bOth lBth 433rd 449th Elmendorf Elmendorf Elmendorf Ladd . Ladd Ladd F-B9O F-B9D F-B9D F-B9D F-B9D F-89D At mid-1956, the AAC fighter program called for three squadrons to convert to F-102A I S beginning in June 1951, two squadrons to con vert to F-B9J I s starting in January 1951, and the sixth squadron to convert to the F-l04B bYBearly 1960. All of these actions wen to be completed by March 1960. '!his plamiing guide underwent considerable change by mid-1951, however. In February, USAF programned a two squadron cut of the AAC interceptor force. The new plan provided for a total of four squad rons -- three to convert to the F-l02A (64th, 65th and lBth) and one (the 449th) to operate with the F-B9J. CINCAL, Lieutenant General Frank A. Armstrong, proposed cutting the force even f'urther. He recommended reducing the six squadrons in existence to two squadrons of F-102A's, the level at which he felt Alaska could best support the defense eff'ort. His reasons were as follows: no more than two squadrons could be ef'fectively employed or controlled with the ground environment equipment either programmed or in existence; AAC could more effectively serve as an early warning command; and the reduction would be beneficial in saving large amounts of construction f'Unds previously allocated in the Military Construc tion Program (K!P) of FY' s 195B and 1959 for MB-l facilities. 9 General Partridge accepted CINCAL's recOJDDendation and in May, he directed General Armstrong to plan on a cut from six to two squadrons in FY 1958. However, CINCONAD. suggested that ·the MB-l facilities be def'erred rather than deleted pending JCS approval.10 UNCL I , .. - I
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-: ..... :!..~,:~ :~ " u JCS approval of the t'WO squadron proposal had not been received. by mid-1957 and the MC fighter program w.s left in a state of nux. '!'he table below outlines the status of the AAC program in July 1957:11 CONVERSION Sqdn Date of Sqdn Re- Date o'f Type Standown placement Replacement Aircrat't 64th* 1 Jul 57 317th(McChord) 1 Aug 57 P'-l~ :>;::.: , .}~ 65th** 1 Oct 57 11th(Duluth ) 1 Nov 57 F-I02A .-:-.. 66th 1 Nov 57 - 30 Nov 57 None(Move to -------- ----- Oxnard) 18th* 1 Aug 57 3lst(Wurtsmith) 1 Sep 57 F-I02A 433rd 1 Oct 57 - 30 Oct 57 None(lobve to -------- ------ Glascow) 449th Training Status in July 1957 F-89J FIGHTER AUGMENTATION FORCES At mid-195o, this force vas composed. of approximately 6,000 air craf't, o'f which about 1,000 were equipped. for all-weather operations. By mid-1957~'the augmentation force had been cut to a little over 4,000 planes to be employed either "in_place" (i.e., at their home base) or at pre-planned. deployment bases. '!he drop in numerical stre~ resulted tram CONAD's changing operational concepts described below. USAF Augmentation. Approximately 1,700 of the mid-1956 force were furnished. by SAC, TAC and A'lt!. Under the operational concept followed. throughout 1956, most of these aircraft would have to deploy great distances to the Northeast and Northwest sections of the country. This concept had proven almost valueless because of the time required. to deploy and the difficulties involved. in controlling these movements. * Squadron exchange: name and personnel ** '!he movement was being held in abeyance pending JCS action. U . L S1 lED
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44 .~- UNCL~SS'flED By mid-1957, long deployment moves had been eliminated. Pre planned deployments were still in use, but they were limited to the IFR range of the aircraft without enraute refueling and to bases where support was avail.a.ble. A new employment plan based on this concept was issued in July 1957. USAF augmentation units were concentrated for the defense of SAC bases and the southern border regions rather than for the North east and Northwest. Deployment assignments were limited to the fighters of A'D: and 224 aircraft were progra.mDed for the defensive shifts.13 On 1 July 1957, the total number of USAF augmentation fighters avail.a.ble to CONAD amounted to ~ planes of A'D: and TAC (224 A'D:, 464 TAC). SAC no longer furnished aircraft because its fighter units had been given to TAC. ~ An agreement between CONAD, A.UC and TAC gave CONAD operat10nal control or a~l tact1ca~ fighter day units schedUled for general war deployment during D-Day through D plus two months for the first 30 days after D-Day. Fighter-bomber units scheduled for general war deployment during the first month after D-Day were to be returned to TAC operational control ten days before scheduled deployment or no later than D plus 20 days, whichever came first. However, there was also the possibility that some or all of the TAC fig~er-bOmber units might be deployed immediately after D plus 48 hours.l ~ Navy Augmentation. '!be Navy augmentation force remained com paratively stable between June 1956 and June 1957'. 'lbe status reports showed around 2,300 fighters available in mid-1956 and some 2,112 for June 1957. Navy planes available for emergency defense (reserve train ing, training and fleet aircraft) inciuded on~y those aircraft that were operating from Land bases. However, the actual number of aircraft that could be counted on for anyone time hinged largely upon f~eet and carrier commitments and the almost daily change in the reserve and training forces status.15 Air National Guard. At mid-1956, the Air N'ational Guard had ap proximately 1,500 fighters in the 69 squadrons available to ADC. About a third of the squadrons had all-weather aircraft -- primarily F-89B's and CIS and F-94A's and B's. By 1 July 1957, the total ANG capability wasl,247 fighters in the 69 squadrons which consisted of 23 ~l-weather squadrons and 46 day UNCLASSIFiED
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· t L squadrons.16 It vas difricult to estimate the actual number ot air crart that could be depended upon at any one time, however, tor the Guard was scheduled ror a large scale conversion program in Py 1958. Nevertheless, the mobilization objective or the ANG was still to make 65 per cent ot its assigned aircraft and personnel available within two hours after receipt or warning. Air Force Reserve. '!he operational plan in etrect throughout 1956 called ror the Reserve units allocated tor air derense to support CONAD 1"rom D through D plus 30 days. Ai'ter the rirst 30 days, the Re serve rorces were to support TAC -- their primary mission in the event ,' , -,r rij.-·.- :.. . or war. As or 30 J\.Ule 1956, the Air Reserve bad 22 tighter squadrons ac tive. From these squadrons approximately 300 fighters could be count ed on in an emergency. Ten or the squadrons were equipped with obso lescent F-Bo's, eight had F-84E's, three had F-84G's and the last squadron was equipped with the T-28 -- a propeller driven training aircraft. '!he picture at mid-1951 bad changed little witb respect to air derense capability. CONAD estimated that eight squadrons were sutri cient to accomplish the intended air derense role. or the eight squadrons chosen to support CONAD on 1 July 1951, three were equipped with the F-BO (88 airc~rt), three bad F-B4E's (53 aircrart), one had the F-86H £16 aircraft}, and one had a caDl>ination ot F;.84E/G's (44 aircrart). 1 With respect to operational 'control, COHAn's hand bad been strengthened. Operational control or the Reserve squadrons was to re main with CONAn as long as the units were needed. ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS STATUS, CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES* '!he U. S. Army Air Derense Command bad a total or 46 assigned . Nike missile battalions against a progra.JllDed strength or 50 battaliOns at mid-l95b. Its goal was to obtain 61 on-site Nike battalions by the end or FY 1951, which was also the number needed to meet CONAD' s re quirements ror the same date. * See Appendix Three ror USARADCOM Station List or 15 April 1951. ') .s-9E8RET NClASSIFIED
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~ I D. For all practical purposes, this goal was met, for the last of the batteries in the Nike Ajax program was on site by June 1951. As of 30 June 1951, ARADCOM had 58 Nike battalions on site -- in fire power the equivalent of 61 battalions. Although a two month period was required for the batteries to become fully operational after be ing placed on sitg, an operational capability could have been reached on short notice. l ARADCOM was not so successful. in meeting its planned requirements for gun (9Q-12UJm) and Skysweeper (15m) battalions. On 30 June 1956, there were 39 battalions with these weapons (ten Skysweeper, twenty five 9ODm, and four 12cma). By 30 June 1957, there were programmed to be 56 gun and six Skysweeper battal10ns for the United States, or a total of b2 (this included both Regular ~ and National Guard bat talions). But the Department of the ~ decided to limit united States active on-site gun battalions to 42 -- 17 Army and 25 National Guard -- and active Skysweeper battalions to three A:rrIry, or a total of 45. '!he ArrIq's action in making the reduction resulted from a slash in its budget. '!be first effects were felt on 15 April. 1.95'( when seven 9QIm gun battalions were deactivated at the following def'ense ar,eas: Washington-Bal'r,imore, Philadelphia, New York, Detroit, Chicago and San Francisco. In this same month, three 15D1D. (Skysweeper) battalions at Castle, March and Carsvell Air Bases were also deactivated"! '!he revised on-site program goal was met and on 30 June 195·(, USARADCOM had three Skysweeper battalions, 13 90am and four l20mn gun battalions in the United States.** '!he units being inactivated were, for the most part, 1il defense areas where Nike or other gun battalions were located. Neither guns nor Skysweepers constituted CINCONAD's priDBry defensive weapons and therefore, no serious degradation of the defense system was expected. * '!he 90mm gun battalions inactivated were: the 14th and 601st in the Washington-Baltimore area; the 19th at Philadelphia; the 98th at New York; the 99th at Detroit; the 734th at Chicago and the 152d at San Francisco. '!he deactivated Skysweeper units were the 52d at Castle, the 451st at l>i1rch and the 546th at Carswell. ** Not included in the above totals are the ,forces1n the North east Area -- two batteries of Skysweepers and one battalion of 90mm guns. I I .- l I ~ FlED
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2 SKY OF ASSIGNED BATTALIONS go JUNE 1957 SEATTLE HANFORD SAN FRANCISCO COS ANGELES ALLOCATION FAIR CHILO ELLSWORTH 4 S. MARIE S 12 MILWAUKEE BTRYS LORING 131 BOSTON CHICAGO DETROIT p ROVIOENCE CLEVELAND PtiTSBURGH 2 SKY SAVANNAH R NORFOLK HARTFORO•BRIDGEPORT NEW YORK p HILA DELPH i A WASHINGTON •
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. ~.~~> • ' •• 48 Long bef'ore the Departllent of' the ArT:q bad to reD>Ye the 15 battalions f'r0Dl the three air bases, SAC bad attempted to get CIlf COlCAD's approval of' such a JIOVe. Seven SAC bases in the United State. had gun battalions only. CIlfCSAC f'elt that the AA battalions detenaive capabilities were negligible and that the cost of' supporting th18 de teD8e vas prohibitive. SAC proposed reDK>ving those battalions whos. prograaa did not call f'or conversion to Kike. " SAC's stand on this matter vas supported by USA.F~ In August 1956, General 'lh0lla8 D. White, lEAF Vice Chief' of' Staf'f', wrote hi. Arm:f counterpart that: 19 Presently there are' a nlDiber ot AA gun battalions l~ated in air def'ense of' USAF bases. A thorough study ot all AA guns in the present United States inventory wa. accomplished and they appear wholly deticient to cope with the threat. '!be cost of' reta1ning these weapons is f'elt to be disproportionate to the air de f'err.e obtained. '!he Air Force is unable and. unvllling ~ spend any additional tunds in direct or indirect svpport ot these battalions. ~ " ~ answer to General White was not long in coming. '!be A.rrIq re plied bt it W88 cognizant ot the limitations of' AA guns and that its ultimatA obJective was conversion of' all gun units to surf'ace-to-air m1ssile units. However, the answer cont1nued:20 •••the Arm:! does not agree that they [i.A gunsJ appear wholly deticient to cope with the threat. The ArtIlY would point out, instead, that 'AA Guns' in general have a U.m1ted capability to meet the potential threat•••require ments •••are established either through JCS action or by conjPanders of' unif'ied C()JIIIIUl<ia •••no unilateral action can be taken by Department ot the A.rmy to withdraw Antq AA units tultilling•••[detensiJ missions on USAF bases. 'the JEtter was eventually brought to the attention of' CINCONAD who supported the A:rmy. Some detense, CINCONAD f'elt, was better than no de-tense. General Partridge wrote General Curtis E. LeMay, then CINCSAC, that: - "Everything possible will be done ••• to expedite the conversion of' all AA gun units to missile units. In the meantime, present17 assigned Skysweeper battaliOns should be retained pending their replacement by suitable guided missile units. '~l Four ot the .eYeD bases (P'airchild, 'rravis, Loring and Ellsworth) were prograumed UNCL SSIFIEO'
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UCL I to receive their Jlis8ile units by the end o~ Y'l 1958. 'Dle reaain1ng three, as pointed out above, vere deactivated, thus settling the problem. lfational ~ Units. 'lhe Depe.rtaeDt o~ the ArIq cut-back in ~orc:es also bad ita effect OD USARADCOM'a lfational Ouard CD-aite pro gram. At mid-1956, 121 Rational Ouard batter1ea -- the equivalent o~ about 30 battalions -- were p~ tor the eM ot rt 1957. Snen ty-nine National Guard antia1reratt artillery batteries were OD-aite in June 1956 aDd ot this number 53 bad been deaignated to the Special Security Foree. Highly skilled, they could JDOTe quick17 to their OD site emergency positions and provide etfective aDd austa1Ded fire. against an aggressor. '!he revised on-site program called ~or a total o~ 25 BatloD&l. Guard gun battalions or a decrease over the md-l956 prograa ot five battalions. At JDid-1957, 100 batteries ot the Guard were on-aite compared to the 101 progr8JllDed. Ninety had been designated to the Special Security Foree. In addition to the 25 National Guard Gun battalions in the revised on-site program, 32 National Guard (9QIa) and 13 Skysweeper (75J!D) battalions had M-Day mssioDS to augamt and/or replace active Army gun units.22 Operational status ot active ArrIry batteries in June of 1956 aDd 1957 is shown on the following table (June 1957 figures 1Dclude 'lbule ):23 June 1956 HIKE GUN SKYSWEEPER 182 116 30 . Av. No. Assigned 236 7a. 14 151 110 27 Av. No. On-Site 221 71 13 ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS STATUS. ALASKA AND NOR THEAST AREA '!he CONAD F'i 1957 program called tor three gun (9OJa-12CBa) bat talions and two Skysweeper (75l1li) battalions in Alaska aDd ODe gun [battalioriand tvo-thirds ot aSkysveeper battalion in the Northeast. " ' .. lED
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-- 50 U CL I The number and location of the deployed units were &8 progr8Dllled (see below) 24 ALASKA (~h 1957)* UNITS LOCATION WEAPON 96th Bn .Elmendorf(Ft. 90Dm Richardson ) 867th Bn Elmendorf 75D11l(Sky) 5~d Bn Eielson 12Qmn 450th Bn Eielson 75mm(Sky) 93d :en !.add l20nJn C Btry 450th Bn Ladd 75DDD(Sky) NOR'lEEAST (April 1957)* UNIT LOCATION-- WEAPON 549th Bn 'lhule 9QIm 428th Btry(L) 'nlule 7511D(Sky~ 429th Btry(L) 'lhule 75D1D(Sky / '!be subject of re-arming the Alaskan and the Greenland. AA t'orces with the Nike missile was under study. Plans by mid-1957 were to equip the three non-Skysweeper battalions in Alaska with Nike in the June 1958-June 1960 .t1me-period and the 'nlule 90um gun battalion with a Nike Hercules battalion in FY 1960.25 • The antiaircraft units in the lIortheast were assigned to U8ARADCOM on 1 September 1956. Ant1a1rcra:rt units in Al.aaka were as signed to u. s. Artq, Alaska, a caaponent CC'WPlnd ot' AlaSka COBIMOO. UNCL ·
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" STATUS OF -THE RA AR SYSTEMS JULY 1956 - JUNE 1957 UNITED STATES LAND BASED RADAR On 30 June 1957, ADC had a network o-r 120 land-based radar sta tions in the United States. This total represented an increase o-r , nine stations over the mid-1956 status. '!he operational radar sta l · .,,;;;~·,; tions in the ADC network consisted o~ the -rollow1ng according to radar program:1 PROGRAM 1956 "p" Stations 75 75 First Phase Mobile Stations 28 28 Second Phase ltk>bile Stations 4 9 Third Phase Mobile Stations 0 0 ~ \ ~F1ll~~~;ations ~ ~ ~ : --Jri -up ODS ~ ! J The CONAD goal was ~or 133 radar stations in the U. si -ror the el1~ o-r FY 1957. However, a shortage o-r maintenance and operation (M!:O) t'unds allotted by USAF to ADC -rorced the latter to de-rer acti vation o-r 13 ltt>bi1e Program stations originally funded in the FY' 57 budget. '!be action taken by ADC to remain within its budget presented a three--rold problem: it meant delay in completing the ZI perimeter surveillance network, particularly 'in the Gull Coast area where most o-r the stations had been de-rerred; it lett gaps in the overall detec tion network; and it raised the total number o-r stations to be f'UDded -ror F.i 1958 to 24. CONAD's ACW objective -ror the end o-r FY 1958 was 144 radars in the continental U. S. or an increase o-r 11 stations over the F.i 1957 goal. ''!hus, to meet the requirements it would be necessary -ror ADC to tund -ror the 13 de-rerred stations as well as the II stations originally planned for Fr 1958 complet100. As one COBAD of'1'1cial put it: "Failure to meet current fiscal year construction . programs obviously has a 'snow-balling' ett'ect on :tuture programs. "2 J ;,; It was -reared that CONAD's plans for . a rap1d increase in surve1lls.nce facilities would be Jeopardized by such actions. UNCLAS IFIED
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52
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UNCLA At mid-1957, CONAn was confronted not only with quantitative de.. ficiencies but also vith qualitative problema. '!be air surveillaDce system -- caaposed largely of Alf/FPS-3 and Alf/CPS-6B type radars - had neither the range nor altitude to eft'ectively cope with high speed bombers :f'1.y1ng above 45,000 teet. Also, the system was YUl.nerable to a mass ECM supported attack at any altitude.* Both deticiencies were expected to be corrected by moditication ot the existing radars with the AR/GPA-27 aDd the acquisition ot newer AM/FPS-7 and AN/FPS-20 radars. However, at the end. of JUne, only a tev stations bad the AR/GPA-27 'operational and the AN/FPS-7 was not expected to enter the ADC inventory until July 1958.3 '!be lot>bile Radar Program. A total of 84 radar stations were planned tor the three phases of the mobile program. 'Ibis total was divided as tollows: 39 stations in the tirst phase, 21 in the second, and 24 in the third.' '!bese goals had been established by the end ot July 1956 and remained unchanged at mid-1957. As of July 1956, a total ot 32 tirst and second phase stations were operational -- 28 first phase and tour second phase stations. Of these stations, 18 (1.6 first phase and two second pbase) were "tully" operational, the remainder were either "sustained" or "liJl1ted. It At mid-1957, a total ot 37 stations were operating -- an increase ot five over the July 1956 figure. Twenty-eight of the stations were tirst phase and nine were second phase. A "tully" operational status had been attained by 26 ot the :first and seven ot the secoDd phase stations. 1he remaining tour stations were at a "sustained" status. As has been told previOUSly, 13 ot the stations originally planned' tor FY 1957 had to be deterred into F1' 1958 because ot a shortage in maintenance and operations funds." It vas anticipated that by the * See Chapter Eight, Exercise Section. ** The deterred stations were: two first phase stations: M-130 (Winston Salem, N.C.) and. M-122 (Dallas Center, Ia.); 'lbree second phase: SM-145 (Joelton, Tenn.), SM-150 (Cottonwood, Idaho), and SM-15l (Geiger Field, Wash.); Eight ot the deterred stations were in the third phase: 'IN-l.86 (Pyote, ~x.), 'lM-187 (Ozona, ~x.), TM-188 (Eagle Pass, Tex.), 'Df-1.89 (Zapata, Tex.), 'lM-19l (Rockport, Tex.), 'l'H-192 (Killeen, Tex.), 'IN-193 (Lutldn, Tex.), and 'Dt-194 (Lake .charles A.FB, La.) / . IFIED,
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UCL I I end ot T! l~, a total of 64 stations in the mobile program would bl! operational. . . '!'he Oe.p Filler Program. .Supplementing the pel'llBJlellt and mobile radars were the SDIll.l, unattended radars known as gap-fillers. A total ot 235 radars vere planned for the system to provide low-alti tude coverage. Are pl.aimed to install the AIf/APS-14 in the first 64 stations with the remainder to receive an 1Japroved model -- the Alf/P'PS-18. At the end of JUne 1956, none of the gap filler radars were operational. By aid-1957, eight stations were operatioDal.: three vere "sustained" and five were "limited. II A total of lcrr stations had been :f'unded for construction by June 1957 and at 64 stations installation of the electronic components had begun. It was est1me.t ed that by the end of FY 1958, 138 gap filler radars would be in operation.5 NORTHEAST AREA When CONAD assumed operatiOnal. control of the Northeast Area (1 September 1956), a total ot 13 pel"DlUlent radar stations were operat ing. In addition, NEAC bad six gap-filler radars scheduled for operations between Hopedale and St. John's. ']he only change by mid-1957 was the eliJllination of one perm.nent station -- N-33 -- located at Etah, Greenland. With respect to the gap-filler radars, five (Cape Mlkkovik, and Spotted Island, in La.bra- . dor, and Fox Harbour, La. Scie and Elliston Ridge, Newfoundland) had been accepted and were operating. '!he sixth, N-27A, located on Cut 'lhroa6 Island in Labrador, was slated to become operational in AugUst 1957. ALASKA By December 1956, the Alaskan radar system was scheduled to con sist of two control centers (Ladd and Elmendorf) and 21 radar stations. Twelve of the stations were operational at the end of 1956, nine were still under construction. 'lhe stations under construction vere lo cated at: Middleton Island, Gn1ksna, Bethel, Kotzebue, Unalakleet, Fort Yukon, Chiniak, Homer, and Sitkinak Island~ UNClA SIFI
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GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF 4TH AIR DIV D UN TS NIX - ADG3Fts;ADDC; ICE CAP THULE FROBISHER RESOLUTION SAGLE K BAY HOPEDALE AAA — ADG; GCI - GCI - GCI GCI CAPE MAKKOVjK CUT THROAT CARTWRIGHT GCI SPOTTED IS. FOX HARBOUR - ST. ANTHONY - GCI LA SCIE - GANDER (RCAF) ELLISTON ccy;AOD HARMON ABVS RIDGE - GCI AOCC
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UI C I At mid-1957, two of the stations had been el1m:lnated t'raa the building program, while a third had been deferred 1ndet1nitely• A review by AAC of the ACW network revealed that the OPerational value ot the stations scheduled for 6itkinak, Chiniak and Q.tl kana would be 11Jl1ted to high altitude back-up protection of Project S'mE'lUH-~ -- the DEW extension along the A1eutian chain -.. once S'lRE'reH-OUT vas completed. Since the only Justification for completing the three stations vas their capability to provide radar coverage until the DEW extension vas finished, AAC recalllllended that Sitk1nak and Chiniak be eltm1nated entire~ and that the station at ~Ilkana be deferred. CIRCAL and cmcORAD asre1 with the reconmendation which sUbsequentl.y' received USAF's approval. . In June 1957, the radar network in Alaska rema.1ned JDUCh as it had in December 1956: 12 stations operational and six stations under construction. lJhe radar system at m1d-1957, including both the oper ational end prograDlDed stations, is shown on the tollov1Dg map. S£CRET -1~AlR.COMMAHoD-------- ACW STATIONS June 1957 OPM. • EARLY .. • OCW LINE ~F-9 PROG WARNIHG 0 Gel '" ..ECTJON CENTER a s:t D* CONTROL CENTER SECRET * STRE'lCH-OUT vas the code name applied to the DEW line exten sion running along the Aleutian Chain for · some 500 miles. '!bis exten sion was to tie into the Me radar network at King Salmon. UCL \ ) . ....../
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( .I L 57 CONTIGUOUS RADAR AEW&C. At mid-1956, CONAn's Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) force was composed of six tactical squadrons -- three at MCClellan AFB, California, and three at Otis AFB, Massachusetts. This force remained unchanged at the end of June 1957. The squadrOl18 at ).l:Clelian were assigned to the 552d. AEW&C Wing, those at Otis to the 55lst Wing. Both wings were under the supervision o~ the 8th Air Di vision -- which was activated to watch over the wings during their formative period -- until 1 July 1957 when it was 1nactiva~. At this time, the 551st was assigned to EADF, the 552d to WADF. In June 1956, both wings were in a training status. The 552d was manning two stations full time and one part time oIT the West Coast, while the 551st was able to man only one full time station. The 55lst was scheduled to become operational.ly ready on 15 October 1956 and the 552d on 15 December 1956. '!be goal of both wings, established by CONAD Operations Plan 9-56 in April 1956, was to provide three ~ time stations and one part-time station along each coast a~ter becom ing operationally ready. .. ']he readiness dates for the AEW&.C wings were achieved ahead o~ schedule, however. Brigadier General Kenneth H. Gibson, 8th Air Di vision CQUIImlder, reported on 3 October 1956 that both wings could soon be c<mSidered operational~ ready. '!be 55lst bad. attained this distinction, he continued, in July 1956, while the 552d was to be considered ready on 15 October. It was pointed out that the declara tion of readiness was somewhat premature because neither wing pos sessed its full. resources. However, General Gibson continued, " ••• we will still accomplish our objectives •••• In terms of detection effectivness •••we are seeing approximately 85~ of all traffic vhile ve are on station with an operational. weapon. "lC B,y the first of the year, the 551st was manning three full time stations (2, 4, and 6) and station eight was being manned part-time. '!be 552d was able to man three stations (3, 5, and 7) full time and two stations (1 and 9) part time. A severe reduction in the mainte nance and operations funds provided for ADe's flYi~ hour progr.am soon disrupted the schedule adopted by both wings. USAF informed ADC that its Fourth Quarter FY 1957 flying hour program was being reduced by 4.2 million dollars. In order to live within the resources provided, ADe imposed severe restrictions on its l;lir elements. One of the many programs curtailed was that of airborne early warning. UCLAS I I 0
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58 .UNCLASS FI D '!he ef'fect of the budget slash on the AEW&C program was first :felt in Marcil 1957. On the 22d ot this month, the :flying hours allo cated to the AEW&C wings we!-e reduced approximately 50 per cent which necessitated a cut in on-station .time to approximately eight hours per day. CONAl) intormed AOC that the reduction was unacceptable. And, al.D>st 1111'Dfrl1ately, the :former sent a message to the JCS protest ing USAF's unilateral action and requesting reconsideration ot the AEW&C program. In its message, COBAn pointed out that et:fective counter actions could be taken only on the basis o:f early warning inf'ormation and. that the AEW&C prograa should be increased rather than decreased. "In the event this capability cannot be restored 1mIDediately," CONAD wrote, "it is considered that [fbi! CONAl) Terms ot Reference requires acceptance o:f the resulting increased calculated risk by the JCS. "12 Shortly after the ~rotest lett COHAD, AOC reported that it had realized an additional $542,941 which would be used to supplement the AEW&C tlying program. '!be increased program provided the 8th Air Di vision with some 5,884 additional hours, increasing the 8D>unt ot station time to approximately 14 hours per day effective 16 April. Although the increase was appreciated by CONAD, it was -still desirous of obtaining 24-hour coverage. Hope for 24-hour-coverage vanished in late April when USAF re plied. that it would be unable to provide additional flying hours for ADC. mAF stated that the action taken by ADC on 16 April provided. CONAn with enough hours to man six AEW&:C stations 16 hours each day and two stations with an eight hour capability. "'!be significance of the AEW&C in the contiguous surveillance, detection and control system is appreCiated," the executive agency stated., "nevertheless, this f'l.y1ng hour allocation cannot be fUrther increased. without jeopardizing other priority :f'unctions. tt13 '!be effect of the reduction on the AEW&C program was best illus trated by the actions of the 55lst Wing in attempting to provide COYfAD with as much coverage as possible. Of the four stations prev iously manned, only three were projected :for coverage. From 16 April until FY 1957 ended, stations two and four were to be manned 24 hours a day and station six 16 hours per day. Coverage on this latter station was to be shared with the Navy's blimps (ZPG-2W's). The 55lst's RC-12l's and the Navy's ZPG-2W's were to alternate on the station. On those days that the Navy covered station six, the 55lst shifted its support to station efght. . . . ueLA
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UCLA I 59 Actual operational activity of the two ~ wings d.uriq the budget crisis is shown in the following table:1 AEW&C AIRCRAFT OK-STATION TIME JANUARY 1957 55lst WIlfG APRIL 1957 STATIOK SCHED ACTUAL EFFEC'l'IVE 2 744 5TI:00 574:10 4 744 678:15 668:25 6 744 628:05 586:30 8 248 153:10 1.26:55 10 STATION SCHED AC'lUAL EFFECTIVE 2 357:22 343:<:6 335:51 4 365:46 329:15 323:"R ~.t. ,' :.~::': 6 356:10 329:15 323:"R 8 360:00 322:21 313:40 10 552d WING 1 120 125:17 124:32 3 744 727:17 711:34 5 744 741:49 728:32 7 744 735:19 725:01 9 128 140:32 133:51 1 24:00 24:00 24:00 240:00 235:17 231:15 3 .. 5 478:00 473:13 463:38 ! . 7 474:00 469:11 453:50 9 236:00 2"R:40 231:40 '!he two wings (551st and. 552d) at mid-1957, were JI8D1ling the eight stations required by CONAn's 1956-1966 Objectives Pl.an (CADOP 56-66). 'lbree f'Ull-t1me and one part-t1JDe station were being mm'led. by the 551st in conjunction with the Navy Airship Squadron (ZW-l). M3-nn1ng o~ stations two and ~our was carried out by the 551st alone. Station six was being manned alternately by the Navy's ZPG-2W's and the Air Force RC-121 's, while Station eight vas mnned bY' the wing on those days the Navy patrolled station six. On the West Coast, the i 552d manned ~our stations -- three f'ull-t1me aDd one part_t1me.14A I I _. '.Ihe CONAD Objectives Plan, 56-66, called ~ar no iDIIediate changes in the AEW&C ~orce. Future expansion o~ the AEW&C network was dependent upon a great many factors. Be~ore additional squadrons were to be activated, an aircra~t with increased performance character istics bad to be procured to replace the RC-12l. A1s0, a suitable replacement ~or the APS-20 radar had to be developed; however, the APS-70 -- a replacement mOdel tested between March and June o~ 1956 - vas thought to be the answer to the latter problem. Plans at mid-1957 were ~or a ~orce of 13 AEW&C squadrons patrol~ 1IIftIIIIIJ__. UCL S5! lED
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60 ~ lEO UNCL ling 21 stations by 1961. '!he 1ncrease in stations provided tor D1ne statiOll8 OIl both the East and West Coasts aDd three stations in the Gult ot Mexico.15 Lighter-'lban-Air. Iftle first Bavy AEW&C squadron scheduled to augment the COHAD contiguous system vas c~ssioDed at Lakehurst BAS, Rev Je~, on 3 January 1956. '!his was Airship Airborne Early WarD ing Squadron <me (ZW-l). COKAD Operations Pl.e.n 9-56 scheduled one lighter-tban-air airship station to be mazmed continuously oft the East Coast by 1 July 1957. On the West Coast, the pl.a.n called tor a station to be D8DDed tull time by 1 July 1959. '!he Navy was to do this with one lightor-tban air squadron on each coast, each equipped with tour bl1mps.16 At aid-1951, ZW-l had 52 otticers, 200 enlisted personnel aDd tour ZPG-2W airships. Until 1 July 1951, the tirst lighter-than-air squadron was in a training status. Its earliest missions were con tined to training stints on station six located 180 nautical mles trOll Lakehurst. On 1 July 1951, the squadron vas declared operation ally ready ~ assumed air defense ca.1tment in the middle of the" AEW line. '!he ZPG-2W's were scheduled to JIBD station six tram 1 July until 24 July on alternate days in conJunction with ADC's 55lst Wing. In eftect, this meant manning station six on a sustained basis of 50 per cent ot the time required, each month, tor continuous coverage.17 ADC had objected to the blimp employment plan. Station six, it stated, was a number two priority station in the East Coast system and, as such, should be DUlIled continuously. Callprehens1ve and con tinuous coverage could best be provided by the 551st Wing. Coverage by the ZPO-2lo1's was 11mited by the altitude at which they operated (3,000 to 5,000 teet), which reduced the BlIOUDt of effective low altitude radar range and coverage. To correct these deficiencies, ADC had proposed that Navy air ship training be conducted on station eight -- a f'ourth priority sta tion in the system. Also, it proposed that the operating base ot the blimps be mo:ved from Lakehurst to Weekswille NAS, North Carolina. FroB the latter base, the ZPG-2W's could provide coverage tor station ten. '!he ADC proposal had neither been callpletely accepted nor re Jected by mid-1951 and ADC was tald.ng steps to get Navy concurrence of its ideas.lB . '!he Picket Ship Force. At mid-1951, the manning of' picket ship_ I "', .-// .. I " i UNCLAS
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61 .stations reJl8ined unchanged from the mid-1956 level. Five picket ship stations were being ms.nned around-the-clock ott both coasts ot the United States. '!he ten stations being JlBDDed met CONAD's progr8Jlll8d requirements tor FY 1957. 'lhe Atlantic stations had been tul.l.y JIBDlled since July 1955 and the Pacific stations since July 1956. Ott the West Coast, three converted liberty~type transports (YAGR's) and two destroyer escorts (DER's) were manning the stationa. Out in the Atlantic, eight YAGR's and two DER's were assigned as picket patrols. Future plans tor the patrol stations called tor eight YAGR's and two DEft's manning the Atlantic stations until around 1960. In the Pacitic, tour YAGR's and seven DER's were to man the contiguous system until July 1958. In the latter mnth, the operating torce vas to be changed to eight YAaR's and two DEft's, a level to reJIBin until 1960. CONAD plans called tor 19 picket ship stations.19 '!be tuture program called tor six additional stations ott the East Coast and three ott the West Coast. Manning and operating the nine additiona! stations vas dependent upon JCS approval ot the CADOP requirements and the capability ot the Navy to provide sutticient picket ships. By mid-l957, the existing cODlDUDicationa network tor picket ship operations remained unreliable. '!he problems were low power output ot the picket ships and poor trequencies that suttered trom interterence. At mid-1956, it was proposed that the Navy take over operation ot ship-to-shore communications. '!he picket ships would broadcast to Naval radio stations on shore and they, in turn, would transmit by teletyPe to the Ar£ .directions centers. At mid-1957, responsibility tor operating the communications net work was unchanged. In September 1956, the Navy agreed to assume the responsibility, but it reversed its decision in early 1957 because or the cost involved. '!he Chiet ot Naval Operations was asked to recon sider ais decision; no answer had been received by August 1957, hov ever.2 Texas Towers. A tinal element ot the contiguous system was the ott-shore radar plattorms dubbed Texas Towers. At mid-1957, as in mid 1956, only one ot the tive towers originally programmed tor the system was operational. '!his tower, designated tower number Two, was located on Georges Bank, a North Atlantic shoal, approxiDBtely 100 lliles east ot Cape Cod. The tower had begun limited operations on 7 May 1956, a U'CLASSIFIED
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62 -I status it maintained on 30 June 1957.21* A second tower, designated number Three, had been towed to Nan tucket Shoals, 100 miles southeast of Rhode Island in August 1956. ADC assumed control in November and it vas anticipated that the tower would become operational by August 1951. The third tower destined tor the system was tower Four which was to be built on an uDll8.llJed shoal about 80 miles southeast of New York City. It was expected that this tower would become operational by June 1958.22 'l\ro of the towers were deleted from the Air Force construction program because of a lim!ted budget. USAF 1nf'ormed ADC that the cov~ to be provided by towers One and Five -- scheduled for Cashes Ledge (100 miles east of New Hampshire) and Brown's Bank (approximate ly 15 miles south of Nova Scotia) -- aver adjacent coastal radar was deemed insufficient to justify construct.ion costs. It recOlllllended dropping towers One and Five from the Military Construction Program. Arter reexamining the tower program, Are agreed with USAF's findings. Also, a shortage of maintenance and. operations :f'unds weighed heavily in making the decision to eliminate both towers .23 The discovery of an underwater plateau oft the West Coast caused CONAD to consider the possibility ot building an otf-shore platform in the Pacific. '!he underwater shelt named "Cobb's Sea Mountain" was located some 300 miles off the coast of washington. News of the pla teau was forwarded to CONAD to determine the feasibility of buIlding a tower to replace the picket patrol. A shortage of f'unds, CONAD re plied, coupled with the long lead time required. to replace the ~~cket ship station made it impractical to consider the tower further. A second means ot ocean radar coverage investigated during 1956 was the moored sea plattorm. It vas thought that these platforms would be less expensive and more effective than the Texas Towers. USAF recoJlllleDded that ADC study the possibility of using these plat forms in the seaward extension program. By mid-1957, the concept of using radar platforms had been re jected, however. ADC inf'ormed CONAD that it considered floating radar * A tower was considered "11mited operational" when either due to a shortage of personnel and/or equipment it could not be operated continuously but could operate tor a minimum ot 24 hours on an emerg ency basis. .r '; lL. L IE
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, l IF D 'j ~. .' ~" plat~orms impractical because o~ their coat ~ also because ~ vehicles seemed to otter the beat means o~ obtaining s~icient radar coverage and the control capability needed. 'Dlis view vas supported by COHAD and the -.tter vas dropped.25 DIS TANT EARLY WARNING LINE At m1d-1957, the land-baaed sectioo o~ the DEW Line running troza Cape Dyer, Battin Island, generally within about two degrees o~ the 69th parallel, to Cape Lisburne, Alaska, vas in ¥bat II1ght best be described as a semi-operational status. Orig1nally, an operational deadline o~ 1 July 1957 had been set ~or the Line to begin operations. This date, erroneously based on what w.a thOU8ht to have been the ex piration date o~ Western Electric's contract, was subsequently cor rected to 31 July 1957, the true expiration date.26 On 1 July 1957, the civilian contractors said the line vas in an "O erational state," which they de~ined as meaning: "The Line ••• would f'unction as an 0 erational system from 1 July exactly as it••• wou$ when it ffiec~an Air Force responsibility. During the 1 ~ July-3l July period, it [Woulg remain the responsibility o~WEC, ex cept in the event o~ an emergency, and both wre and FEe ZCouJ.!! IMke modi~ications without re~erence to the Air Force. "27 Actually, the period vas an ex~ensive test. By 15 July, the line was considered technically ready: the radars at all the sites vere vorking, the sites were manned, and the cOJllDUlli cations systems, both lateral and rearward co~ormed operationally to the specifications the civilian contractors were required to meet. '!be line, however, could not per~orm its asSigned mission and was not ex pected to attain that capability for months to come.28 Even though the contractors work was ~nished, the operational 11m1tations of the sectors were numerous: landl1ne tie-ins to COHAD's combat operations center vere not installed; the rear,""3.rd UHF and VHF scatter communications systems still required considerable te~ting along various links; i~orma.tion on the DEW Line ~acilities, l:eeded to implement interim identification procedures, was yet to be pul·llshedj communications circuits to the AMIS facilities had not been cJnnected to their AR'm centers, nor were the AMIS ~acilities in the AR'm centers ready; the supply depot being constructed at Frobisher had not been completed because of a shortage of tunds which made logistical support ()~ the line both dif~icult and costly; and, lastly, operational E J I
Page 92
UNCLASSIFIED; personnel ror the line were untrained. Hevertheless, the Air Force rol'DlBl.ly accepted responsibility ror the line on 13 August 1957.29 Testing. '!be time-table ror the two-phase DEW test prograa vas also disrupted by the operational l1m1tations. Part I (the contract ors test cycle) or the test program was completed 31 Jul.y 1957. Part II (the SAC penetration tests) had to be postponed until March 1958 because or the various discrepancies outlined above.30 )hnn:lng. Muming or the DEW Line was about the only project com pleted on-schedule. In June 1957, it was reported that all military personnel were in-place. On 12 June, some 675 people were on the line with 705 · expected to be in-place by 1 July 1957. '!he personnel were receiving OJT with the assistance or WEC. Although the aanning status was considered good, the personnel were expected to reJlBin in a train ing status ror SaDe time to come. '!be technicians on the l1De bad barely begun concentrating on the technical aspects or the equipment and would be unable to begin operational training until operational procedures were published. Even then the erficiency or the "radicians" was expected to be poor until they had gained surficient experience and training.3l Operational Procedures. As late as M:lrch 1957, SOllIe thought was still be1Dg grven to making the DEW Line an action as well as a warn ing line. In this latter month, however, CONAD placed i tselr in op position to such a concept, stating:32 While the employment or air def'ense weapons along the DEW Line may have some tactlcal reasibility, it is believed that political, budgetar,y and oper ating conditions at this time override the desira bility or such action. 'lbererore, the conclusion can be drawn that, with the incorporation or qualitative improvements, the DEW Line will continue to serve as a warning rather than an action line. COHAD was also opposed to the identirication procedures outlined in the USAF-RCAF Operations Plan or 1 June 1956. The June plan estab lished an identification system based upon rlight plan correlation combined with the use or code words a:ndlor maneuvers. CONAD was made responsible ror the development, establishment and administration (in coordination with approprib.te ReAF agencies) or the identiricatloD UNCLASSIFIED
Page 93
~ ".-. UCLA FlED --.'; code and maneuver program for the line. By November 1956, CONAn bad come to the conclusion that the system approved by the EWOWG was impractical. )h.ny reasons were ad vanced tor its decision: the use ot code words and mneuvers vas con sidered too complicated; the system would not be cOIIp&tible with oper ations on the seaward extensions; the coat ot euc;:h a system in te1"ll8 ot personnel and money were excessive; it would require the support ot toreign nations, some ot which were reluctant to cooperate and set up stations to distribute envelopes tor the nights; and it would not be ready for use in time to meet the operations date ot the line.33 In place of the enveloPe system, CONAD requested a system ot simple night plan correlation. '!be EWOWG did not concur, and the matter was reterred to the JCS for resolution. On 24 )By 1951, CONAD received approval from the Joint Chiets tor the use of its flight plan procedure as an interim measure. However, the Joint Chiefs continued, " •••it is desired that you study the en tire identification problem and take positive action to bring into operation•••an improved identification system•••comparable to the de " tection characteristics established for the DEW Line ••• ~ initial ob jectivewill•••~-1the capability to identity as triendly 95 to ~ of all triendly tratfic detected."34 CONAD's proposed identification system required a ground tiled flight plan and compulsory reporting by all inbound aircraft to the DEW stations. Time and distance tolerances tor aircraft penetrating the DEWIZ were plus or minus one hour and 100 nautical Ililea trOll the ground filed estimated time and point of DEWIZ penetration.35 '!be question of identification procedures resolved tor the tiDe being, the problem ot publishing and disseminating DEWIZ intormation to all operating agencies in order to implement the system still re DBined. CAA and the DOT were not e~cted to publish the needed information be~re 1 September 1951.3b SEA EXTENSIONS Eastern Sea Extension. By mid-1956, the Joint Chiets bad ap proved two extension locations tor the Atlantic. 'nle tirst, tavored by CONAD, was to run tran Cape Dyer, ' Bat'f'in Island, to cape Farewell, Greenland., and then by water to the Azores. A second line, reccmnend ed by the Navy, was to run :f'rom Cape Dyer across Greenland, then by
Page 94
U LAS 66 water to Iceland, :f'rom Iceland by water to the Faeroes and then once again by water to a point to be selected. in Scotland.31' On 1 July 1956, limited operations began on a line from Argentia, Newfoundland, to the Azores, and was manned prior to 1 July 1957 by two picket ships and two AEW aircraf't. On 1 ..Tuly 1957, a full barrier, operated continuously, vas established. between the above two points with four DER's and four AEW aircraft. Plans at mid-1957_were to swing the Western end of the line up to Cape Farewell by 1960.3tl 'lhe second extension was still in the planning stage, however. By June 1957, the Greenland portion of the extension was programmed to in clude four stations extending from Ho1steinsborg to Ikateq. A fif'th station at Kangek Island was to provide a link with the Azores barrier. The Ikateq station vas to connect either with a radar at Keflavik, Ice land (H-1) or with H-4 (located. on the Straumnes Penninsula in south west Iceland), the latter site being favored. if connections with Green land proved. feasible. A target date for site survey completion was set for 1 September 1957, with early 1958 anticipated as the earliest date construction contracts might be awarded.. 39 LoY a1titude coverage over the Denmark Straits was to be provided. by either AEW aircra:ft or picket ships. Danish approval for radar sit ing in the Faeroes was obtained. in the latter half of 1956 and siting parties had begun initial surveys in January 1957.40 Western Sea Extension. At mid-1956, the JCS approved. Pacific ex tension of the DEW Line vas a line runn1 ng from Naknek to UDna.k by land-based radar and then by sea to Midway. A total of eight stations -- one main and seven auxiliary -- had been programmed for the Aleutian segment by mid-l956. 'lhe main station, located at Cold Bay, was to connect with the AAC radar station at King Salmon. 'lhe latter station would also be connected with Project WEST WALL (the DEW extension moving down the Bering coast between Lisburne and King Salnx>n). Upon completion of WHITE ALICE (the relay improvement project in Alaska), penetration data would be transmitted from King SalJoon to CONAD's COC, MC' s COC, the 10th Air D1vision and RCAF/ Are. The target date for operation of the Aleutian segment was September 1958.41 .,':-; 'lhis date was soon changed, however. In M9.rch 1957, Headquarters USAF informed CONAD that the operational date had been re-scheduled to .1 Mu-ch 1959. Meeting the September 1958 deadline required spending UNCLASSI F I EDI
Page 95
67
Page 96
68
I'IED
excee.1ve tunda, it stated, which would Jeopardize other priority air
defense electronic projects.
A limited capability, it continued,
could be anticipated by January 1959.42
AM::, in the meantime, vrote USAF that the DEWPO (Distant Early
Warning Project Office) had asked for a six month defel"Dlent of the
Aleutian Segment deadline in February.
At this time, it bad been
given to understand, that the operational date was to be 31 M:l.rch 1959
and all contractual negotiations had been based on this date.43
USAF
accepted 31 }lkrch.
CONAD objected to the new date on the grounds that a serious gap
would exist for approximately eight months between it and the oper
ations of the Pacific flank extension scheduled for operations on 1
J'ul.v 1958.
'l.\u-ning to the JCS, COJIAD ~ged a return to the original
September 1958 date if at all possible.44
While awaiting a reply from the JCS, COKAD explored the po8si
bility of adjusting the Pacific seavard extension to fill in for the
Aleutian segment during the 1958 period, a course of action suggested
by ~quarters ~SAF.
1 The suggestion was studied by CINCAL and CINCPACFLT.
CIlfCAL
;I
re,.tmmeooed an interim line from Oahu to Naknek.
CDfCPACFLT, boweverj
disapproved on tbe grounds of lack of f\mds and forces.
"'!be WV-2
,
aircraft cannot fly a longer round-trip than M1dvay-UDlak," CINCPACFLT
continued, "["andJ basing aircraft ~the Alaskan area appears infeas
ible •••CHO comment is being sought." 5
The .ms reply, on 22 Mly 1957, offered little consolation.
'!he
1959 date was not changed although two solutions to CONAn's problem
were offered.
The first solution was to place picket sbips between
Midway and Umnak aDd use the radar coverage from King Salmon.
ARW
flights could also be flown from Midway to the extent of tbeir capa
bility as additional assistance.
As the Aleutian facilities became
operational the picket sbips could be returned to tbe Midway-Umnak
route.
'!be second solution was to locate picket stations between
Hawaii and Kodiak with r~om operation of AEW planes t'rom Hawaii on
round-robin flights along the picket route.
CONAn could plan on oc
casional AEW turn-around assistance in Alaska, the JCS cpJ}tinued, as
long as it did not necessitate construction in the area.46
Thus matters stood. at Dlid-1957, with the n~ operational date for
1:be Aleutian segment remaining at 31 March 1959. 7
UNCLASSIF
{
'
j
'". ... "
i
I..
I
'"
'
oPage 97
_ VI L ~ ~r.~m"$i. i,a. , . 4<J~~:tr3I ' '!he sea extension be . en JUCliCij g ~ received its 1n1tial i lDB!lDing in March 1957. -On::1 July 1957, the Navy placed a partial barrier in operation. '!he barrier consisted of one AEW aircraft operating :f'roJa Midway to Adak (to be shifted at a later date between Midvay-Ulmak) of one and one-halt nights a day (22 out of 24 hours) · for training purposes. A progressive build-up to f'ull. operation was planned by 1 July 1958, when ~e ImRls and six to seven AEW aircraft were scheduled for operations. . In early 1957, the JCS approached CORAD with the possibility of extending the Pacific DEW extension south fro. Midway to Oahu. COIIAD turned thumbs down on the suggestion. It f'elt that priority should first be given to strengthening those portions of' the early we.rn1D8 system that would contribute IIOst to the defense of North America and it recoJDended that any extension south of' MldWlq not be consideredlt9 MID-CANADA LINE By 30 June 1957, operations on the Mid-Canada Line (lCL) were in a state of nux. '!he line bad been scheduled to begin operations on 1 January 1951. 'DIe operational deadline could not be aet, however. Difficul ties vith the Doppler detect;lon (nuttar) radar equipment developed, making sustained operations 1JIIpossible. As a result, on the 1 J~ target-date none of the eight doppler sections were operatiOD&l..50 By JDid,,-1957, four sections had achieved a 11m1ted operatioDal status. 'lhe 'dates that these sections cOWW)Ced l1Ja1ted 24-hour operations are shown belov:51 SECTlOI Dawson Creek Stoney lIbuntain Cranberry Portage Bird W1n1sk Great WbaleRiver Knob Lake Bopedal.e OPERATIONAL DAm 1 *y 1957 3 June 1957 24 May 1957 21 June 1957 Although these four sections were considered to be l1m1ted oper ational by 30 June, their capability was only JErg1nally satisfactor;y. u c lED
Page 98
70 CL IFIE "It was expected that they would be required to shut-down at V&r71D& intervals in an effort to correct the problems experieDCed with the doppler equipment. A new operational date of 1 October 1958 vas es tablished for the entire Line to become tull.y ~ratioD&l.~52 - UCLASSI I D, - ," ,
Page 99
( " UNCL S5 OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES ALERT REQUTREMENTS ADC Interc~tors. The CONAD alert requ1reaents established in Mily 1956 remalil In f'orce until ttlrch 1957. 'Dle interceptor alert requirement during this time was that 24 hours rr day there be two aircraf't on f'ive minute readiness at all base.. Four aircraf't at. one squadron and eight aircraf't at two squadron bases were to remain on one hour readiness. '!he remaining aircraft at all bases that could be operationally ready within three hours were to ntE1n on three hour reserve. ADC interceptor units were f'iDding it increasingly diff'icult to meet these requirements, however, by late 1956. A shortage of' air cra!'t caused by conversion programs and Project FOLLOW-ON (the F-86D modit'ication program) made it dif'f'icult f'or the squadrons to carry out the required alert, train crews, and meet proficiency requ1~ts. The hardships were best illustrated by Eastern Air De:feIlBe Force's position. By the end of' 1956, 16 of' its 39 squadrons were undergoing "f'ollov-on" modif'ication while :four additional units were undergoing or programmed f'or conversion to the F-l02.2 Headquarters ADC was in no position to ofter aid. Shortages of II8IlpOWer and money made it virtually impossible to meet its CONAD de tense coaaitments. As early as July 1956, General Partridge, CINCONAD and Commander ADC, had been forced to consider a revision o:f CONAD coanitJDents levied on his Air Force cODlpOIlent. "The United States Air Force," General Partridge wrote the JCS in September 1956, "has ••• been unable to provide the Air Def'ense CODIJBlld vith the resources necessary' to carry out the current agreed [def'eDBi/ program." '!he revised ADC plan, accepted by General Partridge, proposed several actions to overcome the manpower and money limitations. One such proposal was to lower the f'ighter alert requirements. Lowering the alert, ADC stated, would (1) allow more time f'or training tbua as suring better qualif'ied pilots, (2) provide field coJDDallders greater .... . :.: f'reedom in using personnel and f'acilities, and (3) reduce maintenance ~ operations costs while providing better def'ense per dollar. CONAD ) UNCLASSIFIED
Page 100
- NClASSIFIED accepted these vieva and began revising its regulation 55-8, the alert requirements.3 In revising it, three assumptions were made: (1) the current alert standards were wastef'ul in terms ot available manpc\ler, aircraft, .f\mds and time; (2) under the nol"DBl. state ot preparedness regional cOJDDUlders were more cognizant ot their own positions and could tl~~re fort: set JlK)re realistic standards; and (3) sufticient warning time mde it possible to lower the alert without daJlllg1ng the capability ot the units to counter an attack. CONAD adopted the position that a calculated risk should be taken and a reduced alert status was necessary. Tb accomplish this reduc tion, it proposed to provide the CONAn regional cC)l1lDAmers vith an established set ot alert minimums. Using these CONAl> guidelines, the torce . ffOlllD8llders could specify the alert requirements within their own are~. On 1 March 1957, CONAn issued a new regulation 55-8.5 The guide lines laid down by CONAD made it possible to cut the number ot inter ceptor units needed to maintain a normal state ot alert. · 'lh1s was ac complished by establishing the conditions ror a squadron to be on alert. These conditions were that only those squadrons based near enough to an ADIZ to allow interception or ADIZ violators and umer the scramble control or a direction center (DC ) having an identirication responsi bility ror an ADIZ were to be scheduled tor alert. Also, an &dditional reduction was possible since the regional cC)DlD8nder was authorized to select the bases within this area as the alert rorce. Squadrons selected to stand alert were to keep no less than two aircraft on tive-minute alert, tour on one-hour, and the remining air craft that could be operationally ready within three hours on three hour or higher alert status. CODIID8llders were cautioned to vary the alert pattern vithin the alert areas to keep duplication ot ADIZ cover age at a minimum and to insure that a tew squadrons in each area were Dot constantly chosen ror the alert. Squadrons outside the alert areas and those un!ts within the area but not assigned to the alert were to get their requirements from the CONAn regional cOllllMooers. Any squadron could be designated ror tive minute and one-hour duty as back-up air derense aircraft or tor train ing purposes. Aircraft at these bases, other than those on tive minute and one-hour alert, were expected to meet the three-bour re serve also. UNCLf SSI I ED . I ~, I
Page 101
73 UCLASSIF E CONAD regional coJllll8.Ilders were also authorized to allow as many as 20 percent ot all three-hour reserves to be away on navigational tlights provid"ing the alert cODlllitments up to and including one-hour had been met and that the planes were capable ot returning in three hours. 'Ibis latter ruling vas unacceptable to the regional cOJllll!lnders. It was pointed out by them that 11m1ting navigational nights to three hours made it impossible to get quality training. COHAD agreed. and issued an amended version ot the regulation (3 June 1951) providing that a regional commander could allow as many as 20 per cent ot all three-hour alert ];!lanes to be absent from their home base on navi gational nights.O " Air National Guard fighter-interceptor squadrons on active air defense operations were to keep two planes on tive minute alert 14 hours per day. '!be normal schedule established vas one hour betore sunrise to one hour after sunset. If this schedule went over 14 hours, an alternate vas to be tollowed vb1ch stipulated the aircraft were to begin one hour before sunrise and continue to 14 hours later. By 1 July 1951, 19 ANG squadrons were standing the alert, an increase of one during the preceding year. AlB0 , the 319th Fighter-Bomber Wing, an Air Forc"e Reserve unit located at Memphis, TenDessee, was standing the same alert schedule as the ANG units. Two additional units, not covered by the CONAn regulation, standing alert were the Navy unit at San Diego and an Air Force Train ing COIIIID9.Ild unit at Perrin AFB, Texas. Both kept two aircral't on five-minute alert around-the-c1ock.1 Antiaircraft Missiles and Guns. '!he readiness requirements dur ing 1956 were as to11ows: (1) Nike units: 25 per cent on 15 minutes; 25 ~er cent on 30 minutes, and the remainder on three hours; (2) 90/12Qam units; 66 2/3 per cent on 30 minutes, and the reJl81Dder operational within three hours; (3) 151111l Skysveeper units: 50 per cent on 30 minutes, and the remaining guns operational within three hours. In its new regulation ot 1 March 1951 (55-8), CONAD reduced the 15 and 30 minute al~rt torce almost by half' and increased the torces on three hour readiness by a proportionate amount. COllAD required that ar.m;y antiaircraft fire units have the capability ot assuming bat tle stati§ns within the time 11m:1.ts shown in the chart on the tollow ing page; UNClASSIFIE j
Page 102
. ~ u c 74 15D11l FIRE UNI'lS NIKE FIRE UNITS 90/12cm FIRE UNITS 25~ on 15 minute alert at 25~ within 30 'min 33 1/3 within Loring, Boston-Providence, utes. Remaining 30 minutes. Hartford-Bridgeport, New operational within Remaining oper York, Philadelphia, Wash three hours. ational within ington-Baltimore, Norfolk, three hours. Fairchild, Hanford, Seattle, San Francisco, Travis and Los Angeles. 25~ on 30 minute alert at: Niagara-Buffalo, Pitts burgh, Cleveland, DetrOit, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Ellsworth. Remaining operational with .... in three hours. ACW Squadrons. ACW squadrons, with the exception of those on lim!ted operational status, were required. as of 1 March 1957 by 55-8 to maintain continuous radar surveillance and control capability in accordance with the regional commanders directives. Squadrons on lim!ted operational status were to operate at least eight hours per day: during a four hour period beginning two hours before sunrise and a four hour period starting two hours before sunset, provided they were directly supporting or augmenting per1Jleter radars.9 Alaska. Tbe authority to establish alert requirements for Alaska. was lett to the discretion ot CINCAL. By December 1956, CINCAL had established the normal state of alert to be DBintained by the units of his two interceptor bases. 'lbere were three conditions: 1) a normal state of alert at Ladd and ElJaendorf with all aircra:tt present; 2) an alert when as many as eight aircraft were deployed tram the home base to provide an alert force at surrounding deployment bases; and 3) the state of alert to be maintained at deployment bases. The alert requirement for the twO three-squadron bases was that 24 hours per day there be four aircraft on five-minute readiness, four on 30 minute, four on one-hOur, and the remaining aircraft that could be ~J u c I lED,
Page 103
FlED
75
operationally !'eady within -lree hours on three hour reserve.
When
ever as many as eight aircr: ft from Lad.d or Elmendorf were deployed,
CINCAL authorized the follo'ring alert standards:
tvo aircraft on five
minute readiness, tvo on 30 minute, eight on one hour, and the remain
ing aircraft that could be operationally ready on a three hour reservetO
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
Interceptors.
The procedures for intercepting and engaging an
enetn;{ attack in force during 1956 and · early 1957, were contained in a
regulation issued. on 8 October 1955 and amended in February 1956.
No
change was made until May 1951, although much thought had been given
to a revision prior to that time.
Changes in the command structure, the addition of the Alaskan and
Northeast air defense missions, and a new group ~f special weapons
coming into the weapons inventory made new rules essential.
A new set of rules, CONAD Regulation 55-6, bearing the Departments
of State and Defense approval, was issued on 13 May 1957.10 These
rules provided instructions for interception and engagement of hostile
aircraft in the United. States, Alaska, and. the coastal ADIZ's.
They
were based upon the concept of centralized operational control of all
air defense weapons by CINCONAD with maximum decentralization of tact
ical authority to meet the needs of any battle situation.
The new regulation provided that any aircraft that presented a
clear and present danger to the security of the United States and com
mitted a hostile act within CINCONAD's area of air defense responsi
bility was hostile.
And any aircraft that did not have a proper flight
clearance and that presented a clear and present danger to the security
of the United States could be declared hostile by CONAD commanders
down to and including Division level and by appropriate naval commanders
operating in a coastal ADIZ when:
(1) it bore the military insignia of
a known enemy nation or of 'a nation causing an air defense emergency
within the boundaries of or over the territory where CINCONAD bad air
defense responsibility; or (2) it was seen in a coastal ADIZ on a course
which, if continued, would carry it over the continental U.S.; or (3)
it did not meet the standards for identification after the declaration
of an air defense Warning Yellow or Red; or (4) the pattern of ~cticn8
of incoming aircraft indicated beyond a reasonable doubt that an attack
on the continental U. S., Alaska, or other territory where CINCONAD had
air defense responsibility vas in progress and the aircraft was deeme~
UNCLASSIFIEDPage 104
(no text recognized)
Page 105
76 -. "'ft __.'~••~~'~ to be a part of the att~ck; or (5) intelligence indicated that aircra~ or other weapons were enroute toward the continental u. S., Alaska, or other territory where CINCONAD had air defense responsibility with the mission of attack and the aircraft was deemed to be part of this attack. CONAn defined engagement as any action or series of actions by air defense weapons to effect the control of hostile aircraft. Such action! (to be taken in accordance vith the tactical situation) included visual signals, radio COmmunications, warning bursts, etc. -- to be followed, - none of these worked, by destruction ot the hostile aircraft. Surface-to-Air Weapons. The regulation mentioned above, 55-6, as noted, also provided for antiaircraft weapons. It stipulated four state; of fire for antiaircraft weapons: "Weapons Free," any target not ident: fied as friendly could be tired upon; "Weapons Tight," onl..7 targets identified or declared hostile, or those targets committing hostile act~ could be fired at; "Discreet Fire," when the tactical situation permitte: it, CONAD commanders could assign specitic targets (i.e., individual tracks, multiple tracks or raids) to air defense weapons; and "Hold Fire- ___ ,~II Do Not Open Fire-Cease Fire-r- Under normal conditions, ground-to-atr weapons were to remain on Weapons Tight until an Air Defense Warning Ye:' lov with SCATER implemented was declared. Hold Fire vas to be imposed only on 0. temporary basis to permit friendly aircraft operations in or through predetermined corridors, altitudes or sectors in cases where an~· other conditions would prove impractical. CONAD division commanders or their authorized representatives coul~ impose this latter condition. A division commander could also delegate his authority to order Hold Fire to Senior directors at an ADDC. Howeve: a Hold Fire ordered by a director had to be relayed to and confirmed im mediately by the division commander. If confirmation vas not received, the surface-to-air weapons units were automatically released from the condition. '!be CONAD division commander, who had operational control over all ground-to-air weapons in his sector, vas to designate the AA status as the tactical situation dictated. All information and orders were to be issued directly to the AA commander, communications permitting, at the AAOC; otherwise, such orders were to be issued through the ADDC. Com plete failure of communications in the sector would leave the authority to deSignate the weapons control status to the AA defense commander.
Page 106
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CANADIAN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT From :954) air defense interceptors of Canada and the United ~jtates cC'.lld cross the border for purposes of interception and engage ment (there had been limited authority to overfly tor identification since 1951). In 1956, Canadian aircraft over U. S. soil had to tollow the rul;s of engagemen't outlined in CONAD Regulation 55-6. American pla~es over Canada had to operate under Canadian rules as outlined in t',he' ~CAF Air Defence Command Air StaN' Instructions (ASl) 2/5.13 ASI :'/~'; December :956, provided that a pilot could engage an air Cl~aft U1.~.r.i :;!" cuc:: of tvo provisions: when he observed the aircraft com mitt:.ng :~ host~ , le act, and when he was ordered to engage by a Gel con treller ~c~ing on instructions from the AOC RCAF ADC or his appointed deputy_ The definition of a hostile act closely paralleled CONAD rules and provided th3.t a ~ostile act was: employing weapons against ground, ai~ or 'Nat:r targets ~which included firing against a fighter maintain ing 3urveill~ce); opening bomb bay doors when approaching a vital ar~a; dropping parachutists except vhen in distress; or conducting mir~e-l3.ying 0perations _ Only in one other instance could engagement be ordered. The AOC RCAF Air Defence Command or his deputy could order engagement when the pattern or actions of unknowns justified a belief tha't t~ef had hostile intentions. A limiting factor to the instructions was that they provided guid ance to the forces prior to the declaration of a state of emergency. No rules 1oi~re ~Titten for engagement subsequent to an air defense emer gency. This 1oi&.3 corrected by a new ASI, dated 15 June 1957. Canada 'a new rules provided for engagement both before and after an emergency. In addition, the revised ASl provided more flexible rules. En gagements could be ordered by an interceptor pilot when an interceptor crew obserred ~ aircraft committing a hostile act (using the criteria in the precedL,g ASI for a hostile act) or by a sector commander when (1) his :::ec-:o!" ws in an air defense l.~arning Red conciition, (2) order ing an in~er~eptor to attack an aircraft identified as hostile, and (3) he 10ias 30 directed by the AOC RCAF ADC or his deputy. The AOC RCAF AOC and his de~uty kept the authori~ to order an attack 8.€Pinst un .knowns '.men the )attern of their behavior was sufticiently suspiciOUS \ ' j4. .' • , :'!i
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18 to justif,y a belief that they had hostile intentions. 'nlere were two differences between the American and C8nadian en gagement procedures. 'nle CONAD rules provided for more decentraliza tion of authority -- a CONAn division commander could declare an air craft hostile and order engagement. As noted above, Canadian rules maintained more of a centralized control -- only Air Vice Mirabal L. E. Wray or his deputy could order engagement --unless an aircraft committed a hostile act or a sector was UDder a Warning Red condition. 'nle second difference vas the def1n1tion of "engagement." To the Canadians, engaging an aircraft meant shooting down or attempting to shoot down the plane engaged. Engagement to the Americans meant any action necessary to control a hostile such as visual si~, radio communications or varning bursts across the aircraft b~.14 ANTIAIRCRAFT RULES ·FOR CANADIAN OPERATION Temporary procedures for the use of American surface-to-air mis siles over Canada were also set up in June 1951'!' '!he two countries agreed that operational control over surface-to-air units was to be exercised by or through the CONAn division commander, in whose sector the weapons were located, with the concurrence of the Canadian 4i vision/sec~or commander, over whose territory the weapons were to be employed. The operations of 'the five border defense areas in the Un!ted States were to be controlled in the following manner: (1) the de fenses at Port Huron and Detroit, Mlchigan, and Niagara Falls-Buffalo, New York, were to be controlled by the cODlllBllder of the 30th CONAn division. To engage a target over Canada, the commander of the 30th Air Division was to obtain permission from the sector commander of the 3d ADCC in Canada. '!he Canadian sector commander, under normal conditions, was to authorize engagement of specifically designated targets -- ~ condition of Discreet Fire. When the tactical situation dictated either more or less tire than that provided by the Discreet Fire state, the sector cClDDBnder vas to permit either a Weapons Tight or Weapons Free condition. A similar arrangement was to exist between the 32nd CONAn Division COD!!DB.D.der (1.e., the Loring AFB, Maine defense) * These rules were to be followed until new border defense agree ments could be written.
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and the 1st or 2nd Sector Commander in Canada, depending upon the aii space needed. Separate provisions were established for the Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, defense (under the 31th CONAD Division). This defense was capable of engaging targets some distance vithin Canada. Air defense actions by this unit were to be authorized and conducted sole~ in accordance with instructions of the AOC ADC (RCAF).15 MILITARY AND CIVIL WARNING Military. CONADts responsibility :for providing a military air defense warning lMADW) included: determining the conditions of warn-. 1ng and preparedness; and transmitting these conditions to CONAD eche lons, other commands and agencies having collateral air defense re sponsibilities, and to representatives o:f the federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) as appropriate. '!be three degrees of warning in :force at mid-1957 were: Air De :fense Warning YellOW, attack probable; Air Defense Warning Red, attack imminent, or taking place; and Air Defense Warning White, attack im probable. In addition, CONAD set up three states of preparedness which were: Normal Preparedness, the normal condition specified in current operations orders to provide sustained air defense potential; Increased Preparedness, a temporary increase over the normal condition to provide a defensive potential against an unknown or doubtful threat; and Air Defense Readiness, which would place the entire system in a state of IDrulimum immediate operatl'onal preparedness for relative ly short periods.16 '!be states of preparedness and warning were to be passed f'rom CONAn Headquarters over a special warning network (Alert 11) to CONAD echelons. Almost simultaneously, over a MADW network from the CONAD division control centers the information was to be transmitted to key point air warning centers set up throughout the United States. '!he key points, in turn, were responsible for sending the warning to their 'surrounding local areas. ' '!be primary means o:f transmission over these networks were multi point teletypewriters, except between the control centers and military flight service (MFS) centers. The latter centers were to correspond over interphone. Back up :for the teletypewriters was the tactical long distance telephone circuits between the key pOints and control centers. _.- UNClASSIF1£D
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80 80 iiNCLASSlflED
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And, when all ~lse failed, the centers were authorized to use commer~
ial facilities. 17
Civil Warning.
'the civil air defense warning (CADW) system con
tinued to operate under the FCDA as it had since July' 1952.
However
the procedure of placing FCDA liaison officers (Attack Warning Offi
cers) at CADW switchboards in CONAD division control centers to dis
seminate air defense varnings changed in May 1957.
'!'he change in the FCDA procedures came in an attempt by that
agency to streamline its warning methods.
To protect the public, FCDA
officials reasoned, the earliest warning information was needed.
This
information could best be obtained from three sources -- CONAD Head
quarters and the CONAD Western and Eastern Region Headquarters.
From
this reascning, the new National Warning System (NAWAS), a combination
of the previous CADW and. the National Warning Control System (NAWAC),
was developed.
The new NAWAS, adopted on 1 May 1957, provided for the abolition
of all attack ~>{8.rning centers at division level.
To do the same work,
three centers -- one each at CONAD, and Western and Eastern Region
Headquarters -- were set up.
From the center at Colorado Springs, all
FCDA key points, state CD cepters, and FCDA offices we~e to receive
ini tial warning.
After the declaration of a Warning Yellow, subse
quent warning and position reports ~re to be furnished to the FCDA
key pOints from all attack centers.l~
EXERCISES
Cocmand ~olicy.
CONAD set forth its policy on exercising and
evaluating the air defense system in a regulation issued on 19 June
1957.
'me ~chiner./ set up by the regulation provided for conducting
exercises at four le.,els -- division, region, national and internation
al.
Inc luded in the r!nchinery was an outline of the types of exercises
to be conducted at each level and the responsibility of each commander
to CINCONAD.
Under the prOVisions ~f the new regulation, component commanders
were responsible for conducting the training necessary to bring indi
viduals and units of the system to a combat ready state and to maintain
them at peak efficiency.
Such training was to include individual and/
or unit exercises which would increase proficiency and intra-unit exer
-cises designed to maintain peak efficiency.
In addition, the commandersPage 116
U ·~,··!t\l '\r: ~ -:, '···· I . '.J \ i " '; ! )' j .' ':.J j V'oL.JJ '.:;;i~ ~J C-..4~ , ( '\ 82 could, arter coordination with the appropriate CONAD headquarters, set up exercises with rorces or more than one component service. Exercises at the component level were to include but were not limited to training, tactical evaluation, operational readiness or similar inspections, em ployment and suitability tests, and service conducted weapons rirings. Operation and evaluation or the integrated air derense system ~s set up as a runction or the CONAD commanders. '!he scope or these exer cises was to include joint tests involving elements or the components and/or exercises between CONAD rorces and forces not under CONAD control. At the division and region levels, the commanders could schedule joint training and/or evaluation exercises that normally were to be held with * . training missions rlown by SAC. CONAD headquarters kept the authority to hold exercises of the broadest scope. The exercise areas marked out ror its supervision in cluded actual riring exercises, speciric controlled exercises, national exercises (two or more regions participating), and international exer cises.19 CONAD-SAC ECM Exercises. The threat or electronic countermeasures against the CONAD air derense system was never mOre rorcerully demon strated than in October 1956 and January 1957. During these tvo months, SAC aircrart, ritted with multiple jammers and employing random charr drops, rlew",through the three derense rorce areas disrupting the sur veillance, identirication and control capability or much or the system. How well the missions succeeded was brought out by the commanders or the derense area. Major General Jarred V. Crabb, CADF commander, wrote: "'!hey completely jammed our radar. All the normal rules or ECM were exercised by our people. We were unable to read through the jamming."20 EADF reported that its ability to run close control intercepts was "virtually eliminated. ,,21 Although the Joint CONAD-SAC missions were not designed ror eval uation of the air defense system, the fact that all S-Band radars (ap proxim.tely 20 per cent of the CONAD radar system) could be rendered ineffective by ECM was a serious problem. The radar had some anti jrumning features, but they were inadequate. In essence, this meant that until newer·radars incorporating built-in ECCM reatures -- equipment thus far in the distant fUture -- were delivered to the field, CONAD * Missions scheduled with SAC were to conrorm to CONADR 51-1. o
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( u c would .have to rely upon experienc.ed ,ECM operators who could "read through" ja.umiDgin so far as possible. 'lbeCONAD statf turned its attention to helping ADC in its efforts to provide such experience and . to gain additional knowledge of ECM characteristics. To enable th~staf'f' to more effectively cope with the ECM threat, CONAn proposed that the previously impromptu exercises provided by SAC be made a regularly scheduled event. A series of these scheduled tests would, it was hoped, provide the radar operators with the needed experience. Such mssions could be used also to provide ECM training to and evaluation of the entire defense network (including Rike bat teries, picket ships,TexB.S towers. blimps and AEW&C aircraft -- parts of the system previously untested). SAC eventually agreed to the CONAn proposal. · '!be exercises could be worked into its rotation schedule and would provide an excellent op portunity for testing penetration and ECM tactics of its bomber forces~ Shortly thereafter, joint CONAD-SAC ECM monthly missions were set up for the 'evaluation and training of the system. · The first exercise was scheduled for April 1951. By 1 July 1951, two of the monthly exercises .bad been ,run. Although neither offered conclusive evidence on which tti evaluate the air defense system, both served their purpose of providing maximum ECM-ECCM training and experience in evaluating and collecting data on which to base a series of controlled ECM tests for the immediate fUture.23 CON~Navy Exercises. Associated radar problem areas which handi capped the air defense system were emphasized in two Navy West Coast exercises (HOP SCO'.OCH and HOME RUN) held at mid-1956 and mid-1951. ']be two operations illustrated the fact that the radar currently em ployed for air defense ~s inadequate to detect either very low or very high altitude f1ights.24 In HOP SCO~, held in June 1956, 120 Navy AD, AJ, F2H, F9F and F7U airc!B.ft were launched against targets in the 21th and 28th Di visions' areas of responsibility. The planes attempted to penetrate the areas at altitudes that varied from 40 feet to 42,000 feet. * SAC's capability to test the entire defense network on a con tinuing scale was hampered because of the 1im1ted number of J8Dmers in stalled in its aircraft fleet sUfficiently strong enough to jam "L" and high "SIt Band radars. ... i I I '0 UCL
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j ' .' ~ i.:..~~ ;- .;~ · 84 Forty-two carrier~baseo. aircraf't, employing very high and very low level attacks, entered the same areas a year later (June 1951) in exercise HOME RUN. A 6\ll11D8l"Y of' the CONAD combat air patrol (CAP) etfectiveness in detecting the aggressor f'orce appears in the table shown below: HOP SCO'reR HOMERUN HOME RUN On Pen. Pen, and, Trks Only On Pen. Trks Only Outbound. Trks Nr Faker Acf't Penetrating Nr Faker Acf't Detected Percent Detected Nr Faker Acf't Comadtted Against Percent Committed Against Nr Faker Acft MA 'd(Intcpt) I . , Percent MA'd Fighters Committed per Faker Acft Detected 120 30 25~ 28 2~ 13 ll~ .. 42 12 2gf, 10 24~ 0 0 1.1 1.1 42 13 3l~ 11 2fII. 2 ( 5~ 1.8 I . I u ·1 , _ ~.---_ # .-- - -- - ~'!r;~ . NCLASSIFIED
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\ / UNCLAS !FlED NJINfE. AIR DEFENSF PROGRAMS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE OH.TF.C:'T'TVES PLAN. lQS6-1966 The terms of reference for CINCONAD directed that he would, after consultation with unified and specified commanders, recommend to the JCS the operational requirements for forces, wear~ns, and equipments of all elements of the contir.ental air defense system. The terms further provided that the development and procurement of weapons would be responsive to CINCONAD's requirements as approved ~ the JCS and were to be accomplished by the various services. In compliance with this directive, CONAD submitted to the JCS on 18 December 1956, the Continental Air Defense Objectives Plan for the .,.,. ten years 1956 to 1966 (CADOP 56-66).1* A new plan was to be issued I j each year, e.g., 1957-1967. The plan covered objectives for the air defense of both Canada and the United States. In formulating it, the AOC RCAF ADC was consulted frequently and the RCAF Liaison Staff at CONAD Headquarters participated fully. General Partridge conferred with the Canadians after the plan was finished and advised th~ JCS that the RCAF voiced no serious objection to any part of it. They were in general agreement with the level of forces and ground environment. They did have some reser vations on actual numbers of fighter squadrons, deployment, etc., but, General Partridge stated, it appeared that the differences were minor and could be worked out in the future. Eve~one agreed, he said, that the JCS should not send the objectives plan to the Canadi an Chiefs officially for comment until a decision on integration of operational control of the Canada-U. S. systems was made. As noted above, CADOP 56-66 had been submitted on 18 Decembe:r 1956. Lack of JCS approval by April 1957 brought a strong plea from CONAD. Approval by the JCS was a prerequisite to provision of required :' '; ·t. * Prepared with the support and assistance of !DC, ARADCOM, and NAVFORCONAD. CL IF u
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.i UN LASSIFI D .' 1,) (."" . , . 86 ,~..... forces by any of tne services. In its letter CONAD said that this lack of approval was having a harmful effect:3 Without any recognized and approved GONAD program and goal, the air defense of North America can be, and is being, jeqpardized by unilateral Service ac~ions which, althougr valid insofar as the individual Service is concerned, frequently have a highly adverse effect on the Continental Air Defense System. The JCS still had not given its approval by August 1957 and the CONAD requirements and the service programming were considerably at variance. Headquarters lliAF had published a program document (PO 59-1) for the guidance of Air Force units in their planning.L This, document was not submitted. to CINCONAD and did not agree with CAOOP. The Army submitted its program to CONAD in a piecemeal manner only. The Navy was not planning expansion of their forces as a result of CADOP and had not sent any program to CONAD. FY 1959 PLAN On 6 August, in response to a request from the lliAF Chief of f Staff, CONAD submitted all CONAD reconunended air de!ense programs for FY 1959~ CONAD also sent along the forces programmed to be operational by the various services by the end of FY 1958 and the forces recommended or approved to be operational in FY 1959. The 1959 plan was as follows. I CONAD REQUIREMENTS FY 1959 II PROGRAMMEr TO BE OPERATIONAL - FY 1959 III SERVICE RECOMMENDED OR APPROVED TO BE OPERATIONAL IN FY 1959 MANNED INTERCEPTORS United States Northeast Area Alaska BOMARC United States 66 Sqdns 3 Sqdns 2 Sqdns 1 Sqdn 64 Sqd.ns 3 Sqdns 4 Sqdns NONE 68 Sqdm 3 SqdnB 4SqdnB NONE NOTE: In February 1957, the JCS approved construction of five BOMARC sites at: (1) McGuire AFB, J. J. (2) Suffolk AFB, N. Y., (3) otis AFB, Mass., (L) O Dow AFB, Me., (5) Plattsburg AFB, N. Y. The first Four sites were under con struction (USAF PG-59-l provided four units to l1e operational in FY 1960). llliif-'/ :::.' . ~ . (f: - I '. ,~il'~~~ ~~( ~;: ' ~.1· I~;¥ . , :J. : ~ I ~ UNCLASSIFI ED . ~.
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SFrED j . ) .-/ 1 .. III . II "" JUKE/TAtOO United States Alaska HAWK GUNS (90 & 12Omm) United States Northeast Area Alaska SKYSWEEPER United States Northeas t Area Alaska LAND BASED RADARS United States Northeast Area Alaska Canada 61 Bn's NIKE NONE 73 Bn's (NlKE) (12 new Bn's at 16 new sites) 2 Bn's 77 Bn's NIKE 2 Bn's NONE 59 Bn's IBn IBn 6 Bn's 1/2 Bn 2 148 12 21 35 NOTE: In November 1956, the JCS approVed 3 Nike battalions far Alaska, to be operation al by IT 1960. . . ~ : : NONE NONE NOTE: In February 1957, the JCS approved two Hawk sites: New York and Wash1.ll.I!ton.. The New York site was to be operational in FY 1960. I 17 RA 25 1/2 NG 42 1/2 Total IBn 3 Bn's 3 Bn's 2/3 Bn 2 144 · 10 18 11 U.S. Manned & Financed 4 u.s. Financed 11 Canadian '20 Total ! .. 3RA 25 1 2 NG 28 2 Total IBn 3 Bn's (? Bn's approved by CONAD in lieu of 2 Skysweeper En's planned for conversion to Hike). " 1 2/3 Bn NONE 1h4 I· .. " 10 18 26 UNCL ASSIF ED , U
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sa ( .:.. III II I GAP FILLER RADARS lS8 TJnited States 142 161 6 6 6 Northeast Area 6 6 Alaska NONE NONE 82 Canada OFF SHORE RADARS Texas Towers 3 3 3 10 10 Picket Ship Stas 13 8 Day to nay 8 Day to Day Basis Basis AEW&C Stations 13 2 Increased Readiness Basis 2 Increased IO" Readiness Basis 10 Total C-, SAGE DIRECTION CENTERS NONE 8 United States 7 SAGE COMBAT CENTERS NONE 1 United States 1 BADGE To be Northeast Area NONE NONE Determined Modified NONE 2 Colocated AAOC-ADDC's in BADGE System Alaska modified BADGE System DEW LINE Alaska & Canada Not Included 40 (Northern DEW 40 in CADOP 56-66 line Proj.) 6 (Proj. i-"" 6 Stretchout) Not Included 11 (Northern DEW <:)nada-N. E. ATea 11 L) in CADOP 56-66 Line) • UNCLASSIFIED
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· , .~ DEFENSE AGAINST MISSILES A requirement for a defense against the intercontinental bal listic missile was contained in CONAD's CADOP 56-66. CONAD had repeatedly expressed concern over this threat. In March 1957. it told the JCS that an adequate and timely defense ~stem against the intercontinental Ballistic missile was "the most urgent future CONAn requirement."6 CONAn urged that tull recognition and effort be put on this requirement in order to get a system in time to meet the threat. National Intelligence Estimat~s and all other available intelli gence, CONAD pointed out, indicated that Russia could have an ICBM as early as 1959 and a lmost certainly by 1961.* Another requirement, not formally stated in CADOP 56-66, was for a defense against cruise and ballistic missiles launched from submarines or surface ships. On 1h June 1957, CONAn stated a re quirement to the JCS for such a system. 7 CONAD pointed out that current systems were limited in their capability to acquire and react against small, high-speed targets. What was needed was a quick-reacting anti-Missile capability that could detect and destroy short and intermediate range surface-to-surface and underwater-to surface missiles. ( * On 26 August 1957, Russia announced that she bad. Just com pleted successfUl tests of a missile that could hit any target in "any part of the world," including the United States. UC
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APPENDIX
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l " . :~;;!: .... UNCl S FLED APPENDIX .. .. MISSIONS OF FRIENDLY FORCES (As listed in CONAD, ']he Air Defense Plan, Continental United States, Alaska, and Northeast Area, (1-57 ), 1 January 1957, Title SECRET) 1. Commander-in-Chief Alaska a. Mlintains the security of the Alaskan Cranand. b. Supports CIRCONAD in the defense of tee United states against air at tack· through Alaska and the Arctic regions within his coJllllBnd. c. Supports CIrfCONAD in his mission. 2. Canmander-in-Chief Pacific a. Defends the United States against attack through the Pacif'1cOcean. b. When there exists an iDminent threat of air at~k upon the conti nental United States or in case such an attack develops, provides, for the operational control of CINCONAD, those naval forces and facilities having an air defense capability and which can be made temporarily available for air defense operations. c. Plans for and conducts operations required for the seaward extension j of the early varning system within his area of responsibility and supports I CINCONAD in accordance vith plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff' and mutual agreements by the cODlll8.Ilders concerned, to insure that plans for, and the operation of, these elements of the early warning system will be re sponsive to the needs of CINCONAD. · . • d. Conducts Naval operations (ASW) designed to destroy possible enemy capability to deliver submarine-launched guided missiles. e.Supports CINCONAD in his mission. 3. Commander-in-Chief Atlantic a. Defends the United States against attack through the Atlantic Ocean. and the Caribbean Sea. b. Same as b. under CINCPAC. c. Same as c. under CINCPAC. d • . Same as d. under CINCPAC. e. Same as e. under CINCPAC. 4. CODDlBnder-in-Chief Caribbean a. lohintains the security of the Panama Canal and of the Caribbean COJlIM.nd, and defends the United States against attack through the Caribbean. b ~ Supports CINCONAD in his mission. . 5. · UNClASSIFIE Commander-in-Chief StrategiC Air Command ( a. Conducts strategic air operations with assigned forces and vith 8uch"---'/ other forces as may be . le by the .leS. ..... ~ .
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UNClASSIFI ~ .. " -'j -"-:" \ b •. When lbere exists an i.......~~r attack upon the cont1Dental United States or in case such aJf~!lttack-dev:elops, ,provides, tor the operational control ot cmcORAD, those SAC torces and tacilities having an air detense capability which are in a position to be employed e:Ueetively and which can be made temporarily available for air detense operations. c. Provides air defense training tor the above torces to insure the et.. tective integration ot these torces into the continental air detense system. d. Supports CmCONAD in his mission. 6. Designated U. S. Air Force CoDll8.nders a. Supports CINCONAD to the maximum extent consistent with assigned primary missions. b. When there exists an 1JJn1nent threat ot air attack upon the conti nental United States or in case such an attack develops, provides tor the oper ational control ot CINCONAD, those available torces and tacilitieo having an air defense capability which are in a position to be employed e:Ueetively in air defense operations. c. Provides air defense training tor the above torces to insure the et fective integration ot these forces into the continental air detense system. 7. Designated u. S. Arm:t Canmanders a. Same as a. under Designated USAF COIIDB.Dders. b. Same as b. under Designated USAF CODIIIUlders. ( " c. Same as c. under Designated USAF CO!IIDBllders. 8. Designated u. S. Navy and U. S. Mlr1ne Corps CODIDAnders a. Same as a. under Designated USAF Commanders. b. When there exists an 1mn1nent threat ot air attack upon the continental United States or in case such an attack develops, provides, in accordance with coordinated plans, for the operational control of CINCONAD, those available Navy and Marine torces and tacilities having an air detense capability and which are in a position to be employed effectively in air detense operations. c • Same as c. under Designated USAF CCJI!IIIJIBDders. 9. Canada a. 'lhrough the Air Defence r;0DIDfUld, RCAF, provides, for the air defense ot Canada and coordinates the operation of the Canadian air defense system with the United States continental air defense system. b. Participates in other operations for the security ot the Western Hemisphere. i I <l".', 10. ~xico i Maintains internal security within her own borders but will be unable to make significant forces available for combined air detense missions. No bi lateral air detense agreements have been completed with Mexico at the present • Otime. L ': 1 ~..~,;.. .... , : k· " UNCLASSIFIED
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U CL / APPENDI , -" ~ : ADC FIGHTER.:.INTERCEPTOR FORCE As of 28 June 1951 Air Base Type Actt Creva Div Sqdn Location Asgmt Actt Asgd Opr Rdy Asgd .Opr Rdy EASTERlf AIR DEFENSE FORCE 26th 2 Su1"t'olk ADC F-l(~A 28 4 16 0 5 Suffolk ADC F-lC~A 24 4 6 0 46 Dover MATS F-94c 22 18 34 21 49 Hanscom ARne F-86L 19 11 17 15 ~', ,:~~~,:. ~~ . 58 Otis ADC F-89H 1 0 0 0 F-89J 28 16 35 26 60 Otis ADC F-94c 20 13 22 36 96 Newcastle ADC F-94c 19 13 21 33 rn Newcastle ADC F-94c 21 15 34 26 98 Dover MATS F-89H 2 2 0 0 F-89J 19 10 34 0 324 Westover SAC F-86D 25 12 35 25 330 Stewart ADC F-86L 16 1 35 20 331 Stewart Are F-86L 11 1 32 24 332 McGuire MATS F-86L 23 11 31 12 331 Westover SAC F-86D 6 1 29 14 , F-86L 13 1 0 0 539 McGuire MATS F-86L 21 8 22 33 " 30th 31 Wurtsmith ~ F-102A 21 6 29 0 42 Greater Pitt ADC F-86D 3 0 26 25 F-86L 18 10 0 0 41 Niagara. Falls ADC F-86L 19 13 31 16 11 Selfridge Are F-86D 3 3 21 20 F-86L 23 16 0 0 86 youngstown ADC F-86D 2 2 0 0 F-86L 16 10 30 12 94 Selfridge ADC F-86L 21 · 11 33 29 445 Wurtsmith ADC F-89H 2 0 0 0 F-89J 28 20 32 9 32nd 21 Griffis AJ.C F-94c 12 9 28 9 F-lC~A 1 0 3 0 31 Ethan Allen ADC F-86D 25 19 29 23 15 Presque Isle Are F-89l£ 16 1 33 10 16 Presque Isle ADC F-89D 15 8 30 19 I 465 Griffis Me F-89H 11 1 10 0 F-89J 14 11 22 22 ' , 35th 444 Charleston MATS F-86D 8 6 32 29 F-86L 12 6 0 0 UNCLASSIFIED
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63 U CL S FlED tt Crews .:) Sqdn Location Actt Asgd Opr Rdy Asgd Opr Rdy EASTERN ' Am DEFENSE FORCE (CONT' D) . 31th 62 O'Hare ADC F-86D 4 3 0 0 F-86L 23 19 35 15 O'Hare ADC F-86D 1 0 0 0 F-86L 11 11 31 16 323 Truax ADC F-l~ 23 1 24 0 325 Truax ADC F-l~ 22 8 19 0 438 Kinross ADC F-89D 1 0 1 0 F-l00A 16 0 16 0 484 K. I. Sawyer ADC 0 0 0 0 58th 56 Wright-Patt ~ F-86D 1 3 30 30 ~:~:~E F-86t 11 6 0 0 87 Lockbourne SAC F-86D 25 12 36 34 319 Bunker Hill TAC F-94C 22 11 J7 . 0 354 ltkGhee-'l'yson ADC F-86D 11 10 Z7 25 F-86L 14 4 0 0 469 M:: Ghee-Tyson ADC F-86D 29 11 31 29 ! I 85th 48 Langley TAC F-l02A 25 16 37 0 ... 95 Andrews MATS F-86t 22 11 31 21 482 Seymour-Johnson TAC F-l02A 8 4 14 0 CENTRAL Am DEFDSE FORCE 20th 13 Sioux City ADC F-86D 26 1.6 36 29 14 Sioux City ADC F-86D 22 8 34 31 85 Scott ATe F-86D 23 6 37 36 326 Richards-Gebaur ADC F-l~ 10 8 25 0 29th 29 Malmstrom SAC F-89H 18 16 32 0 54 Ellsworth SAC F-86D 25 10 33 11 31st 11 Duluth ADC F-l02A 24 8 31 1 432 Minn-St. Paul ADC F-89H 26 18 32 12 33rd Bone 34th 15 Davis-Monthan SAC F-86D 21 10 38 36 93 Kirtland ARne F-86D 21 14 31 30 I:,~ :: ... WESTERN Am DEFENSE FORCE . 9th 322 Larson TAC F-86L 23 18 35 24 491 Geiger ADC F-86D 30 24 31 30 498 Geiger ADC F-102A 21 5 25 0 538 Larson TAC F-86D 4 3 0 0 .. F-86L 18 14 33 21 (-/} 25th 311 ltkChord ADC 8 26 1 UNCLAS
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Air Div Sqdn location Crews Asgd Opr Rdy WESTERN AIR DEFENSE roRCE (CONTtD) . 318 ~Chord Are F-102A 24 8 30 0 321 Paine Are F-89H 12 10 15 12 F-89J 13 10 16 1.6 460 Portland ADC F-89D 27 14 32 25 27th 327 George TAC F-102A 23 5 26 20 329 George TAC F-86L 23 1.6 42 33 437 Oxnard ADC F-89H 19 13 35 31 28th 82 Travis SAC F-86D 6 4 29 28 83 Hamilton ADC F-86D 6 3 0 0 I . F-86L 18 13 29 6 84 Hsa:11ton ADC F-89J 22 17 30 6 398 Hamilton Are 0 0 0 0 456 Castle SAC F-86D 23 1.6 32 25 518 Kl.amath Falls ADC 0 0 0 0 64TH AIR DIVISION (DEFUSE) .... 59 Goose SAC F-89D 20 15 36 24 61 Harmon SAC F-89D 21 17 27 25 74 Thule SAC F-89D 14 12 24 24 UNCLA Sl LEO I Source: ReS 1-AF-Vl4, 28 J\me 1957
Page 132
UNCLAS IFIE ~ APPENDIX III " ", USARADCOM UNITS 15 April 1957 . 'l'!PE BA'I'l'ALION LOCATION , . 1st AAA Missile En. 9th AAA Missile Bn. 10th AAA Missile Bn. 11th AAA Missile En. 13th AAA Missile Bn. 18th AAA Missile Bn. 24th AAA Missile Bn. 28th AAA Missile Bn. 34th AAA Missile Bn. 36th AAA Missile Bn. 38th AAA Missile Bn. 44th AAA Missile Bn. 49th AAA Mi.ssile Bn. 54th AAA Missile Bn. 56th AAA Missile Bn. 66th AAA Missile Bn. 71st AAA Missile Bn. 74th AAA Missile Bn. f 75th AAA Missile Bn. 78th AAA Missile Bn. 79th AAA Missile Bn. 83d AAA Missile Bn. 85th AAA Missile Bn. 86th AAA Missile Bn. 176th AAA Missile Bn. 351st AAA Missile Bo. 401st AAA Missile Bn. 433d AAA Missile Bn. 436th AAA Mlssile Bn. 441st AAA Missile Bn. 465th AAA Missile Bn. 483d AAA Missile Bn. 485th AAA Missile Bn. 504th AAA MissIle Bn. 505th AAA Missile En. 506th AAA Missile Bn. 508th AAA Missile En. 509th AAA Missile Bn. 513th AAA Missile Bo. 514th AAA Missile Bn. 516th AAA Missile Bn. 526th AAA Missile Bn~ 531st AAA Missile Bn. 548th AAA Missile En. 551st AAA Missile Bn. NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE . NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE .NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE HIKE NIKE NIKE NIXE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE Irwin, Pennsylvania Fort Baker, Sausalito, California Fairchild AFB, Washington Manchester, Connecticut Orland Park, Illinois Detroit, Michigan Fort Banks, Massachusetts Kent, Washington Plainville, Connecticut Fort George G. Meade, Maryland Norfolk, Virginia Youngstown, New York Skokie, Illinois Army Chemical Center, Maryland Fort Monroe, Virginia Fort Totten, New York Fort Belvoir, Virginia West View, Pennsylvania Andrews AFB, Washington D~ C. Fort Sheridan, Illinois Gary Municipal Airport, Gary, Ind. Camp Hanford, Washington For,t Wayne, Detroit, Michigan Arlington Heights, Illinois Media , Pennsylvania Lordstown Ordnance Depot, Ohio Milwaukee, Wisconsin Fort Lawton, Seattle, Washington Travis AF.B, California Berkeley, California Youngstown, New York Camp Kilmer, New Jersey Fort Sheridan, Illinois Dearborn, Michigan Fort Tilden, New York Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Lordsto'WD Military Res. Warren, Ohio }.bon Run, Pennsylvania Fort Ward, Washington Quincy, Massachusetts Selfridge AF.B, Michigan Fort Hancock, New Jersey Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota .Loring AFB, Limestone, Maine \. ' Van Nuys, California ___ .. "i'.. I ... _ ___ __ •• _ UNCLASSI lED " 9fA I
Page 133
( UNCL BA'lTALION 554th AAA Missile Bn. 602d AAA Missile Bn. 605th AAA Missile Bn. 737th AAA Missile Bn. 73Bth AAA Missile Bo. 739th AAA MissileBn. 740th AAA Missile En. 74lst AAA Missile Bn. 75lst AAA Missile Bn. B52d AAA Missile Bn. 865th AAA Missile Bn. 933d AAA Missile Bn. 967th AAA Missile En. NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE HIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE NIKE Fort loBcArthur, San Pedro, Callf. Arrrry Chemical Center, It:t.ryland Fort Dawes, Massachusetts Tappan, New York Pedricktown, New Jersey Rehoboth, Massachusetts Fort Winfield Scott, San Francisco Fairfield, Connecticut Coventry, Rhode Island Milwaukee, Wisconsin Van Nuys, California Fort MacArthur, San Pedro, Calif. West Haven, Connecticut 12th AAA Bn. * 14th AAA Bn. 16th AAA Bn. * 19th AAA Bn. 20th AAA Bn. 33d AAA Bn. 35th AAA Bn. 41st AAA Bn. . r ' 69th AAA Bn. 70th AAA Bn. 77th AAA Bn. * 98th AAA Bn. * 99th AAA Bo. 549th AAA 1m. 550th AAA Bn. *60lst AAA Bn. 606th AAA Bn. 70lst AAA Bn. *734th AAA Bn. 749th AAA Bn. *752d AAA Bn. 496th AAA Bn. 50lst AAA Bn. 5lBth AAA Bn. 5l9th AAA Bn. Bth AAA Bn. * 52d AAA Bn. 425th AAA Bn. *45lst Al.A Bn. 47Bth AAA Bo. . *546th AAA Bn. 12<Amn Gun, Continental l2<Aml Gun, Continental l20mm Gun, Continental 12<Amn Gun, Continental 75mm Gun 75JDD Gun 75mm Gun 75mm Gun 75D11l Gun 75mm Gun Fort Wadsworth, Staten Island, If.Y. Fort Meyer, Arlington, Virginia Fort Banks, Massachusetts Mount Ephraim, New Jersey Bellevue, Washington Savannah River AEC Installation, Jackson, South Carolina Fort George G. Meade, Maryland Fort Tbtten, New York . Fort Hamilton, New York . Silver Springs, lfiryland . Manhattan Beach, Los Angeles, Calif. Wallington, New Jersey Detroit, Michigan Thule AFB, Greenland Norfolk, Virginia Andrews AFB, Washington, D. C. Grand 'Island, New York So. Park Mil. Res., Broughton, Pa. Oaklawn, Illinois Englewood, New Jersey Fbrt Winfield Scott, San Francisco Chicago, Illinois Camp Hanford, Washington Camp Hanford, Washington Camp Hanford, Washington Camp Lucas, Michigan Castle AFB, California k Savannah River AEC Installation, Jackson, South Carolina March AFB, California . Savannah River AEC Installation, Jackson, South Carolina Carswell AFB, Texas UNCLAS I ED 90um Gun, 90nm Gun, 9QmnGun, 90um Gun, 90mm Gun, 9<AtmGun, 90um Gun, 9Qmn Gun, . 9Onm Gun, 9Qmn Gun, 9cm Gun, 9<Amn Gun, 901mn Gun, 90mm Gun, 90mm Gun, 9Qmn Gun, 90rmn Gun, 90mm Gun, 90mm Gun, 90nm Gun, 90um Gun, Mobile Continental Mobile Continental Mobile Continental Continental Continental Continental Mobile · Continental Continental Continental Mobile Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental Continental 99 I
Page 134
BATI'ALION TYPE LOCATION BATI'ERIES (15MM GUN) 428th AAA Btry 15mm Gun Thule AFB, Greenland 429th AAA Btry 15mm Gun Thule AFB, Greenland ! . UNCLAS IFIED I
Page 135
, , " ....;~' :- : U CL S I .... . - , .. , -.. ~ . . -~ :APP-ENDIX 'IN OPERA TIONAL LAND-BASED CONTINENTAL U.S. Data as of 30 June 1957 PERMANENT PROGRAM RADARS Site Sq. No. No. Location Division Force 1 635 M:Chord AFB, Washington 25th WADF 2 TI5 Cambria, California 21th WADF 6 638 Curlew, Washington 26th EADF 7 769 Continental Divide, New Mexico 9th WADF 8 767 Tierra Amarilla, New Mexico 34th CADF 9 646 Highlands, New Jersey 34th CADF 10 762 North Truro, Massachusetts 26th EADF 11 680 Yaak, Montana 9th WADF 12 761 North Bend, Oregon 25th WADF 13 654 Brunswick NAS, Maine 32nd EADF 14 764 St. Albans, Vermont 32nd EADF 15 669 Santa Rosa, California 27th WADF 16 665 Calumet, Michigan 37th EADF 17 739 Wadena, Minnesota 31st CADF 18 787 Chandler, Minnesota 31st CADP 19 676 Antigo, Wisconsin 37th EADF ., .20 661 Self'ridge Am, Michigan 30th EADF 21 763 Lockport, New York 30th EADF 24 681 Cutbank, lbntana 29th CADF 25 TI8 Havre, l>bntana 29th CADF 26 TI9 Opheim, J.k>ntana 29th CADF 27 780 Fortuna, North Dakota 29th CADF 28 786 Minot, North De.kota 29th CADF 29 785 Finley, North Dakota 31st CADF 30 648 Benton, Pennsylvania 26th EADF 31 755 Williams Bay, Wisconsin 37th EADF .. 32 636 Condon, Oregon 9th WADF 33 m Klamath, California 28th WADF 34 752 Empire, Michigan 3'(th EADF 35 674 Osceola, Wisconsin 31st CADF 37 776 Pt. Arena, Calif'ornia 28th WADF 38 666 Mill Valley, California 28th WADF 39 670 San Clemente I., California 27th WADF 40 637 Othello, Washington 9th WADF 42 663 Lake City, Tennessee 58th EADF 43 783 Guthrie, West Virginia 58th EADF 44 758 Neah Bay, Washington 25th WADF 45 773 J.k>ntauk, NeW' York 26th EADF 46 757 Blaine, Washington 25th WADF 47 793 Hutchinson NAS, Kansas 20th CADF 49 655 Watertown, NeW' York 32M EADF 50 656 Saratoga Springa, New York 26th EADF 51 768 }.briarity, New Mexico 34th CADF 52 746 Tinker AFB, Oklahoma CADF 3~rd 53 782 Rockville, Indiana 5th EADF ~. UNCLASSIFIED
Page 136
'; ,.'" .;~;~~ i- .,'. UNCLA S , j Location Division Force 54 170 Palermo, New Jersf!!Y 26th EADF 55 641 Quantico Marine Base, Virginia 85th EADF 56 171 Cape- Charles, Virginia 85th EADF 57 159 Naselle, Washington 25th WADF 58 668 Mather AFB, California 28th WADF 59 150 Boron, Ca1ifornia 27th WADF 60 160 Colville, Washington 9th WADF 61 154 Port Austin, Michigan 30th EADF 62 662 Brookfield, Ohio 30th EADF 63 112 Claysburg, Pennsylvania 30th EADF 64 190 Kirksville, Missouri 20th CADF 65 165 Charleston, Maine 32M EADF 66 153 Sault Ste. r.brie, Michigan 31th EADF 61 181 Ft. Custer, Michigan 30th EADF 68 191 Fordland, Missouri 20th CADF 69 156 Finland, Minnesota 31st CADF 10 198 Belleville, Illinois 20th CADF 11 189 Otmha., Nebraska 20th CADF 12 138 Olathe NAS, Kansas 20th CADF 13 b64 Bellefontaine, Ohio 58th EADF .,4 714 Madera, California 28th WADF ~ ~ . 15 741 Lackland AFB, Texas 33rd CADF 76 151 Mt. Laguna, California 27th WADF ( I 11 1~ Bartlesville, Oklahoma 20th CADF 18 145 Duncanville, Texas 33rd CADF 19 141 Ellington AFB, Texas 33rd CADF 80 766 Caswell, Maine 32M EADF 81 188 Waverly, Iowa 20th CADF 82 184 Fort Knox, Kentucky 58th EADF 85 191 Hanna City, Illinois· 20th CADF M:>BlLE PROGRAM RADARS 88 688 Amarillo, Texas 33rd CADF 89 683 Sweetvater, Texas 33rd CADF 90 686 Walker AFB, New Mexico 34th CADF 91 103 Texarkana, Arkansas 33rd CADF 92 684 Mt. Lemmon AFS, Arizona. 34th CADF 93 904 Winslow, Arizona 34th CADF 94 681 West Mesa, New Mexico 34th CADF 95 685 Las Cruces) New Mexico 34th CADF 91 740 Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota 29th CADF 98 902 Miles City, M:>ntana 29th CADF 99 903 Gettysburg, South Dakota 31st CADF 100 689 Mt. Hebo, AFS, Oregon 25th WADF 103 911 North Concord, Massachusetts 32nd EADF 104 644 Rye, N~ Hampshire 26th EADF 110 9C!7 Bucks Harbor, Miine 32nd EADF 111 908 f.hrietta AFS, Georgia 35th EADF 112 102 Hunter AFB, Georgia 35th EADF 113 192 N. Charleston, South Carolina 35th EADF U CLASS! lEO.
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' :~7 , t UNCLAS I E 'jjl, '.~.:?:";I';..t.. . '01 i · .~, :"","" ·'·=rm-~ , I l ' •. Site Sq. ~ No. No. Location Division Force 115 701 Ft. Fisher, North Carolina 85th EADF 117 632 Roanoke Rapids, North Cart'lina 85th EADF 118 634 Burns, Oregon 9th WADF 121 649 Bedford, Virginia 85th EADF 122 650 Dallas Center, Iowa 20th CADF 125 653 Eng1 and Am, Louisiana 33rd CADF 1.26 657 Houma NAS, Lou1.1aDa 35th EADF 127 658 Winnemucca AFS, Nevada 28th WADF 128 659 Kingman, Arizona 27th WADF 129 660 MacDill Am, Florida 35th EADF 138 7Cf7 Grand Rapids, )ti.nnesota 31st CADF 143 725 walnut Ridge, Arkansas 20th CADF 156 858 Fallon, Nevada 28th WADF I · · ·· f, :: 157 859 Red Bluf'f AFS, California 28th WADF 159 861 Aiken, South Carolina 35th EADF 162 864 Vincent AFS, Arizona 27th WADF 163 865 Las Vegas, Nevada 27th WADF I 164 866 Tonopah AFS, Nevada 28th WADF I 165 867 Flintstone AFS, Georgia ---- 58th EADF I I GAP FTI.LER RADARS . . ~,... P-9A 646 Gibbsboro, New Jersey 26th EADF P-I0A 762 Westboro, Massachusetts 26th EADF P-I0B 762 Ft.• Dearborn, New Hampshire 26th EADF P-20A 661 Burnside, Michigan 30th EADF p-45A 773 Manorville, Nev York 26th EADF p-45B 773 Chilmark, Massachusetts 26th EADF P-50A 656 New Preston, Connecticut 26th EADF P-50E 656 Nev Salem, Massachusetts 26th EADF I·. ", UNCL SID 103
Page 138
. C
I I D
APPEND
KEY PERSONNEL HEADQUARTERS CONAD
1 JUlIE 1957
Co.mander-in-Chiet
General E. E. Partrld.8e, USAF
Chief of Staff
Maj. Gen. M. S. Carter, USA
Secretariat
Col. C. H. Scott, Jr., USAF
Asst. Sec. Adjutant
Dir. Plans and Requirements (cont •. )
Ch, Policy and Programs Div.
Col. W. H. Murray, USA
Ch, Plans Division
Col. J. F. Kirkendall, USAF
Director of Operations
Col. J. H. Jeffus, USAF
Lt. Col. W. J. Birmele, USAF
Asst. Sec. Audio-Visual SVB.
Lt. Col. R. A. Bassler, USAF
Asst. Sec. Protocol
Lt. Col. O. D. Simpson, USAF
Information Services Officer
Col. A. B. Oldfield, USAF
Asst. Director
Lt. Col. C. E. ·Tovne, USA
Director of Public Information
Cdr. J. R. English, USN
Director of Command History
Mr. L. H. Buss
Director of Internal Information
ncS/Plans and Operations
Maj. Gen. H. T. Alness, USAF
Asst. DCS/P&O
Brig. Gen. T. V. Stayton, USA
Capt. E. Tatom, USN
Director/Plans and Requirements
Brig. Gen. A. J. Pierce, USAF
Asst. Director
Col. W. H. Murray, USA
Ch/ .Requirements Div.
Capt. G. W. Snider" USN.. .
•
"'".: t''-i !i~.:.i...f-{.~~••st. Director
~ ."Z~ , · t
. '-.IT
Dr. R. H. Jordan
....~~~T
104
_____
Asst. Director
Col. L. R. Seibert, USMC
Ch, Training & Exer. Div.
Col. R. S. Dingle, Jr., USA
I
!
Ch, Tactics & Tech. Div.
i
Col. H. B. Allen, USAF
[..
Director of Combat Opos. Center
,
Col. H. W. Shoup, USAF
Asst. Director
Lt. Col. L. H. TYree, USA
Cdr. J. W. I.a.vyer, USN
Plans &Eval. Officer
loBJ. M. D. Surratt, USAF
Ch, Combat Rptg. Center
Capt. K. O. Butler, USAF
Director of Plans Analysis
Col. E. H. Callahan, USAF
Executive Officer
Lt. Col. K. K.
Howenst~ne, USAF
Ch, Feasibility Div.
Col. O. K. Marshall, USA
Ch, War Ge.ming Div •
Cdr. H. R. Nylund, USN
Director of Operations Analysis
Mr. P. S. Ball, Jr.
UNCLA I
o
,',Page 139
I I Director of Operations Analysis (cont.) Ch, Electronics Div. Mr. R. E. Donegon Ch, Ident. and Raid Recognition Div. Dr. R. H. Jordan Ch, Interceptor and Missile Div. Mr. E. C. Helfrich Ch, System Anal. Div • Mr. R. H. Blythe, Jr. DCS/Communications and Electronics Brig. Gen. F. F. Uhrhane, USA Asst. DCS/C&E Col. P. H. Long, USAF Director of Electronics Warfare Col. O. W. Miller, USAF Chj Electronics Warfare Div. !-Bj. J. W. Clancy, USAF Ch, Emission Control Div. CWO R. L. Westfall, USAF Director of Plans &Requirements Lt. Col. H. K. Anderson, USAF Ch, Operational Rqlllts. Div. Maj. D. L. Faulkner, USAF Director of Systems Lt. CoL F. K. Nichols, USAF Ch, Electronics Div. Maj. W. R. Goodrich, Jr., USAF Ch, Communications Div. Maj. R. ~ -. Livermore, USAF , DCS/Intelligence Brig. Gen. R. Taylor, 3d, USAF Asst. DeS/I Col. R. Totten, USAF DeS/Intelligence (cont.) Director Collection &Dissemination Col. J. D. Hand, USA Ch, Coll. Service Div. MaJ. R. P. Reinsch, USAF Ch, Pub. & DisseminationDiv. Capt. W. B. Wilson, USAF .Director of Researeh & Est. Col. M. R. Graham, USAF Asst. Director Lt. Col. A. Roman, USA Ch, Strate Analysis Div. Lt. Col. J. M. fok>oneyham, USAF Ch, Tech. Analysis Div. Lt. Col. J. N. Young, USAF Ch, Domestic Vul. Div. Maj. A. B. Adams, USAF Director of Oper. Intelligence Col. J. F. Setchell, USAF Asst. Director Cdr. T. C. Schaible, USN Ch, Intell. Watch Div. Lt. Col. W. F. Zeller, USAF Ch, Combat Intell. Div. . Maj. A. B. Harper, USAF Ch, Procedures Branch Maj. A. B. Harper, USAF Ch, Systems Anal. Branch Capt. J. D. Fletcher, USAF Sp. Asst to Des/r Col. H. C. Brown, Jr., USAF u eLA .. I D Executive Lt. Col. E. C. Rowe, '---' ~ I .... 105
Page 140
k · . ".-... ..,. . ··.". iP~ " • • ~ .' ... .. ,. '" '" .1 . . - : . . :-:<:: ~UARTERS AIR DEFUSE CO*AltD COMMANDER Lt. Gen. J. H. Atkinson HEADQUARTERS ARMY: AIR DEF'EBSE COMlWU> COlotlAl'IDING GENERAL Lt. Gen. S. R. Mickelsen HEADQUARTERS NAVAL FORCES CONAn COMMANDER Capt. J. G. Howell ReAF PLAIlmfG LIAISON STAFF SENIOR pLADIlfG LIAISOlI OFFICER Group Captain G. S. Austin UNCLA SIF... · l~
Page 141
REFERENCES
Page 142
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Page 143
~ , . " ~, UNCLASSI I REFERENCE NOTES FOR PAGES 1-16 ONE 1. Memo for the Record, "Report of Staff Visit to Headquarters USAF," 27 Feb 1956, by Col. L. G. )okCollom, COllAD/AOC P&R, with MeJoo, Gen. Partridge to Gen. IJ.Dd.88.7, "Organi zational Planning for Air Defense," 13 Feb 1956 (Doc 1, COIiAD/Are Rist, Jan-Jun 1956). 2. Ibid., Memo, (]en. Partridge to Gen. Lindsay. 3. Ibid., Mello, "Report ot Start Visit to Hq USAF." 4. Mag., CINCOllAD to cis USAF, 5 )tu- 1956 (Doc 2, COlfAD/Are Hist, Jan-Jun 1956). 5. Ibid. 6. COllAD to ARAACOM, "Study on CONAD Organization," 15 Dec 1956 (DOC 1). 7 • Proposed Reorganization of Headquarters CONAD, 23 Mar 1956 (DOC 2). 8. ARAACOM to CONAn, ''Proposed Reorganization ot COllAD Headquarters," 11 Apr 1956 (DOC 3). 9. Ibid. 10. BAVFORCONAD to CONAD, "Proposed Reorganization ot COllAD Headquarters," 11 Apr 1956 (DOC 4). ..1 11.' MlSg., USAF to CONAD, 3 Jul 1956 (DOC 5). 12. Incl., Proposed UMD Headquarters CONAD, 31 Ju1 1956, to CONAD to cis USAF, ''Proposed Manning Document tor Headquarters CONAD," 6 Aug 1956, with 1 Ind (DOC 6), IV'-'~ ~.(~- 3 VAtej'~~1 ' 13. Ibid.', lst Ind, USAF to CONAn, 22 Aug 1956. ------- 14. CONAD to USAF, "lthnning Requirements tor Hqs COIlAD," 30 Nov 1956 (DOC 7). 15. JCS SM-716-56, Memo for CINCONAD, "Terms ot Reterence tor CmcONAD," 4 Sep 1956 (DOC 8). 16. COIAD GO 21, 24 Sep 1956 (DOC 9). 17. Mag., USAF to MC,17 Sep 1956 (DOC 10)j *.1. OeD. M. S. Roth, Actg COllAD cis, Mao tor Ul Start Agencies, "CONAD Problem Areas," 20 Sep 1956 (HRF 2). TWO 1. Mag., CIRCOllAD to CIlInm, 28 Aug 1956 (DOC 11); DF, DCS/P&R to Staff,. "Implementation ot,the Unified COJIID8Dd Plan," 11 Sep 1956, V1th4 incls. (DOC 12). 2. Mag., CINCOIAD to COMlmAC, 19 Sep 1956 (DOC 13). 3. Air Defence Agreement between AOC RCAP' ADC ana CIICOBAD, 1 Jan 1957 (Doc 18, COllAD Rist. Ret, Paper" 1, U. S. Air Detense in the lortheast, 1?40-1957. 4. USAF to ReAF, "USAF Reorganization or the Northeast Area," 3 Oct 1956 (DOC 14); RCAF to USAF, "Proposed Reorganisation ot the -~ Northeast Air CC)D'OBnd, II 22 Oct 1956 (DOC 15). 5. ,Are GO -/I 13, 26 Feb 1957 (Doc 16, Rist. Ret. Paper 1, U. S._ Ai_r Det_in the N. E. 1940 !2TI.); NEAC-Are-SAC-MA'l'S-AIC AgreeiIent Perta1ning to the JJSAF Reorganization ot the , . UNCLASS
Page 144
UCLA REli'ERl!JIfCE-'}lr<:>TI!:S FUR PAGES 16-26 Northeast Area, 5 Dec 1956 (Doc 17, CONAD Hist. Re:f. Paper II 1, U. S. Air Defense in - the Northeast, 1940-1957). 6. Msg., ARAACOM to First Army, 31 A~ 1956 (ARADCOM Adj. Files). 7. CONAD GO /I 2, 19 Mar 1957 (DOC 17). 8. CONADR 24-1, 'Drganization - 64th CONAn Div," 1 Apr 1957 (DOC 18); CONAn to cIs WAF, "Progress Report on Air De:fense Planning in the Northeast Area," 25 Jan 1957 (DOC 19); Col. C. W. l>t:Colpin to Gen. E. E. Partridge, 5 Apr 1957 (DOC 20); CONAn to Are, "Desig nation o:f Commander," 16 Apr 1957 (HRF 4). 9. CONAD, '!he Air De:fense Plan Continental U. S., Alaska aM lIortheast Area (Title ~), Jan 1957, p 5, Basic Plan (HRF 656). 10. Mag., CINCONAD to CINCAL, 28 Aug 1956 (DOC 21). 11. Memorandum of Agreement between CINCONAD and CINCAL Concerning Air De:fense Responsi bilities ·and Arrangements in Alaska, 28 Aug 1956 (Appendix) . 12. Msg., ARAACOM to USARAL, 2 Oct 1956 (DOC 22). THREE 1. CONAD to cIs USAF, " Air De:fense o:f Ce.nada. and the Uni·ted States," 14 r-hr 1957 (DOC 23). 2. CADOP 56-66, 15 Dec 1956, (Secret page o:f Top Secret document), p 1 (HRF 657). 3. Mag., OSD to CG Ent AFB, 2 Aug 1956 (DOC 24). 4. Briefing Prepared :for OCS/I, CONAD, by Lt. Col. C. Kekoa, CONAD P&R, 12 Apr 1957 (DOC 25). 5. Mag., WAF to AOC, 9 Jul 1956 (DOC 26). 6. As in n 4. FOUR 1. Mag., CONAn to JDF's, 13 Mar 1956 (DOC 2'7). 2. CONAD GO I 25, 21 Dec 1956 (DOC 28). 3. CONADR 21-1, 21 Dec 1956 (DOC 29). 4. Ibid. 5. CONAD to ADC, "Designation o:f Commanders," 12 Dec 1956 (DOC 30). 6. CONAD to cIs USAF, "CONAD Subordinate Hqs UMD," 7 Jun 1957 (DOC 21). 7. Ibid., !nels. U\ C l FIVE 1. AOC, OCS/C&E, Historical File Covering CONAD Method o:f Employing AA Weapons, 9 Jan l j 1957, pp 15-16 (HRF 50).
Page 145
---
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REFEREJfCE ltO'l'ES FOR PAGES 26-37
2. CONAD to Are, ARAACOM, "Implementation or Missile *ster (AIf/FSG-l)," 6 Dec 1956
(DOC 32).
3. Mello ror the Sec or the AP fro. Sec or Der, "Continental Air Der.," 21 Jun 1956, Incl
to USAF to CINCONAD, "Continental Air De1'ense," 10 Jul 1956 (DOC 33).
4. As in n I, pp 17-19.
5.
Annex C to ;;.S....;,trr=x..,..;;...~~=~..;.;:,.,~~~~~~~~=~~~....;;;;;;~~~~
to cIs USAF,
6. As in n I, pp 17-19.
7. Ibid., letter CONAD to cIs mAP.
B. Memo, Dep. Sec or Der to Sees. or Air Force and Army, 30 Oct 1956 (DOC 35).
i-,
9. Memo, Dep Sec or De1' to Sec 01' Army, Air Force, 2B Jan 1957, Incl to cIs USAF to
CINCONAD, "Technical Plan - SAGE Missile ~ter," 11 Mu- 1957 (DOC 36).
10. COESS, Starr Study, "SAGE-Missile lester Integration, II 22 Mu- 1957{ Incl to DF, OOS/C&E
to OOS/p&o, "SAGE-Missile Master Integration," 27 ler 1957 (DOC 37).
11. CONAD to Are, ARADCOM, "Draft Plan for Testing SAGE/Missile lester Integration," 15
Jul 1957 (DOC 3B).
.
i, ~
12. CONAD to cIs mAF, "Implementation or Missile *ster (AN/FSG-l) Program, n 4 Feb 1957
(DOC 39).
13. Mag., USAF to CONAD, 15 Mar 1957 (DOC 40).
14. mARADCOM and AOO to CONAD, "Plans for CONAD (Joint) Direction Centers at Ten (10) Lo
catioDS," 30 Apr 1957 v/l Ind (DOC 41).
15. Ibid., 1st Ind, CONAD to cIs USAF, 2 May 1957.
16. Mag., USAP to CONAD, 21 loBy 1957 (DOC 42).
17. CONAD to ECR, "CONAD Organizational Concepts During SAGE Era," 26 Apr 1957 (DOC 43).
lB. CONAD to CONAD Rgns, "Colocation and Integration or ADDC's and AAoo's," 12 Apr 1957,
v/3 Inds., 2 !ne1s, and 3 DF's (DOC 44); CONAD to Are, ARADCOM, "Colocation or ADOO's
& AAoo's," 14 lohy 1957 (DOC 45).
.
19. Ibid., 1st Ind., ECR to CONAD, n.d.
20. As in nIB, 1st Ind, WCR to CONAD, 9 Apr 1957.
21. As in nIB, 1st Ind, CCR to CONAD, 19 Apr 1957.
22. Memo 1'or the Record, .Lt. Col. O. E. Griest, COOPR, to Mag., CmCONAD to cIs lEAF, 18 J\m
,'. --",
1957 (DOC 46).
I'
23.
AAC to CONAD, 23 May 1957 (DOC 47).
t
24. Mag., CONAD to ALCOM, 31 May 1957 (DOC 48).
25. Mag., CONAD to cIs mAP, IB Jun 1957 (DOC 49)•
_
UNCLA SIFIED
26-;- Mag., CONAD to ALCOM, 11 J\m 1957 (roc 50). ...
;
."'".: .
. ..Page 146
,tt '
~I ,
:
-'
,
.
_ __I
~ ..
~
UNCL A ~FI L)
REFERENCE NOTES FOR PAGES 38-45
SIX
1. ReS: 1-AF-V14, 28 Jun 1957 (DOC 51); RCS: 1-AF-V14, 25 Jun 1956 (Appendix III, COliAD!
AOC Rist, Jan-Jun 1956); Mag., COMNEAC to 'CONAD, 22 Jan 1957 (DOC 52).
2. Ibid.
3. Hist CONAD/AOC, Jan-Jun 1956, pp 41-43.
4. CONAD to AOC, "Re-equipping of Operational Units," 4 Apr 1956 (DOC 53); USAF to Are,
"{Unc1) Operational Concept of the F-102A," 3 Dec 1953 (DOC 54); Mag., COMADC to COM:iAAMA,
17 Apr 1956 (DOC 55); Memo for the Record, "Discussions w:t.th General Putt Regarding mIX
and the TF-102," 23 May 1956 (DOC 56); DF, OCS/P&IJ to COHCS, n(U) Continental Air De
fense Command Status End FY 57," 9 Apr 1957 (DOC 57).
5. As in n 1.
6. DF, 'OCS/P&JJ toCOHCS, "eu) Continental Air Defense COIIIIIBlld status End IT 57," 9 Apr 1957
(DOC 57).
7. CONAD Rist. Ref. Paper No.2, Air Defense of Alaska 194Q..,1957, pp 25-28; Me, COlJIDRnd
Data Book, Thi.rd Quarter, FY 1957 (HRF 704).
8. Ibid.
9 . USAF, "F-102 Conversion Program," 14 Feb 1957 (COOOP-T Files); Mag., CINCONAD to cIs,
USAF, 13 Nov 1956 (DOC 58); Mag., CINCAL to CINCONAD, 21 Jun 1957 (DOC 59); Mag., USAF
to CINCONAD, 19. Jun 1957 (DOC 60).
10. Mag., CINCONAD to CINCAL, 14 May 1957 (DOC 61); Interview with Col. H. B. Ailen, COOOP-T,
2~ Jul 1957; Interview with Lt. Col. O. E. Griest, COOPR, 23 Jul 1957; Mag, COMAAC to
CIS, USAF, 22 Kay 1957 (DOC 62).
_
11. Interview with M3.j. C. W. Knott, COOOP-T, 23 Jul 1957; Mag., USAF to COMMC and Are, 19
Jul 1957 (DOC 63).
12. Blst CONAD/Mx;, Jan-Jun 1956, p 58; CONAD, 'lhe Air Defense Plan: Continental United.
States, Alaska and Northeast Area 1-57, (Title SECRET), 1 Jan 1957 (HRF 656 ).
13. AOC, "(Unclassified.) Air Defense COlIIII8Dd Operations Plan (USAF Augmentation Forces)
4-57," l 'Jhl -1957 (HRF 430); CONADR 55-7, "Criteria for Determ1n1ng Operational Alert
Ready Aircraft and Operational. Alert Crew within CONAD Augmentation Fighter Units," 10
Jan 1956 (HRF 430); Mag., CINCOKAD to COMFECR, et al, 7 Feb 1957 (DOC 64); Mag., 64th
CONAD Div to CINCONAD, 2 M3.y 1957 (DOC 65); Mag., CINCONAD to JEADF, et al, 3 Dec 1956
(~ 66).
14. Mag., CINCONAD to TAC, 22 Apr 1957 (DOC 67); Mag., TAC to CONAD, 17 Apr 1957 (DOC 68);
USAF to CONAD, "(Unclassified.) Employment of AIX; Augmentation Fighter Forces," 28 Feb
1957 (DOC 69); USAF to CONAD, "(Unclassified) CONAD Operations Plan 4-57 (Oref't)," 16
Oct 1956 (DOC 70); 1st Ind (CONAD to TAC, "(U) CONADOP 4-56 (Draft), 25 Jul 1956), TAC
to CONAD, 13 Aug 1956 (DOC 71); Mag., CIRCOBAD to CFEXm,n.d. (HRF 430.1); 2d Ind (TAC
to AOC, "(Unclassified.) Letter of Agreement-1\1ctical Air Command Support of Air Defense
Command;' 12 Feb 1957), CONAD to AOC, 18 Mar 1957 (DOC 72).
15. CONAD OPLAN 1-57, 1 Jan 1957 (HRF 656); Interview with Lt. Col. C. E. Dobson, Jr,
.
NAVFORCONAD, 18 Jul 1957; Dept of the Navy, "OPNAV Instruction Q5410.3A," 11 Apr 1957
(DOC 73); COMNAVR>RCONAD to Dist. "Operations of Naval AugJDeDtation Aircraft in Conti-
0"
nenta1 Air Defense," 15 Jun 1957 (DOC 74).
.
i - "
I·.· .' :.'.
i ·
I
1
f
i
~
',';:' , ' , '
..-
9; AOC, "(Unclassified.) Air Defense ColIIIIand
UO
UNCLASSIFIEDPage 147
............·3;;;"
UNCLA
RE~E NOTES FOR PAGES 45-54
Operations Plan (ANG) 5-57," 1 Apr 1957 (COOOP-T files).
17. CONAD OPPIAN 1-57, Annex B~ 1 Jan 1957 (HRF 430.1); ADC, OPLAN 4-57, 1 Jul 1957 (HRF
430.1); ADC, Operations Plan 5-56, 1 Jul 1956 (HRF 430.1).
22. As in n 12.
23. USARADCOM, Weekly Summarv. 12 Ju1 ]Q'j6: 10 Jul 1957; Intervie'-' vi+.h Mr .. W. J. lotPRr.h.
UsARADCOM G-3, o&T Div, 14 Aug 1957; USARADCOM, station List (U), 15 Apr 1957 (HRF 6.4).
24. CONAD Blst. Ref. Paper No.1, U.S. Air Defense in the Northeas! 1940-1 57, ~ 18; CONAD
Rist. Ref. Paper No.2, Air Defense of Alaska. 1
0-1957, pp 2
29; Mag., CjS, USAF to
CmCONAD, 13 Hov 1956 (DOC 2; USAF to CINCONAD, 'u Interceptor Missile Planning
Guide: Alaska," 11 Dec 1956 (ooc 83); Mag., JCS to CINCONAD, 19 Nov 1956 (DOC 84); 1st
AA Regional Command to USARADCOM, "M Weapons Readiness, Thule Air Base," 29 Jan 1957
(DOC 85); DF, G3 P&O to 04, et al, "CoDlll8Jld Arrangements for AAA Units, Alaska & Green
land (U)," 20 Aug 1956 (DOC 86).
25. Interview with Lt. Col. O. E. Griest, COOPR, 29 Jul 1957; CONAD Rist. Ref. Paper No.2,
Air Defense of Alaska 1~0-1957, p 28; Mag., CINCONAD to CmCSAC, 11 Jul 1957 (DOC 87).
SEVEN
1. Hist CONAD ADC
Jan-Jun 1956, p 15; ADC,
"~nthly ADC ACW S\lDIIIIBXY and. status Report,
2-AF-V20,
30 June 1957
HRF 302).
2. DF, OCS/P&O to CORCS, I/(U) Continental Air Defense Command Status End FY 57," 9 Apr 1957
(roc 57)~ Personal, Gen. E. E. Partridge to Air Marshall C. R. Slemon, "[CONAD Ob-
Jective!b" 3 l<8y 1957 (DOC 88).
.
3. Ibid.
4. ADC, "lobnthly ADC ACW Summary and status Report (2-AF-V20)," 30 Jun 1957 (HRF 302);
Blst CONAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, pp 27-28; DF, OOS/P&O to CORCS, "(U) Continental Air De
•
fense COJIID9.Ild Status End FY 57," 9 Apr 1957 (DOC 57).
5. Ibid. In addition see:
ADC to AOC/RCAF, "(Unelass1f1ed) U.S. Gap Filler Program,"
n.d. (DOC 89); ADC to USAF, "(Unclassified) Proposed Deferral of ADC Gap Filler Radars,"
28 Sep 1956 (DOC 90); 2nd Ind (ADC to CONAD, "(U) Proposed Deferral of ADC Gap Filler
Radars," 28 Sep 1956), ADC to CONAD, 8 Nov 1956 (DOC 91).
.
.
6. Mag., USAF to CINCSAC,29 Oct 1956 (DOC 92); 1st Ind (ADC to CONAD, n{U.) NEAC Radar
Deployment," 30 Nov 1956), CONAD to ADC, 14 Dec 1956 (DOC 93);OONAD Rist. Ref. Paper
No.1, U.S. Air Defense in the Northeast 1940-195 , pp 8-15, 21-22; 64th ADiv, Com
lIIB!lders Mission pr0r,ess ~ June 1957 HRF 7(5); Interview with Lt~ Col.--o.W.
Camp, ADd, 13 A\1.g 195 •
.
D
.
~
....
.
illPage 148
« - -
-
UNCL SSIfI-
J~ t t .
'1. CONAD Rist. Ref. Paper No.
pp 29-33·
8. AAC, "Command Data Book FY 51 ('lhird Quarter)," pp Bl-2 (HRF 1rA); Mag, CINCONAD to
cIs, USAF and CINCAL, 16 May 1957 (DOC 94); Mag., Me to CINCONAD, 4 Apr 1951 (DOC 95);
Mag., MC to USAF, 10 Apr 1951 (DOC 96); USAF to MC, "(SECRET) Deletion or Sitkinak
(F-19) and Chiniak (F-18) AC&W Stations "from the Alaskan Air Coumand Program," n.d.
(DOC gr); Interview with Lt. Col. O. E. Griest, CooPR, 5 AUg 1957.
.
.,
9. Hist CONAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, pp 33-34; ADC, GO # 39, 13 Jun 1951; ADC, GO 11 49; 12
Jul 1951.
10. B/Gen. Kenneth H. Gibson to Lt. Gen. J. ~. Atkinson, "/Jrogress Report AEW&CJ," 3 Oct
1956 (DOC 98).
11. CONAD Operations Plan 9-56, 1 Apr 1956 (HRF 302.12); Hist CONAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 1956,
p 33; ADC, Command summary, Charts, as of 31 Jan 1951 and 30 Apr 1957 (ADC ADHIH
files).
For additional information see:
Mag., CINCONAD to 8th ADiv, 5 Sep 1956
(DOC 99); CONAD to Dir of Requirements, USAF, "(UNCLASSIFIED) CONAD Concept of AEW&C
Employment," 2 Aug 1956 (DOC 100).
.
12. Mag., CINCONAD to cIs, USAF, 27 Mar 1951 (DOC 101); DF, CooPO to CORCS, "Reduction in
Early Warning Radar Coverage," 26 Mar 1951 (DOC 102).
13. Mag., USAF to CINCONAD, 24 Apr 1951 (DOC 103).
See also:
Msg., ADC to 8th ADiv, 11
I
Apr 1951 (DOC lrA); 1st Ind (CONAD to ADC, "Intercept Capability of Picket Ships and
I
AEW&Con Aircraft," 1 Apr 1951), ADC to CONAD, 12 Apr 1951 (DOC 105); ADC to CONAD,
!
" (Unc1assHied) ADC Flying Hour Program, Fourth Quarter FY 1951," 16 Apr 1951 (DOC
106 ); CONAD to ADC, "Essential Early Warning Coverage," 29 M!i.r 1951 (DOC 1CJ7); CONAD
~
to ADC, "(Unclassified) ADC Flying Hour Program Fourth Quarter FY 1951," 11 Apr 1951
(roc loS).
.
14. ADC, Command SUIIIIlary, Charts, as of 31 Jan 1951 and 3() Apr 1951, (ADC ADHIH files).
14A. ADC, "Monthly ADC ACW Summary and Status Report (2-AF-V20)," 30 Jun 1951 (HRF 302).
15. ADC to CINCONAD, "Present.ation on AEW&Con Deployment," w/2 !ncls, 19 Jun 195'{ (DOC
1(9). See also: 1st Ind (ADC to CONAD, "Change to COllAD Ops Plan 9-56 (UNCL)," Feb
1951); CONAD to ADC, 29 M9.r 1951 (DOC 110); CONAD to ADC, "Priority Flight Clearance
ror AEW&:Con Operation," 16 May 1951 (DOC 111); 2nd Iod (WADF to ADC, "(U) AEW&Con
OperatiOns," 29 Jan 1951), ADC to CONAD, 27 May 1951 (DOC 112); 1st Ind (WADF to~,
"(U) AEW&Con Operations," 29 Jan 1951), ADC to CONAD, 24 Apr 1951 (DOC 113); 1st Ind
(8th ADiv to ADC, "Airborne Early Warning and Control lobbility," 24 Sep 1956), ADC
to CONAD, 24 Oct 1956 (DOC 114); DF, COOOP-T to COOPO, "Trip Report (AEW&C Symposium),"
15 Jul 1951 .(DOC 115).
16. Ibid.; R1st CONAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, pp 36-37.
,
11. DF, COOOP-T to COOPO, "Trip Report (AEW&Con Symposium)," 15 Jul 1951 (DOC 115); 1st
Ind (ADC to CONAD, "Navy AEW&Con Activities, n 22 fuy 1951), CONAD to ADC, 13 Jun 1951
(DOC 116); Msg., CFECR to 8th ADiv, 15 May 1951 (DOC 111); Mag., CFECR to CINCONADj
10 Apr 1951 (DOC 118); Mag., CFECR to 26th CADD, 27 Jun 1957 (DOC 119); Mag., CFECR
to 26th CADD, 18 Apr 1951 (DOC 120).
.
.
.
18. 1st Ind (ADC to CONAD, "Navy AEW&Con Activities," 22 May 1951), CONAD to ADC, 13 Jun
1951 (DOC u6).
19. CNO to Dist. List, "Continental Defense," 27 Apr 1951 (DOC 121); Hist CONAD/ADC, Jan-
Jun 1956, pp 32-33.
See also: Mag., ADC. to Comdr Nagoya Japan, 16 Oct 1956 (DOC 122J; U.
3d Ind (CFWCR to CONAD, "Activation of Picket Ship Stations, n 31 May 1951), CONAD to
CNCR, 12 Jul 1951 (DOC 123); COMNAVFORCONAD to CINCONAD, "Intercept Capability or
... ,.~
UNCLAS I
~~j~Page 149
, . ;, .1 " " , ,f~i - ~ ' . - . ---_ ..' RE~ NOTES FOR PAGES 61-65 Picket Ships in the Contiguous System," 13 lolLy 1957 (DOC 124). 20. Msg., CINCONAD to cis, USAF, 22 Apr 1951 (DOC 125); COMNAVFORCONAD to CNO, "Contigu ous Picket Ship Commmications," 3 Jul 1956 (DOC 126); ADC to EADF, et al, "MLnutes of Seaward Extension-Emergency Radio Con:ference," 25 jul 1956 (DOC 121). See also: lst Ind (ADC to CONAD, ,,(U) Navy Assumption of Picket Ship COllllllUIlications at Shore Stations," 29 Oct 1956), CONAD to COMNAVFORCONAD, 8 Nov 1956 (roc 128); CONAD to JWADF, "(Unclass ified) Picket Ship COllUllUIlications," 22 Aug 1956 (DOC 129); 2nd Ind (25th ADiv to JWADF, "Request for Radioteletype Frequencies," 20 Jun 1956), ADC to JWADF, 19 Jul 1956 (DOC 130); CONAD to C/S, USAF, n (U) Contiguous Picket Ship Communications," 22 Feb 1957 (DOC 131). 21. Hist CONAD/Are, Jan-Jun 1956, pp 37-38; Are, "M:::mthly AJ:IJ AC'rl SunJDary and Status Report (2-AF-V20 ), h 30 Jun 1951 (HRF 302). See also: CONAD to NAVFORCONAD, "(Uncl) Operations Data on Texas Tover No.2," n.d. (OOC 132). . 22. ADC, "1obnth1y ADC AGW SWIIlI!!.ry Status Report (2-AF-V20)," 30 Jun 1951 (HRF 3~). 1st Ind (USAF to ADC, "(UNCLASSIFIED) Texas Towers," 1 Aug 1956), ADC to USAF, 10 Oct 1956 (DOC 133); CONAD to JEADF, "Requirement for Texas Towers 1 and V," 22 Jun 1956 (OOC 134). Also see: CNO to C/S, USAF, "Navy Participation in Project Texas Towers," 21 lolLy 1951 (OOC 135). 24. 25th ADiv to JWADF, "Possible Pacific Ocean Texas Tover Site," w/2 Incls, 1 lohr 1957 (OOC 136). 25. 2nd Ind (USAF to ADC,"(U) Buoyant Radar P1atrormB," 21j Mar 1951), CONAD to ADC, w/2 Inc1s, 29 Apr 1951 (DOC 131); Memo for Record, "1ob0red Seaborne Defense Platrorm," 3 Feb 1956 (DOC 138). 26. Interview with Maj. H. H. Fuss, COOOP-T, 11 Ju1 1951. 21. Report, "Minutes or a Meeting to Discuss DEW Line Operations Held at Headquarters ADC 12-13 June 1951," n.d. (DOC 139) 28. DF, ADORQ-E to ADOOO, "Employment and Suitability Tes t of the DEW Line," 15 Jul 1951 (DOC 140) 29. Ibid.; Mag., ADC to C/S, USAF, 16 Jul1951 (DOC 141); Mag., SAFS to COMAPCS, 3 Jul 1951 (DOC 142); Interview with Lt. Col. L. W. Hough, Jr., COOPR 15 Aug 1951. 30. As in n. 29; See Also: Memorandum for File, 10 Jun 1951 (DOC 143); USAF to ADC, "DEW M!cO Contractor-Air Force Relationship," n.d. (DOC 144). 31. As in n. 21. 32. 1st Ind, (ARne to CONAD, "(U) Final Report DEW System Improvement Plan," 30 Jan 1951, CONAD to ARDC, w/1 Inc1, 19 Mar 1951 (DOC 145)• 33. As in n. 2; 1stInd (USAF to ADC, "(U) Implementation of DEW Operational Plan," 14 Nov 1956), CONAD to ADC, w/1 Inc1, 29 Nov 1956 (DOC 146); 1st Ind (USAF to EWOWG, "DEW Line and Mid-Canada Line Operations Plan," 11 lohr 1957), EWOWG to C/S, USAF, 11 Apr 1951 (DOC 141). . . 34 •.' - USAF to CONAD, It (UNCLASSIFIED) DEW Identification Requirements," 24 lolLy 1951 (DOC 148); CONAp to ADC, "DEW Identification Requirements," 29 May 1951 (DOC 149); Msg., CONAD to CAS, CANAmHED, 28 lohy 1951 (OOC 150). Also see: 3rd Ind (USAF to ADC, It (U) Implementation of DEW Operational Plan," 14 Nov 1956), CONAD to ADC, w/1 !nel, 30 Apr 1951 (DOC 151); EWOWG to CONAD, "(U) Minutes, Early Warning Operations Working Group," 8 Feb 1957 (DOC. 152); Mag•., CANAIRHED.. '~o Are and CONAD, 10 Jun 1951 (DOC 153); Mag., C/S, USAF to .~, et aI, 3 Jun 1951 (DOC 154)• • • . UNCLA S ~IED,
Page 150
.' ,.. REFEREX!E NOTES FOR PAGES 65-70 SIF E j 35. CONAD, "CONAD's Proposed Change II 2 to Operations Plan for Distant Early Warning and Mid-Canada Lines," n.d. (DOC 155); Also see n. 27. As in n. 28. 37. Biat CONAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, p 40. 38: Ibid.; Interview with Com:lr~ King, NAVFORCONAD, 26 Jun 1957; Msg, CINCLANT to CINCSAC, 2bApr 1957 (DOC 156); Mag., CINCLANTFLT to COMASDEFORLANT, 2 Jul 1957 (DOC 157). Also see: CINCLANTFLT to Comir Atlantic Barrier, "Atlantic Barrier Picket Stations, Change in Geographic Location," 6 Jun 1957 (DOC 158); Mag., CONAD to CINCLANT, 26 Apr 1957 (D)C 159); Mag., JEADF to CONAD, 15 Nov 1956 (DOC 160); Mag., COMASDEFORLANT to CO~FECR, 3 Jul 1951 (DOC 161). 39. Mag., USAF to ADC, 1 Jun 1951 (DOC 162); Mag., NEACOM to IAOF, 23 Aug 1956 (DOC 163). See also: Mag., COMNEACOM to Comir. Griffis AFB, 14 Aug 1956 (DOC 164); Mag, NEACOM to AFIR HAR, 4 Sep 1956 (DOC 165); Mag., CINCOHAD to CINCLANT, wll Incl, 23 Jan 1951 (DOC 166); Mag., COMNEACOM to cIs, USAF, 19 Jan 1951 (DOC 161); Mag, CINCONAD to cIs, USAF, 15 Mar 1957 (DOC 168). 40." Mag., CINCONAD to COMNEAC, 16 Jan 1951 (DOC 169)• .For a.dditional information see: CINCLANT to CINCONAD, "Operation of the Atlantic Seaward Extensions of The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line," 21 Feb 1951 (DOC 110); CINCLANT to CINCONAD, "Atlantic Ex tension of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line," 19 Jul 1956 (DOC 111); Mag., CINCAL to CINCONAD, 1 Sep 1956 (DOC 112); Msg., CINCONAD to CINCPAC, 10 Dec 1956 (DOC 113); Mag., CINCONAD to CINCPAC, 10 Dec 1956 (DOC 114); Mag., CONAD to ~ and ADES ProJ Off, 8 Aug 1956 (DOC 115); Msg., CINCONAD to cIs, USAF, 4 Feb 1951 (DOC 116); Msg., CINCONAD to CINCLANT, 18 Apr 1951 (DOC 117); CONAD to CINCLANT, "Operation of the At lantic Seaward Extension of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line," 3 May 1951 (DOC 118); CINCLANT to eNO, "Atlantic Barrier COJlllirunications with Air Defense Commanders," 18 Sep 1956 (DOC 179); Mag., CINCOHAD to CINCSAC, wll !ncl, n.d. (DOC 180). 41. CONAD Hist. Ref. Paper No.2, Air Defense of Alaska, 1940-1957, pp 34-37; Hist CONAD/ ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, pp 39-40. 42. Msg., USAF to CINCONAD, 2 May 1951 (DOC 181). 43. Mag., AJoC to cIs, USAF, 12 Apr 1957 (DOC 182). 44. Msg., CINCONAD to cIs, USAF, 10 Apr 1951 (DOC 183). I ~\ 45 ; -' Mag., CINCPACFLT to CINCONAD, 22 lohy 1957 (DOC 184); Msg., CINCAL to CINCONAD, 22 ).By 1951 (DOC 185); Mag., CINCONAD to CINCPAC, 8 May 1951 (DOC 186). 46. Mag., USAF to CINCONAD, 28 May 1951 (DOC 181). 41. Interview with Lt. Col. L. W. Hough, Jr., COOPR, 21 Aug 1951. 48. CINCPACFLT to Distribution List, "LBarrieiJ," 20 Jun 1951 (DOC 188); Interview with COmir. King, NAVFORCONAD, 26 Jun 1957. See also: Mag., CINCONAD to CFCCR and CFWCR, 25 Jun 1951 (DOC 189). 49. CONAD to cIs, USAF, "(SECRET) Continuation of the Pacific Extension of The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line South From Midway," 14 Jan 1951 (DOC 190). 50. As in n. 26~ 51. Interview with w/Corriir R. V. z.tmning, RCAF/MJC Liaison Group, 21 Aug 1957. .5: .' ~.; Mag., CANAIRDEF COC to CANAIRHED, 2 Jun 1951 (DOC 191); Mag., CANAIRDEF to ADC . . , . . - ~.- :-: ( ) "'---- ..--: . r UNCLASSIFIED · 114 )i ~~Ecn'··.
Page 151
.~ I , • • ., • • .-: 20 Jun 1951 Mag., CANAIRDEF to CONAD and ADC, 20 Jun 1951 (DOC 193). and CONAD, EIGHT L CONADR 55-8, "States of Alert for Air Defense Units," 31 May 1956 (DOC 330, Hist CONAD/ ADC, Jan-Jun 1956 ). 2. Mag., CONAD to CINCAL, 3 Dec 1956 (DOC 194); Bist CONAD/Are, Jan-Jun 1956, p. 68; Mag., CINCONAD to CFECR, 21 Jan 1956 (DOC 195); Mag., CrnCONAD to CFECR, 15 Jan 1951 (DOC 196 ); Mag., CONAD to JWADF, 1 Jan 1957 (DOC 191). 3. ADC to CONAD, "(Unclassified) Revised ADC Plan," 16 Oct 1956 (DOC 198); CONAD to cIs, USAF, "Revised Continental Air Defense Planning," 5 Sep 1956 (DOC 199); ADC to CONAD, "(Unclassified) ADC Revised Plan," 10 Oct 1956 (DOC 200); 1st Ind (ADC to CONAD, "(Un classified) Revised ADC Plan," 15 Oct 1956) CONAD ToO ADC, 16 Nov 1956 (DOC 201); Drart ltr, n.d. (DOC 202); Memo for the Record, 6 Aug 1956 (DOC 203). See also: Mag., CINCONAD to CFECR, 15 Jan 1951 (DOC 196); CONAD to JEADF, "(Uncl) Proposed CONAD Regu lation 55-8," 9 Jan: 1951 (DOC 204); CONAD to AOC ADC/RCAF, "(Unclassified) Alert Re quirements for Air Defense Units During Normal Preparedness," 1 Feb 1951 (DOC 2(5). 4. DF, COCOC to COOOP-T, "(Unc1as) Proposed CONAD R~gu1ation 55-8," 16 Jan 1951 (DOC 206); DF, COOOP to COOPO, "(Unclassified) Proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8," 2 Jan 1951 (DOC 2f17). 5. 1st Ind (CONAD to USARADCOM, "(Unclassified) Proposed CONAD Re~tion 55-8 (u)," 9 Jan 1957), USARADCOM to CONAD, 21 Jan 1957 (DOC 208); 1st Ind (CONAD to Are, "(U) Proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8," 9 Jan 1957), ADC to CONAD, 24 Jan 1951 (DOC 209); NAVFORCONAD to CONAD, "Comments on Proposed CONAD Regulation 55-8," 24 Jan 1951 (DOC 210). .., 6. CONADR 55-8, "(Unclassified)· Alert Requirements for Air Defense Units During Normal Preparedness," 1 loBr 1951 (DOC 211); CONADR 55-8A, "Alert Requirements for Air De fense Units During Normal Preparedness," 3 Jun 1951 (DOC 212); Mag., CONAD to ADC, et a1, 23 May 1951 (DOC 213); DF, cococ to COOOP-T, "Proposed Message Change to CONADR 55-8," 6 May 1951 (DOC 214); DF, COOOP to COOPO, "Proposed Message Change to COBADR 55-8," 15 May 1951 (DOC 215). Hist CONAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, pp 68-69; Interview with loilJ. C. W. Knott, COOOP-T, 2 1· JUl 1951. 8. CONADR 55-8, 1 t-Br 1951 (DOC 211); Hist CONAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, p 68. 9· Bist CONAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, p 69; CONADR 55-8, 1 t-Br 1957 (DOC 211). 10. CONADR 55-6, "Rules of Engagement," 13 May 1951 (DOC 211); Mag., CINCAL to CINCONAD, 19 Dec 1956 (DOC 216)~ 11. Msg., CINCONAD to cIs, USAF, 14 loilr 1956 (DOC 218); Mag., CINCONAD to cIs, USAF, 4 Jan 1951 (DOC 219); CONAD to USARADCOM and ADC, "Vandenberg-Collins and Chidlaw-Levis Agreements, n 28 Mar 1951 (DOC 220); Msg., CrnCONAD to CFECR, et a1, 11 Jun 1957 (DOC 221); CONADR 55-6, 13 May 1951 (DOC 211). . 12. Mag., CONAD to CFECR, 19 ·Jun 1951 (DOC 222); Mag., CONAD to CFECR, et al, 24 Jun 1951 (DOC 223); 2nd Ind (15th AF to SAC, "Draft Regulation: Control of Ground.-to-Air Weapons, Fairchild Air Force Base," 12 Feb 1951), CONAD to SAC, 25 Jun 1957 (DOC 224); CONADR 55-6, 13 May 1957 (DOC 211). 13. RCAF/ADC, Air Stai'f Instructions 2/5, "Fighter Aircra1't Interception, Identification and Engagement Procedures of Unknown Aircraft for Use Over Canada Prior to a DeclaratioD - - ...---- --- --- .. -- .. UNCLASSIFTFn
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UCfASSIFIED. .lieo"e"Mftlrrl ~.,.. REFERENCE NOTES FOR PAGES 78-83 of a state of Emergency," 1 Dec 1956 (DOC 225). 14. ' Interview with Maj. T. C. Schieb~l, COOOP-T, 27 Jun 1957; ASI 2/5, 15 June 1957 (DOC 226); 3d Ind (31st ADiv to ADC, "Rules for Interception and Engagement by Fighter Air craft in Canada," 4 Oct 1956), CONAD to ADC, 9 Nov 1956 (DOC 227); CONAD to AOC RCAFI ADC, "(SECRET) Interception, Identification and Engagement of Unknown Aircraft over Canada-AS I 2/5," 16 Oct 1956 (DOC 228); Mag., CONAD to CFECR, et al, 5 Jun 1957 (DOC 229); Mag., CANAIRDEF to CONAD, 27 t-hy 1957 (DOC 230); Mag., CONAD to CFECR, et al, 6 Mar 1957 (DOC 231); Mag., CONAD to cis, USAF, 26 Jun 1957 (DOC 232). 15. CONAD to USARADCOM, "(Unclas) Coordination of Antiaircraft Defense Plans for Border Areas," 19 Nov 1956 (DOC 233); "Rules" RCAF, 14 Jun 1957 (DOC 234); CONADR 55-6,13 May 1957 (DOC 217); Interview with Maj. T. C. Schiebel, COOOP-T, 5 Jul 1957. 16. CONADR 55-12, "Military Air Defense Warning System Operation," 31 Aug 1956 (DOC 235); CONADR 55-12, "Military Air Defense Warning System," 3 May 1957 (DOC 236); CONADR 55-3, 1 Nov 1956 (HRF)j CONADR 55-3, 29 Feb 1956 (HRF). 17. CONADR 55-12, 3 r.By 1957 (DOC 236). For additional information see: Mag., CONAD to CINCSAC, 10 Jul 1956 (DOC 237); Mag., CINCONAD to COMFLDCOMD AF SWPH, 10 Jul 1956 (DOC 238); CONAD to EADF, "(U) MA.DW in the SAGE Era," 17 Jul 1956 (DOC 239). 18. cis, USAF to CONAD, "Change in Civil Defense Attack Warning Organizations," 7 Jan 1957 (DOC 240); CFWCR to CONAD, "Change to CONAD Regulation 21-1; 21 December 1956, and CONAD Regulation 55-3, 1 November 1955," 20 ~ 1957 (DOC 241). 19. CONADR 55-16, "Exercises," 19 Jun 1957 (DOC 242). 20. Maj. Gen. Jarred V. Crabb to Gen. E. E. Partridge, w/l-Incl, 11 Jan 1957 (DOC 243). j 21. DF, ocs/p&.o to CINCONAD, "October Exercise," 9 Oct 1956 (COOOP-E Files); Mag., CINCONAD to JWADF, 9 Oct 1956 (COOOP-E Files); DF, COOPO to COELC, "'Party Line' Film COllllren tary," 12 Mar 1957 (DOC 244); Hist CONAD/ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, p 21 22. DF, COOOP to ocs/p&o, "Report of Staff Visit," 14 Dec 195b (DOC 245); Mag., SAC to COMAF 2, 13 Apr 1957 (DOC 246); Mag., COMAF 15 to COMEW' 28, et al, 16 Jan 1957 (DOC 247); Msg., CINCSAC to COMAF 2, 25 Oct 1956 (DOC 248); Mag., CINCSAC to COMAF 2, et al, 7 Jan 1957 (DOC 249); Msg., CINCSAC to CINCONAD, et al, 30 Nov 1956 (DOC 250); Mag., CINCONAD to CINCSAC, 3 Jan 1957 (DOC 251); SAC to CONAD, "(Uncl) Operational Exercise of' the Air Def'ense System," 2 Mar 1957 (DOC 252); Msg., CINCONAD to ADC, et al, 30 Nov 1956 (DOC 253); Mag., CINCSAC to CINCONAD, 28 May 1957 (DOC 254). 23. CONAD to SAC, "(Uncl) Exercises," 25 Jan 1957 (DOC 255); DF, COOPO to COHCS, "(Uncl) Summary Report on Exercise 'Bald Eagle'," 20 May 1957 (DOC 256); CFWCR to CONAD, "(Unclassified) Summary Report on Exercise ':Bald Eagle'," 29 Apr 1957 (DOC 257); 1st I Ind (34th ADiv (Def') to CFCCR, "Report on Exercise ':Bald Eagle' (Uncl)," 11 Apr 1957), I creCR to CONAD, 18 Apr 1957 (DOC 258); CFECR to CONAD, "(Uncl) Summary Report of Exercise 'Ball Hawk'," 24 May 1957 (DOC 259). For additional inf'ormation on the ECM exercises see: DF, COOPO to COHCS, "(Uncl) Commmders .Summary Report of Exercise 'Dawn Patrol r ," 5 Apr 1957 (DOC 260); CFECR to CONAD, "(Uncl) Summary Report of' Exer cise 'Dawn Patrol' (EADF 'Green Field')," 22 Mar 1957 (DOC 261); USARADCOM to CONAD, "SAC ECM MiSSion 'Green Field r ," 3 Apr 1957 (DOC 262). .~ 24. CONAD to NAVFORCONAD, "(Unclassified) Cancellation of Large Scale ExerCises, 4th Quarter FY 1957," 11 Dec 1956 (DOC 263); JWADF to CONAD," (Unclassified) Report of JWADF Participation in Exercise HOP SCO~H," 11 Ju1 1956 (DOC 590 in JWADF Hist Jan Jun 1956); CFWCR to CONAD, "Evaluation of Exercise HOME RUN, II 5 Ju1 1957 (DOC 264); Mag., CFWCR to 25th ADiv, et al, 30 May 1957 (DOC 265); 2nd Ind (ClId. First Fleet to JWADF, "Joint Western Air Defense Force Pa.rticipation in Naval Exercises; invitation for," 30 Jan 1957, CONAD to CCFWCR, 7 JoBr 1957 (roc 266). UJCLASS FI II 41 116
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FI 1. CONAD to cis, USAF, "CONAD Objectives Plan 56-66," 20 Dec 1956 (DOC 261). 2. Ibid. 3. CONAD to cis, USAF, "CADOP 56-66," 17 Apr 1951 (DOC 268); CONAD to cis, USAF, "Request for Approval of Nike Deployment Pl.a.ns for FY 1959," 5 Jun 1951 (DOC 269); Mag., CINCONAD to cis, USAF, 28 Jan 1951 (DOC 270). 4. Memo for the Record, Lt. Col. o. E. Griest, CONAD P&:R, to CONAD to cis, USAF, "CONAD Deployment Plan 1959," 6 Aug 1957, wll Incl. (DOC 271). \ 5. Ibid., Incl., "CONAD Plans and. Service Programs, n to CONAD to cis, USAF, " CONAD De ployment Plan," 6 Aug 1951 • .6. CONAD to cis, USAF, "Defense Against Ballistic Missiles," 7 !ohr 1951 vll DF (DOC 272). 7. CONAD to cis, USAF, "Continental Air Defense Requirements," 14 Jun 1951 (DOC 273). J 1· 1 I • • UNCLAS IFIED '68N F '8[fiflAt
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Record
- Author / institution
- NORAD / Continental Air Defense Command
- Date
- 1957
- Source type
- Official operational history
- Used for
- CASE-085 operational context and intercept chronology
- Limitations
- Cross-check intercept chronology against the Blue Book file